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**About Good Governance Worldwide (Africa Symposia Issue)**

Good Governance Worldwide (GGW) is a website publication/journal of the Public Management Practice Section of American Society for Public Administration (ASPA). The Africa Symposia Issue is the first in the series of symposia issue of the GGW. Otherwise referred to as GGW-A, the Africa Symposia Issue focuses on governance, public policy and politics in Africa. With articles received from experts in the fields of African studies and other related areas, the symposia issue deals thematically with the contemporary challenges of good governance and development in the public and social spaces of the African continent.

The GGW-A is an open access, peer reviewed, multidisciplinary publication, which is committed to expanding the base of African studies in general and governance and public administration in particular. The journal and symposia issue are aimed at advancing the cause of robust intellectual conversations through informed research, analyses and commentaries.

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Abstract
With over 250 ethnic groups, Nigeria is one of the world's most ethnically diverse countries (The World Factbook). Its ethno-religious plurality has however been the bane of its nationhood as the country has wobbled from one crisis to another at various stages of its post-colonial history under the full weight of its fractious diversity. Stunted by decades of unrelenting corruption and governance failure, Nigeria faces its worst threat to date in the form of multiple violent ethnic agitations for self-determination. The rise of ethnic militancy revolves around complaints about the politics of exclusiveness, inequitable resource allocation, and perceived domination of the country by one ethnic group. Yet some scholars view the ethnic insurgency as no more than a ploy to subsume the larger interest of the people under the competing interests of rival elites of the various ethnic groups (Joseph, 2014). Successive Nigerian governments have tried to no avail different methods to tackle the challenge, including financial appeasement. It has become apparent that treating the symptoms rather than the disease itself threatens the corporate existence of Nigeria. Employing the descriptive-narrative approach, this article examined the challenge of ethno-religious diversity in Nigeria and argued that socio-economic and political restructuring anchored on the devolution of power could be useful in resolving the country’s ethno-religious conundrum.

Keywords: Ethnicity, Militancy, Religion, Security, Terrorism.
Introduction

Before 1914, when Lord Frederick Lugard amalgamated Nigeria into one administrative unit to enhance effective control by the British colonialists, the geographical space comprised a few hundred disparate ethnic groups that were largely autonomous. There were some interactions among some of them in the form of trading relations and in some cases, wars of conquest, but they were largely independent ethnic enclaves, except for a substantial part of northern Nigeria which had been brought under Fulani domination after the 1808 conquest. The first major colonial era challenge that Nigeria’s multi-ethnic composition had to face together was the struggle for political independence in the 1950s, which brought together leaders of the different ethnic groups in pursuit of a common goal. However, this was marked by a measure of distrust and fear of domination by one over the other. For instance, the predominantly Muslim but educationally disadvantaged Hausa-Fulani people of northern Nigeria were unsure of the designs of the southern Nigerian ethnicities.

By the time the British colonialists left, and Nigeria gained political independence in 1960, ethnicization had become the measuring rod for determining the contribution to national development effort and especially for allocating and distributing power and national resources. Ethnicity is a situation where a group of people, no matter how small, with different cultural and linguistic attributes from those of its neighbors, uses this as the basis of solidarity and interaction with others. The group regards itself as a distinct group and for itself (Anugwom, 2000). This has led some scholars to describe the British unification of Nigeria as an over-ambitious agenda that showed scant regard for natural ethnic boundaries and the major cultural and religious differences between the ethnic groups (Deng, 1997; Mutua, 1995; Oko 1998). This has led to the popular belief among Nigerians that Nigeria is not a nation in the real sense of it, but a mere geographical expression created by British expansionism (Anugwom, 2000; Joseph, 2014).

Managing ethnicity and its handmaiden, religion, has been at the heart of Nigeria’s political instability. Nigeria, with over 374 ethnic groups, is one of the world's most ethnically diverse countries (Ukiwo, 2005). Unsurprisingly, Nigeria’s post-colonial history has been one long struggle among competing ethnic blocs seeking unfettered access to state wealth through a struggle for political power. This is for the simple reason that in Nigeria, whether under a democratic rule
or military rule, the ethnic group in control of power at the center determines who gets what, when, and how from the national cake.

In recent years, Nigeria has witnessed an upsurge of militant groups claiming to fight over perceived socioeconomic, ethnic, political, and religious injustice. According to Joseph (2014), Nigeria's underlying political and social systems had yielded ongoing concern with how specific ethnic interests are characterized and benefits distributed.

Ukiwo (2005) stated that the major problem with these pioneering studies on ethnicity is that they are state-centered, elite based, and proceed on the assumption that the history of the Nigerian people started with the arrival of the British. According to Anugwom (2000), the concept of ethnicity is a preferred attempt in capturing the nature of differences and conflicts among socioculturally distinct groups in Nigeria. Anugwom affirmed that ethnicity contains an obscured class component that is often viewed as a tool for the elite members of society to hold on to their privileges to the detriment of others outside of their groups. Anugwom further argued that Ethnic factors might be seen as responsible for the confusion and distrust that marked this first attempt at democracy, especially towards the end of 1965. Given the intensity of ethnic sentiments and sectionalism, the First Republic was destined for a brief life as it was terminated by the Nigerian Civil War, which started on July 6, 1967. The Civil War ended on January 15, 1970, and was viewed as an ethnic war against the Ibo insurgency, according to Omaka (2014). The former Eastern Region of Nigeria seceded from Nigeria. It declared its independence on May 30, 1967, following the massacre of the Igbo people who were living in the northern parts of Nigeria. The dominant argument in the historiography of the Nigeria-Biafra War, both within academia and the popular media, is that the Igbo ethnic group was targeted for extermination by the Muslim north. Ukiwo (2005) asserted that ethnicity was a weapon adopted and perfected by regionally based elites in their struggle to acquire state power and the wealth it guarantees. Ordinary Nigerians had nothing against each other. It was the elite that mobilized them against one another. The case of Bornu, where the political and traditional elite spoke out against hostilities towards the Ibo and therefore prevented anti-Ibo sentiments from spreading to the Bornu area, is often cited as signifying the agency of the elite. Omaka (2014) also asserted that the ethnic minority groups in Biafra include, but are not limited to, Efik, Ibibio, and Ijaw, located along the Eastern border and
the oil-rich southern coast. They are found in the present-day Cross River, Akwa-Ibom, Rivers, and Bayelsa States, forming a more significant part of the area now known as the Niger Delta region. In 1966, they constituted about 40 percent of the population of Biafra, formerly Eastern Nigeria, while the Igbo made up the remaining 60 percent. Although these designated minority ethnic groups belonged to the Igbo-dominated Biafra, they still maintained their distinct ethnic identities throughout the war. All the minority ethnic groups had their separate historical origin, distinct language, and cultural practices. During the war, mainstream media did not cover reports on atrocities perpetrated against the ethnic minorities in Biafra, both by the Nigerian military forces and the Biafran militias.

**Theoretical Perspective**

Since the 1950s, four main approaches have underlined the study of ethnicity, namely primordialism, instrumentalism, materialism, and constructionism. The primordialist approach tends to see ethnicity as a cultural and identity issue that is innate, fixed, and permanent, and these cultural differences and divergent values in a pluralistic society drive a clash of cultures and inevitably, ethnic violence.

The instrumentalist approach to ethnicity on the other hand emerged as a challenge to the primordialist approach. According to Barth (1998) ethnicity rather than being innate emanates from individuals emphasizing forms of cultural differentiation that they consider important, this differentiation is situationally defined, and it is conducted through the prism of us versus them.

Another challenge to the primordialist approach came from a group of anthropologists known as the Manchester School, which developed the instrumentalism of ethnic affiliation. Abner Cohen (1969) who studied the Yoruba of southwestern Nigeria and the Hausa ethnic group in northern Nigeria suggested that the principal function of ethnicity lies in its use by the competing political elites by using ethnic and primordial symbols to rally followers to their sides in their bid seize power, protect privileges, and defend against group threats (Fearon & Laitin 2000; Kaufmann 2005).

Equally important in the ethnicity debate is the materialist approach to ethnicity. Drawing from the Marxian paradigm, the materialist approach examines ethnicity from the standpoint of class
relations and that ethnic violence is a result of economic inequalities and elitist exploitation (Michael Hechter (1978). The constructionist approach which is not too dissimilar to the instrumentalist approach argued that ethnicity is a social construct, and this social creation is reflected in the actions of individuals who may see themselves as belonging to an ethnic identity that serves as a basis for interacting with other people to propagate, confirm or contest the identity (Fearon & Laitin, 2000).

All the approaches above efficaciously examined the nature and character of ethnicity. There is however another way to examine the dynamics of ethnicity, especially from Nigeria’s troubled history and that is by scrutinizing ethnicity from the political economy point of view. In proposing the ethnic threat theory, we recognized that ethnicity, like race, is a social construct providing paradigms for understanding the dynamics of demography and population diversity and its impact on the political economy of any given state.

This study adopts the critical race theory and racial threat theory as two of its analytical frameworks. Critical race theory is a social construction thesis that holds that race is not objective, inherent, or fixed. Neither does it correspond to biological or genetic reality; instead, races are categories that society invents, manipulates, or retires when convenient, particularly in the United States where being black is frequently a life sentence of cultural isolation and social invisibility. (DeGruy, 2005; Trevino, Harris & Wallace, 2008; Delgado & Stefancic, 2012). In related research, Hacker (2010) identified what seems to be a deep-seated and often unconscious nature of racism rooted in the psyche of an average American, which reflects itself in the beliefs of one superior and the other inferior. Hjerm and Nagayoshi (2011) affirmed that people make group or ethnic classifications with political and economic saliency. They are more likely to benefit their group over other groups in the struggle for scarce resources due to the desired status of the hierarchy of different groups. In mirroring this with the Nigerian situation, ethnicity in Nigeria's polity is not objective, inherent, or fixed. Ethnicity is an invention of the ruling class (the elites) to manipulate the citizens for the continuous hold on power and economic levers. The outcome of each group's desire to acquire these scarce resources for their selfish, elitist desires often results in ethnic insurgencies (Odey & Akah, 2023).
We also draw on the theoretical postulations of the racial threat theory. In the United States, race and ethnicity provide a level of analysis for explaining the struggle for the appropriation of, and competition for limited resources. Consequently, the racial threat theory expounded by Blalock (1976) and others provides a theoretical framework for understanding how population composition influences the nature and character of racial dominance. In the United States, the dominant white race maintains its control over state resources using social controls and other discriminatory practices.

Blalock’s (1967) minority-majority relationship perspective of minority threat theory shows how racialized competition for resources is at the heart of the discrimination, which has been an integral part of the historical evolution of the United States as various races and ethnic groups engage in a continuous struggle for access to scarce resources. Blalock postulated three ways in which racial threat manifest-economic threat, political threat, and symbolic threat. Here, the focus is on how racial threat theory explains the discriminatory practices in the criminal justice system in that a large minority population threatens the interests of the majority group, who then respond politically by demanding, among other things, increased social control (Blalock, 1967). This is in agreement with the research which shows that Americans of European descent tend to be more anxious about crime which reflects in negative stereotypes about people of color areas that have large minority populations (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Chiricos, McEntire, & Gertz, 2001; Golden, 2012; Pickett, Chiricos, Golden, & Gertz, 2012; Quillian & Pager, 2010).

In the same vein, the ethnic threat theory is about domination but with ethnicity as the unit of analysis. This aligns with Williams’ ethnic fears’ perspective whereby the political and other elites of different ethnic groups stoke mass fear and hatred of other ethnic groups through the mass media and other propaganda platforms in order to further their political and economic interests (Williams, 2016). This use of ethnic solidarity by the elite often has nothing to do with the interest of the people involved. But like religion, ethnic solidarity is a powerful emotional weapon that ethnic leaders have learned to use to whip members of an ethnic group into mass hysteria in the pursuit of the defense of some ethnic pride or interests.
In the course of Nigerian history dating back to political independence, many examples suffice to show how inter-ethnic threats and competition among the country’s selfish political elites have shaped the nation’s history.

**Literature Review**

The nature of Nigerian society and the dynamics of its politics is circumscribed by ethnic solidarity. The only rival to ethnic identification among the various ethnic groups that make up Nigeria is arguably religion. Even then, religious affiliation often kowtows to ethnic influence as the church or mosque many Nigerians identify with, is often by and large, affected by the ethnicity of the leadership of the religious organization, and the filial identification of its membership.

The quest by the various ethnic groups in Nigeria for greater political inclusiveness is no doubt a legitimate claim. However, none is as strident as the Igbos of southeastern Nigeria for access to the highest political office in the country. Five decades since the fratricidal 1967-1970 civil war, complaint of marginalization and restriction of access to the highest political office in the country has continued un-assuaged. This has led to strident demands for self-determination and the attendant inter-ethnic tension. Yet, the long-term survival of the Nigerian state requires not just closure on the civil war by engendering a sense of belonging among all Nigerians but also political compromise to assure all ethnic groups of full acceptance as equal partners in the Nigerian project (Yerima, et al, 2016). Such a step is likely to significantly reduce the growing threats to national cohesion and ameliorate the acute mistrust, fears, and unhealthy rivalry that have heightened ethnic conflict in the country (Igwara, 2001; Shehu, et al, 2017).

Of the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria, the Hausa-Fulani of the north have held political power at the center for 37 years, the Yoruba of the southwest for 11 years, and Igbos of the south-east for only three years since Nigeria attained political independence in 1960. This situation has bred ill-feeling, a sense of marginalization, and neglect. It’s a situation that many agreed requires urgent redress, given that Nigeria’s lopsided federalism confers an undue advantage to whichever ethnic group has the levers of power in terms of the distribution of political largesse.

However, while ethnic solidarity has often elicited tremendous emotional reactions and threats to national cohesion in the inter-ethnic jostling for relevance and dominance, we must never lose
sight of the fact that class struggle remains at the epicenter of Nigeria’s current underdevelopment and the unrelenting frustration and resentment across the country. It is an open secret that the pursuit of class interests in Nigeria often involves a great emphasis on ethnic symbols, solidarity, and boundaries in the struggle for wealth and power (Joseph, 2014). The use of ethnicity as a tool for political power struggle has since political independence in 1960 been a foil by the competing political elites of all ethnic nationalities in the country in their pursuit of wealth and power. The politicization of ethnicity has however undermined development and promoted mediocrity since representation in leadership positions is mostly on the basis of ethnic or regional origin rather than merit and ability (Ebegbulem, 2011).

The Marxian analysis of class struggle revolves around the exploitation of labor by capital, but in the Nigerian context, politics rather than economics often determine everything—who gets what, when, and how. The nature and character of the Nigerian political elite which is composed of individuals from virtually all ethnic groups since political independence is unproductive, parasitic, self-seeking, and hell-bent on the criminal appropriation of public funds. It is no coincidence that bitter ethnic struggles for political power go hand in hand with wanton looting of the public treasury. This is so because the competing elite uses ethnic consciousness as camouflage to advance their narrow, selfish interests (Joseph, 2014).

The appeal to primordial sentiment is a tool with multi-various advantages for the average Nigerian politician. With nominal federalism which functions more like a unitary governmental structure with enormous political and economic power invested in a president who also presides over the nation’s wealth, the presidency holds an irresistible allure for everyone. The struggle for political power attains a do-or-die dimension and the elite from different ethnic groups often resort to ethnic solidarity to attain or hold on to political power. At the root of this desperate ethnic struggle for political power is the quest to have unfettered control of state resources and determine their allocation and distribution (Adetiba, 2013).

The failure of the Nigerian state as a consequence of unbridled elite greed has forced the majority of Nigerians of all ethnic groups to live in sub-human conditions, whether their kinsman is in power or not. Whether it is the impoverished north, the environmentally polluted oil-rich Niger
Delta, the infrastructurally deficient southwest, or long-neglected south-eastern Nigeria, the common denominators among the dirt-poor Nigerian masses is indescribable poverty, squalor, and lack of access to basic amenities in a country blessed with enormous resources.

A cursory examination of five and a half decades of political leadership in Nigeria however reveals an open secret. Nigeria’s long-term problem is not ethnicity but bad leadership, corruption, impunity, and a failure of governance that has been masked by an inter-ethnic struggle for political power and wealth. It is ironic for instance that while the north has held political power for 37 years, it remains the poorest part of the country to date. Olusegun Obasanjo’s eight-year presidency did not benefit his Yoruba kinsmen beyond a few cronies. Goodluck Jonathan’s six-year presidency was underlined by the notion that a Niger Delta indigene would be better placed to address the persistent complaints of marginalization from the oil-rich region. Ironically but not unexpectedly, the beneficiaries of the Niger Delta ethnonationalism were members of the local political elite and a few agitators who engaged in personal enrichment with funds meant for developmental projects in the region at the expense of their people (Gilbert, 2013). If anything, the infrastructural deficit in the region is worse today than when Jonathan was sworn in as president in 2006.

Without addressing the failure of governance that has stunted socioeconomic development and created nationwide anger, Nigeria will continue to wallow in underdevelopment and the collateral consequences associated with it. Alongside political integration, it is imperative to address accountability in governance, strengthen political institutions that are meant to provide checks and balances, and embark on devolution of power to make the Nigerian presidency less attractive and reduce the inter-ethnic struggle for political power. According to Nnoli (2003), resolving the ethnic question must begin with good governance focusing on consensus building, dialogue, and an unwavering commitment to the ideals of a true democracy. Anything else will only lead to a slow but irreversible collapse of the Nigerian state.

In a country plagued by deep-rooted ethnoreligious differences, the fierce ethnic competition for access to state resources has resulted in the creation of ethnic militias designed to aggressively pursue narrow ethnic agenda. Their existence has weakened the country, created a situation of perpetual political instability, and made the likelihood of sustainable national cohesion virtually
unattainable (Akinyele, 2001). While they all appear ostensibly to have a common goal of safeguarding ethnic interests and pursuit of self-determination, their activities have crystallized as deadly competition by the elites of the different ethnic groups for power struggle and unfettered access to national wealth. Yet it is a class agenda that has no place for the interests of the common people whose only usefulness is to be whipped into an emotional frenzy and used as cannon fodders to pursue the thinly disguised selfish agenda of the elite. The Nigerian elite is a selfish class of people with a grandiose sense of entitlement. As Olaiya (2016) succinctly argued, ethnicity will not have had the corrosive effect it has had on the underdevelopment of Nigeria if the Nigerian political elite had not seen it as a veritable tool to mobilize and whip their kinsmen into a frenzy to attain selfish political and economic advantages.

It has been argued for example that the armed conflict in the oil-rich Niger Delta was not so much about environmental degradation and deprivation as it is about elite manipulation and demand for reconfiguration of political power to accommodate the Ijaws at the highest level of Nigeria’s political leadership, one which was satisfied by the emergence of President Goodluck Jonathan upon which region returned to normalcy (Aaron, 2015). Meanwhile, neither the Niger Delta pollution nor the people’s plight received more than a nodding attention during the six-year presidency of Jonathan, from the Nigerian state and the multinational oil companies extracting oil from the region. The leading militants became overnight billionaires by exploiting the plight of their people for selfish purposes, while the region is no better than during the pre-conflict era nor the people better off.

Despite the cacophony about self-determination, the common people of all ethnic groups in Nigeria continue to lack basic amenities to make life bearable (Ucha, 2010). Infrastructural decay in Nigeria is worse today than it was at political independence some five decades and a half ago (Ogbeidi, 2012). Wanton looting by both the political and the military elite is an endemic problem that has defied solutions in the light of weak political and social institutions (Ogbeidi, 2012; Ucha, 2010).

Ethnic agitation arises from a lack of inclusiveness and fear of marginalization. But the rise of ethnic militias in Nigeria has remained more or less elite predation and a covert attempt by a few
to corner the commonwealth in the name of their ethnic groups. Since the agitation for self-determination commenced in different parts of the country, nothing has changed in the dire situation of the people. On the contrary, what has so far ensued is a continuation of class interests which has led to the emergence of a new *nouveau riche* among the leading ethnic militants in the different ethnic groups who have exploited their people’s genuine desire for a better life to amass wealth.

**History of Ethnic Agitation in Nigeria**

*Yoruba Agitation for Self-determination*

Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) is at the forefront of the demand for self-determination by the Yoruba ethnic group in Southwestern Nigeria. OPC was birthed in the aftermath of the annulment by the Nigerian military of the 1993 presidential election won by the late Moshood Abiola. His Yoruba kinsmen of southwest Nigeria who make up the second largest ethnic group in Nigeria formed OPC as a movement to protest the annulment and with the aim of protecting Yoruba’s socio-political interests within the Nigerian state (Nolte, 2007). Since attaining political independence in 1960, the three main ethnic groups in the country-Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Ibos- had struggled for political leadership. While the Yoruba could boast of higher literacy and the Ibos are known for their entrepreneurial acumen, it was actually the Hausa-Fulani who made their larger population and control of the military count by taking control of political power for several years.

Between 1960 and 1966 in the aftermath of political independence, the Hausa Fulani controlled the country’s leadership through elections, and when the military overthrew the politicians and took over power in 1966, their control of the military hierarchy ensured that political power remained in the hands of the northerners. Except for a brief period between 1976-1979 when a military leader from the Yoruba ethnic stock was in power, the Hausa Fulani ruled the country. The military organized the 1993 presidential election to return Nigeria to democracy however produced a Yoruba winner, contrary to the expectation of the Hausa Fulani elite, and to perpetuate their hold on power annulled the election.
But while the annulled 1993 presidential election was the immediate trigger that led to the formation of the OPC, decades of misrule, corruption, military dictatorship, and weakening of the state through the bitter struggle by the competing elites of the various ethnic groups had elicited simmering tension arising from the pauperization of the citizenry. There was already full-blown agitation in the oil-rich Niger Delta for resource control by a people impoverished by oil exploitation but whose only reward was environmental degradation rather than the benefits of oil wealth. Elsewhere, the wanton display of wealth by the corrupt political and military elites had corroded the faith of the masses in the government. It was an open secret that the elites were stealing the country blind and access to political offices was like having an open invitation to loot public funds without any fear of rebuke.

Remarkably, the political agenda that precipitated OPC’s emergence eventually succeeded because in 1999, partly through national consensus, the Yoruba agitation for political inclusiveness was rewarded by the emergence of Olusegun Obasanjo as the democratic president of Nigeria. The OPC continues to maintain relevance in southwestern Nigeria by providing some sort of community policing in southwest Nigeria in the guise of a vigilante as a complement to the grossly undermanned Nigeria Police Force. Residents also exhibit more confidence in the crime-fighting capability of the OPC because of its disciplined structure, credibility, and perceived incorruptibility in contrast to the police which is seen as corrupt, ill-equipped, and incompetent (Ikuteyijo & Rotimi, 2012). As a measure of OPC’s effectiveness, many residents will rather report a crime to OPC than the police and the latter has been known to publicly seek the assistance of OPC on several occasions to combat crime given the fact that the OPC elements tend to understand the geographical terrain and the cultural nuances better.

Niger Delta Ethnic Insurgency
The incorporation of different ethnic groups into the Nigerian state by the British colonialists was followed by the integration of these peoples into the emergent global political economy. The trading posts frequented by European traders determined which groups became intermediaries and played dominant roles because of such influence. In the eastern Niger Delta, the Efik of Old Calabar and the Ijaw of Bonny, Kalabari, Nembe, and Opobo dominated the trade. They exploited the Ekoi, Ibibio, and Igbo hinterland as a source of slaves and palm oil and as a market for
European goods (Ukiwo, 2007). Nigeria is also a natural gas producer that accounts for an estimated 22 million tonnes per year, and natural gas exports account for about $4 billion worth of earnings annually. Most of the natural gas is produced from the Niger Delta or its coastal waters. However, this oil- and gas-rich region that generates billions of dollars’ worth of revenues and profits annually is also ironically one of Nigeria's least developed and ethnic conflict-ridden parts (Obi, 2009).

Evans and Kelikume (2019) stated that studies on causes of violent behavior that have led to various forms of insurgency in Nigeria have been largely conceptual while ethnic-linked groups like the Niger Delta militancy, Boko Haram terrorism, and herdsmen attacks have remained far under-researched. Many scholars have argued that some of the violent skirmishes currently experienced in Nigeria today are an offshoot of ethnic prejudice pre- and post-occupation, pervasive corruption, and lack of accountability by elected leaders who monopolize revenue derivations from oil proceeds at the detriment of infrastructural development of oil-producing regions (Evans & Kelikume, 2019). The 1990s witnessed renewed uprising by various ethnic communities of the Niger Delta region against the state and the oil-producing companies. The defining moment of unprecedented unity among Niger Delta social forces was the decision of Niger Delta delegates to walk out of the NPRC in 2005 after northern delegates rejected the proposed 25 percent increase in derivation revenues. The aftermath of the botched conference enhanced the profile of Delta elites as trusted representatives after the turbulent 1990s, which witnessed the decapitation and banishment of some chiefs. Many Delta chieftains and politicians regained relevance at the national level as eminent persons whose good offices were sought to mediate conflicts between youths, the state, and oil companies (Ukiwo, 2011).

The incursion and annihilation of the Odi community in the central Niger Delta by Nigerian soldiers searching for the killers of twelve of their colleagues was a turning point. That this armed onslaught against Odi occurred under a democratic government convinced most hardliners that only armed resistance could counter the extractive and exploitative designs of the government and oil companies and force them to pay attention to local demands. This brought into prominence militia groups such as the Nigeria Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), and the most noted, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
(MEND), and their respective leaders and spokespersons like Asari Dokubo, Ateke Tom, and Gbomo Jomo (Ejobowah, 2000; Obi, 2009; Ukiwo, 2011). More recently, banditry has created an active ransom market through the kidnapping of hapless members of the public, thus handing out considerable financial resources to these groups.

**Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB)**

The issue of self-determination by aggrieved ethnic groups within the Nigerian polity is becoming a constant. According to Chukwudi et al. (2019), the concept of self-determination is a desire of every group as it will undoubtedly prepare them for more significant achievements. The nation is being pulled on all parts from the Islamic insurgencies by the Boko Haram terrorist group in the north. The Western Nigeria Security Network (WNSN) was code-named Amotekun and O'odua People's Congress to the Indigenous People of Biafra in the southeastern part. Ugorji (2017) asserted that the declaration of Biafra's independence caused a bloody war that lasted almost three years (from July 7, 1967, to January 15, 1970) because the Nigerian government did not want a separate Biafran state. Before the end of the war in 1970, it was estimated that over three million people died, and they were either directly killed or starved to death during the war, most of whom were Biafran civilians, including children and women. To create the conditions for the unity of all Nigerians and facilitate the reintegration of Biafrans, the then military head of Nigeria, General Yakubu Gowon, declared no victor vanquished but a victory for common sense and the unity of Nigeria. This declaration was a transitional justice program popularly known as the 3Rs - Reconciliation (Reintegration), Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction. Ugorji (2017) posited that since the postwar transitional justice program was inefficient and failed to address the human rights abuses and genocidal crimes committed against the southeasterners during the war, the painful memories of the war are still fresh in the minds of many Biafrans even over five decades after. War survivors and their families are still suffering from intergenerational trauma.

The early 2000s experienced a new wave of agitation in the southeastern part of Nigeria. The first non-violent social movement to gain public attention is the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), founded by Ralph Uwazuruike, an attorney trained in India. Although the activities of MASSOB led to confrontations with law enforcement at different times and the arrest of its leader, it received little attention from the international media and community.
Concerned that the vision for the independence of Biafra will not be realized through MASSOB, Nnamdi Kanu, a Nigerian-British based in London and born at the end of the Nigeria-Biafra war in 1970, decided to use the evolving mode of social media, which became an effective communication tool, and online radio to drive millions of pro-Biafra independence activists, supporters, and sympathizers to his Biafran cause which led to the formation of the Indigenous People of Biafra (Ugorji, 2017).

The agitations of IPOB and all the strategies used cannot be separated from the political stability of Nigeria. President Muhammadu Buhari responded to these agitations by sending the military, who invaded the residence of the IPOB leader, Nnamdi Kanu, in an operation that was tagged python dance II. The Nigerian federal government has since gone ahead to proscribe IPOB and designate it as a terrorist group through a court judgment. The continuous agitation for the independence of Biafra could be described as a coin with two sides. On one side is labeled the prize that the Igbo ethnic group has paid or will pay for the Biafra independence agitation. On the other side are the benefits of bringing the Biafran issues to the public for a national and international discourse (Ugorji, 2017; Chukwudi, Gberevbie, Abasilim, & Imhonopi, 2019).

**Conclusion**

Ethnic inequity in power and resource sharing continues to undermine Nigeria’s quest for nationhood. In addition, the violence for wealth by ethnic militants is often hijacked by competing Nigerian elite to advance narrow selfish interests. This is used by those seeking to hold on to economic and political power as well as by those seeking accommodation in the continued pillaging of the Nigerian commonwealth. This explains why the inequitable distribution of national wealth among the diverse ethnic groups and between social classes continues to exacerbate ethnoreligious tension in the Nigerian political space. This is an intractable challenge that has bedeviled the country since independence accounting for the lack of national cohesion and fostering a bitter struggle for political power among the ethnic groups. This is not only unsustainable but also fuels perpetual ethnoreligious struggle with the attendant collateral consequences.
The increasing unitarianization of the Nigerian political structure has been partly blamed for this. Though nominally a country with a federal system of government, the unyielding concentration of power at the center has made the struggle to control the center a do-or-die affair. This is why the restructuring of the Nigerian social structure has become particularly urgent. Granting the federating units greater control of local resources and devolution of political powers to the local units will strengthen rather than weaken the country. Decentralization will not only reduce ethno-religious competition but is also capable of re-channeling ethnic grievances to the local level where such complaints can be better managed. In addition, it will be easier to manage perennial challenges such as youth unemployment, poverty, nepotism, infrastructural deficit, religious intolerance, systemic corruption by elected officials and other such problems that have contributed to Nigeria’s stunted growth.
References


https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/nigeria/


Abstract
Following Nigeria’s abrupt border closure few years ago, there was a great quake on the African economic ground, particularly for Nigeria’s neighbors. This article assessed and analysed the Nigerian border closure and her diplomatic implication with her immediate neighbors. Employing historical and descriptive methods along with the use of theories, the article aimed at understanding the situation, state of diplomatic ties and presented a viable alternative to border closure. Ultimately, the study prescribed that Nigeria should embrace liberalization strategies rather than discourage international relations, which could be harmful to her overall development.

Keywords: Border closure, Diplomatic relations, International governance, Neighbors, Trade
Introduction

From the case of the United States and other world powers, history has recurrently proven that no country can successfully thrive in isolation. More than ever, West Africa and Africa as a whole need to unify to create a global force to be reckoned with through consolidated cooperation, especially in the face of integrative elements like the ECOWAS Protocol on the Free Movement of People and Goods, African Continental Free Trade Agreement, and so on. If Nigeria must promote and maintain positive international perception, especially among her African counterparts, she must be willing to embrace economic cooperation for development – which will boost popular support in her quest to represent Africa for the United Nations (UN) permanent seat in later times, especially now in the face of the Sustainable Development Goals. More so, neighboring countries could be instrumental in the fight against terrorists and their violent acts, most of whom come from abroad. This research on Nigeria’s character towards international relations is therefore not only timely but vital in the successful pursuit of her foreign policy.

Nigeria's borders span 4700 square kilometers with the countries surrounding it, including Niger at the northern side, Cameroon at the eastern side, Chad at the northeastern end, and Benin at the western end; however, the vague delineation of some areas of the boundaries could be traced to the Anglophone-Francophone territorial division of 1889 (Osimen, Anegbode, Akande & Oyewole, 2017; Flynn, 1997).

Isyaku (2017), Akinterinwa (2011), and Rasaki (1991) explain that in pre-colonial Africa, there existed good relationships among several territories and ethnicities which fostered commercial cooperation between them. But with the advent of colonization, there was the institutionalization of transnational boundaries. Through the instrumentality of the state, forcefully created by those colonialists, there was partitioning and restriction of movement which had negative social and economic implications among the various ethnicities (Isyaku, 2017; Gashaw 2017). This new arrangement was the beginning of the separation of peoples that have interacted without restriction for centuries (Osimen et al., 2017).

The evidence of the connectedness of precolonial Africa is supported by Flynn (1997), who identified that there is still an overlap of several ethnicities between Nigeria and her neighbors. Bassey and Oshita (2010) observed that most of them even speak identical languages and have identical ways of life. For instance, a significant number of Nigeriens speak Hausa (Bello, Dutse
& Othman, 2017). To Flynn, these people were once one but due to the Anglophone-Francophone territorial division in 1889, they became sectionalized. Additionally, some Yorubas could be found near the intersections of both Republic of Benin and the Nigerian state (Shittu, 2017).

According to Afrika and Ajumbo (2012), the whole of West Africa is grossly characterized by – both legitimate and illegitimate – unofficial trade. For example, Nigeria’s general unofficial interaction with the Republic of Benin is characterized by legitimate and illegitimate commercial transactions, which are common in commercial relationships that run across several West-African countries. This flow of commercial transactions creates a heightened economic impact they have on each other and the provision of a viable passage for regional transportation for the Economic Community of West African States (Blum, 2014).

Hoffman and Melly (2015) provided some insight into the trade relations of Nigeria when they opined that despite the mild individual expenditure of consuming Nigerians, relatively weak machinery, fiscal impediments, and slow progress of integrating among West African states, Nigeria still surprisingly engenders high level of advanced transnational commercial interactions over a wide variety of goods. Hoffman and Melly (2015) also stated that according to official records, by the close of 2014, Nigerian transnational commercial relations were valued at 135.8 billion dollars; this measurement did not account for unofficial commercial relations which far surpasses the identified official figures. However, certain statistic shows that unofficial trade accounts for about 64% of Nigeria's Gross Domestic Product (Hoffman & Melly, 2015).

It is on this background that the bulk of the work rests as a historical view of the border and serves as a platform for understanding present events. The study thus explores and presents a viable alternative to border closure. It does so by examining the different border closure cases in the world and draws lessons. However, this will be impossible without first, a conceptual framework.

**Conceptual Clarification**

**Concept of Border Closure**

Simply put, a border is a boundary line separating two different entities (in this context two countries or more). Boundaries are maintained to protect territories considered important largely
due to both human and natural resources are not put under pressure detrimental to inhabitants of the territory. Borders indicate the eminent domain of a state. According to Ogunsakin (2011), borders could be seen as entrances through which persons, commodities, wealth, and knowledge must cross to be viewed as either legal or illegal by a country. On another hand, Haselsberger (2014) expressed that it is incorrect to regard them solely by their physical qualities, rather, they are complex social constructs, possessing several significances and roles. To Haselsberger, borders possess an impermanent nature because they are subject to either spatial or temporal changes. From a more international definition, the Westphalian treaty considered borders to be structures used in demarcating countries with sovereignty, structures primarily performing the role of boundary definition and limitation of countries’ jurisdictions (Starr, 2006).

Border closure implies the shutting or stoppage of the inflow of goods or persons into a country’s territory (Osimen, Anegbode & Akande., 2017). Foreign policy is the pursuit of a country’s national interest in its interaction with other states (Adeniji, 2000). Satow defined diplomacy as the employment of skill in the practice of official interaction (Neumann, 2005). A widely-accepted definition of diplomacy is the definition provided by Bull. He considered diplomacy as the practice of interactions between recognized international clauses through peaceful methods (Bjola & Holmes, 2015; Bull, 2012). However, since the use of theories is indispensable, this work will adopt theoretical analysis.

**Concept of Foreign Policy**

According to Bojang (2018), foreign policy decision-making is agreed to be one of the greatest instruments at a state's disposal to pursue its national interests. It is considered a full political activity of states. A good foreign policy would lead a state in fulfilling its national interests and acquiring a rightful place among the comity of nations. According to George Modelski (as cited by Dinesh, 2016), foreign policy is "the system of activities evolved by communities for changing the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their activities to the international environment. To Modelski, foreign policy objectives aim at those aspects of policy that aim at the change in the existing behaviour of states, as the primary objectives of foreign policy (Dinesh, 2016). However, foreign policy is not only to change but also the continuation of the behaviour at different times.
(Laura, 2008). It is a concern both with the change and the status quo as far as they serve the national interest (Mahendra, 1967).

**Concept of Diplomacy**
According to Wardle (2021), diplomacy is a method that governments use to influence the actions of foreign governments through peaceful tactics such as negotiation and dialogue. It is typically carried out by a country's representative abroad, but a diplomat's actions will be largely controlled by the government they serve. To Cornago (2008) diplomacy is the conduct of international relations by negotiation and dialogue or by any other means to promote peaceful relations among states. Cornago also sees diplomacy as a set of practices, institutions, and discourses that are key for the basic understanding of the historical evolution of the international system and its evolving functional and normative needs.

**Theoretical Framework**
Theories are important to understand diplomatic interactions better, studying the present state of things in international affairs. Taking a cue from the definition of Kerlinger (1986), theories provide us with tools to acquire an understanding of international phenomena in an effectively organized manner and their relationship with other phenomena, to make objective predictions about those relationships.

Although international relations deal with human relations on a transnational level, and predictions (since it is based on human behavior) are not as accurate as with the natural sciences, with the help of theories, the discipline can emerge with more objective and structured ways of acquiring useful knowledge on past and existing economic, political, cultural and social international interactions, which arms it with more adequate levels of predictive precision. Also, justice cannot be done to the topic (border closure) without taking a view through theoretical lenses. The use of theory in this work is therefore imperative. Summarily, theories of international relations provide a better understanding, explanation, and prediction of international power distribution and how this affects state behaviour. Many theories of international relations exist, some of which include: realism, constructivism, dependency, and game theories. However, this paper will be utilizing the latter two listed theories.
Dependency theory, as posited by Romaniuk (2017), is a widely known theory among the social sciences to expound on state development. This theory originated from Latin-American scholars and was developed by Raúl Prebisch and Hans Singer in 1949. The theory is also linked with Marxism and its proponents include Andre Gunder Frank, Paul Sweezy, and so on. According to Romaniuk (2017), the theory highlights that the international system is grouped into stronger and weaker or less powerful states. In this situation, Nigeria can be considered a powerful nation amongst its neighbours due to its size, natural resources, etc. It is Africa's biggest economy, contributing above half of ECOWAS' Gross Domestic Product. It is known to be the regional giant and assumes the big brother role. It is indeed a nation graced with resources and has with it, remarkable possibilities, opportunities, and capabilities for transformation (Hoffman & Melly, 2015). Secondly, less powerful states rely on the help of the wealthier states (Romaniuk, 2017). For instance, statistics show that unofficial transnational commerce makes up about 75% of Benin’s Gross Domestic Product. This exemplifies Benin’s economic dependence on the Nigerian state (Afrika & Ajumbo, 2012).

Game theory on the other hand is a natural science theory that has a vague origin. However, its history can be said to be traced to John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 1944. The theory could be used to analyze the eventual result of a competitive scenario between entities known as players. These players must maximize their benefits (interests) and minimize their losses, even if to the detriment of other players, to come out victorious (Raoof & Al-rawhide, 2010). For the sake of this paper, players symbolize Nigeria on one end and her neighbouring countries (Niger, Cameroon, Chad, and Benin Republic) on the other. The theory could also proffer explanations as to the reason that Nigeria acts the way she does – arbitrarily, to protect her interests.

**Methodology**

This qualitative and nonexperimental study employs a pragmatic approach, triangulating between historical and descriptive methods, in an attempt to evaluate the recent border closure in Nigeria and thus, get a grasp of its implications on its neighbours. While data from past events (including the origin of the Nigerian border,) were gathered through the instrumentality of the historical method, the descriptive method allowed for an extensive case review on diverse border closures to gain deeper insight into the subject. Consequently, data for the study was gathered from already
Discussion of Findings

Border Closure in Nigeria

Though border provides the incentive for social, commercial, and culture-based interactions, it simultaneously presents an avenue for transnational illegalities, smuggling, and so on (Blum, 2014). Nigeria has some of the world’s highly protective and regulatory trade barriers, consisting of extreme tax and trade bans. Neighboring countries (especially Benin) on the other hand have continued to impose fewer tariffs to promote trade relations (Igué & Soulé, 1992). This, according to previous studies, has heightened the level of informal exportations from neighbouring countries (especially Benin) to Nigeria (Bensassi, Jarreau & Mitaritonna, 2018; Golub, 2012; Raballand & Mjekiqi, 2010).

Nigeria has closed her borders on countless occasions (Liedong, 2019). However, Nigeria on the 20th of August 2020, closed her borders arbitrarily and without prior notice, the suddenness of which caught many unaware, including traders whose income depended on open or closed borders (Folarin, 2019). This study analyses the various events, including impacts on Nigeria's neighbors by employing case studies (most especially Benin since they are arguably the worst hit as Johnson (2019) opined, as well as past events on Nigeria's border closure.

Reasons for the Border Closure

Drawing insights from the theory of the game, at the apex of every country's foreign policy is national interest, and in terms of national interest, security is of paramount importance. Once a country senses that her security is being threatened (including economically), that country must take necessary measures, irrespective of how detrimental or disadvantageous it might be for the other players. In the Nigerian context, the highly permeable nature of her territorial boundaries poses a great challenge to the Nigerian state, presenting Nigeria with various issues, including smuggling-based activities (Osimen et al., 2017). The government mentioned the security of Nigeria from illegal importation of commodities as a justification for the 2020-2022 border closure (Folarin, 2019). In line with Hammed Ali’s (the customs service comptroller-general) words, all
commodities were prohibited to gain absolute control of the commodities entering the country (Mumbere, 2019).

Transnational illegalities connote an array of unlawful and despicable actions undertaken by persons and groups beyond internal boundaries, the reasons attached could be economical, finance-centered or religious, or a combination of these factors (Williams, 1998). In recent times, illegal transborder activities have been characterized by a substantial rise in world illegal activities including the laundering of money, sneaking in of migrants, and unlawful individuals, drug and weapons trade. Consequently, illegal transborder activities in Nigeria have gotten exacerbated since the late 20th century (Ortuno & Apiwan, 2009; Luna, 2008). Since then, Nigeria has suffered one of the highest levels of illegal activities when it comes to transborder trade (Bayard, Ellis & Hibou, 1999; Williams, 1998). Binder (2004) revealed that the International Organization for Migration Estimate (IOME) calculated around 700,000 adult females and adolescents who are traded between transnational boundaries yearly. Corroborating this, Ogunsakin (2011) submitted that the Nigerian customs confiscated weapons worth $30 million and impounded 157,000 firearms in 2002 and 2004 respectively.

Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) has steadily been on the increase despite the strengthening of transnational unity. This has negatively affected the quality of regional integration (Addo, 2006). As ECOWAS policies become more integrative to promote sub-regional economic stability, TOCs simultaneously become worsened (Andrés & Philip, 2008). These factors threatening Nigeria's security (a vital aspect of her national interest) could provide explanations for why Nigeria has been hesitant in the liberalization of her borders.

Drawing some inspiration from the dependency theorists, a vital factor that contributed to the Nigerian border closure could be the relative dependency of her neighbors on the Nigerian state. As earlier stated, unofficial transnational commerce constitutes about 75% of Benin's Gross Domestic Product. This exemplifies Benin's economic dependence on the Nigerian state (Afrika & Ajumbo, 2012). More so, almost all imported goods to Benin are aimed at Nigeria (Signé & Van der Ven, 2019; Oshiotse, 2002). Not only that, the unofficial commercial interactions between Nigeria and all her neighbors constitute just 20 percent of her Gross Domestic Product. Such a
percentage exemplifies the inequality in its commercial interactions with those neighbors (Blum, 2014). This enabled Nigeria to exercise her domination by shutting her border against Benin in 2003 under Obasanjo's administration. Consequently, the economic state of Benin was adversely impacted (Afrika & Ajumbo, 2012).

Adepegba (2019) informed that the Nigerian government recently attached some conditionalities to her neighbors, allowing Nigeria to dictate the terms and call the shots. Among these conditionalities, he added, include: the rejection of imported commodities repackaged by her neighbors, the rejection of immigrants without passports, the streamlining of transportation means to Nigeria, etc. Nigeria was able to do this because of her power status in the sub-region, so much so that Nigeria, despite the prohibition of her neighbors’ goods through her borders, is still exporting to these very countries via land and sea, especially in the northern region. This further widens the inequality gap (Folarin, 2019). Worthy of note is the fact that a country’s location could increase the probability of border illegality (Osimen et al., 2017). Countries could decide to close their borders as a result.

**Implications of the Border Closure**

*Impacts on Neighbors:*

Nigeria's border closure under Buhari's military regime negatively impacted Niger because of her land-surrounded terrain and heavy dependence on Nigeria for crude oil (Bello et al., 2017). In addition, following the border closure, the Chadian, Nigerien and Beninese presidents came to Nigeria and engaged in discussions to persuade her to reconsider the closure and reopen her borders. It was not long until the issue escalated with diplomatic and economic implications. The closure interrupted the smooth financial and military relationship between Benin and Nigeria. France and America made efforts to make Nigeria consider her action of closing her border against Chad because of the displacement of several Chadians. The Embassy of America made efforts to influence Buhari to reopen Nigeria's borders, allowing the free transportation of relief aid to persons displaced by the crisis in Chad. But Buhari was resolute on his decision. This degenerated into plummeting governmental income, delay in salary payment, weakening of capacity to purchase, decrease in expenditure, and other crippling issues in Chad ("Lake Chad basin crisis", 2016).
Furthermore, following Brookings Institute’s prediction, the August 2020-2022 border closure coupled with subsequent ones led to the dwindling of Beninese revenue and employment due to her level of attachment to Nigeria (Ojekunle, 2019). The closure also interrupted fluid intercultural relations. For example, there was economic cooperation between the two countries via the Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation which is situated in Niamey, the capital, with a Nigerian as the secretary. The two nations also have the same historical roots as a significant amount of Niger citizens speak the Hausa language. Furthermore, Nigeria without prior warning, ejected foreign citizens from the nation, particularly citizens from the West African region, those ejected included those with illegitimate or expired entrance visas. This decision was greeted with criticisms from ECOWAS because the decision contradicts the purpose of ECOWAS aimed at aiding the free movements of nationals of its members. Submissively, it may be said that interactions between Nigeria and neighbouring countries were non-friendly. For example, 15 percent of Benin citizens are Yorubas and due to the closure of the borders, they could not relate with their ethnic neighbours (Bello et al., 2017).

Neighboring countries' entrepot trade was subject to fluctuations due to the border closure. Golub (2019) mentioned that although goods imported to Benin meant for export to Nigeria (which is what entrepot trade connotes) are many, they are also widely unstable. For example, entrepot trade experienced a decline in 2016 and 2017 as a result of currency devaluation accompanying economic decline and Buhari’s policies to deter smuggling through border closure. In Benin, there has been a decline in textile importation since around the year 2000. And a further increased decline from 2015 to 2017. Benin’s rice imports also increased in 2012 followed by Cameroon and Togo but fell again in 2015 (Golub, 2019). From 2012 to 2014, Benin’s Importation of automobiles skyrocketed to a per-capita of 80 dollars (which is eight times ECOWAS’ average) and then plummeted in 2015. Although, because of her disadvantaged geography, Togo’s per-capita is not up to the Beninese per-capita in providing automobiles to Nigeria, it still exceeds Nigeria and ECOWAS’ per-capita (“Nigeria’s automobile industry: A shadow of itself”, 2013).

**Impact on Nigeria**

Nigeria prohibited the importation of used vehicles beyond a particular period to defend her ineffective automobile industry. As if this was not enough, Nigeria entirely prohibited land-based importations in 2016, coupled with an increment in import duties. Despite these stringent policies,
Nigeria has recorded even lower manufacture of automobiles. No other country in the region manufacture automobiles, although Benin and Togo engage in automobile import to resupply to Nigeria ("Nigeria’s Automobile Industry: A Shadow of Itself", 2013). Nigeria tried to protect her textile industries, which had been tagged as grossly ineffective and a large number of her manufacturers have vanished or have weak production levels ("Nigeria: Reviving the Textile Industry", 2013). Even Benin and Togo far outpaced Nigeria in textile importation. Nigeria has a very weak formal import base for textile products (Golub, 2019).

Beninese importation of rice consists mostly of parboiled rice, which is more desired by Nigerians. This proves that the bulk of Benin’s imported rice is intended to be exported to Nigeria (Adefeko, 2017). However, Nigeria recently assigned priority to the internal production of rice via rigorous protective policies on import. Despite this, Nigeria’s production has been unable to meet the demand of its citizens (Golub, 2019). There was a doubled growth in demand for rice in 2017 (from 3,700,000 tons to 6,700,000 tons) (Liedong, 2019). With closed borders and insufficient production, rice becomes relatively scarce. Consequently, Nigeria’s citizenry has suffered a rise in the cost of products – rice and pasta cost have become twice costlier (Ojekunle, 2019). For example, Liedong (2019) made it clear that the cost of a 50 kg bag of rice has skyrocketed to about 22,000 Nigerian nairas, contrary to the former 9,000. He added that although these governmental policies concerning border closure might be favourable to indigenous farmers, the consuming majority bear the brunt.

Viewing it from another perspective, Akhigbe (1991) posited that the historic connection between Nigeria and her neighbors is undisputedly factual, giving a case study of how the Egun-speaking persons and the Aja-speaking citizens of Benin Republic have identical ways of life, common language, food, and how they cross-marry, making differentiation between them difficult. Daku (1991) also identified that the border relationship of some Nigerian ethnicities such as the Argungu and Kamba ethnic groups have some historical affiliation with Benin and Niger. These affiliations are evidenced in cultural linkages including the integration of ceremonies and festivals. The connection did not only foster cross-marrying but also enabled them to graze their cattle between both boundaries (Dahiru, 2003). Again, healthy relations between Nigeria and her neighbors have aided Nigeria in garnering support from them over time against country-devastating events the
civil war, and the Boko Haram sect amongst others (Folarin, 2019). However, Nigeria’s decision to shut her territorial entrances has broken historical ties, affected possibilities for cross-cultural integration, and marred further development.

**Reaction of the International Community**

The establishment of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975 was yet another move at fostering cooperation among African countries and attaining free cross-border trade as well as movements in the sub-region. Northern and Southern African sub-regions have as well attempted to adopt this enviable move by encouraging free passage and free trade within the zones by the people (Babatola, 2015). The decision of Nigeria to close her borders largely contradicts her age-long commitment to ECOWAS which she is a member of (Signé & Van der Ven, 2019).

Despite this fact, the reaction of ECOWAS has seemed to be that of relative lethargy and nonconcern for a long time. Although ECOWAS appealed that the borders should be opened, they have not enforced any sanction, especially officially (Liedong, 2019). Liedong added that the poor reaction of ECOWAS owes to its lack of power to enforce its control on Nigeria. Again, taking a cue from the dependency theory, it could be seen that Nigeria is a major stakeholder in ECOWAS. Thus, there is just enough influence ECOWAS can have on this African giant. Similarly, the African Union has maintained a loud silence concerning Nigeria’s drastic action – perhaps, owing to its lack of proper institutional structure for dispute settlement or owing to its dependence on Africa’s biggest economy (Liedong, 2019).

Nevertheless, in 2021, a few bold-enough countries under the auspices of ECOWAS, or for some indirect reasons, condemned Nigeria. For example, it is argued that Ghana's closure of over 70 Nigeria-owned businesses under the justification that those businesses broke their regulations is a retaliatory action against the border closure. Folarin (2019) put forward that Ghana already threatened retaliatory action following the border closure. Nigeria has also attracted criticism from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Conclusions

First, to show how self-defeating the border closure had been, the act was detrimental to most legitimate Nigerian businesses. This was because the closure was intended, among others, to check smuggling and international criminal acts, however, these acts have a high chance of persisting. For example, among the 1,978 entrance routes in Nigeria, just a meager 84 are under survey leaving the remaining 1,894 unchecked. This defeats the purpose of the Nigerian border security mechanism (Sagir, 2013; Williams, 1998). Equally, increasing unlawful acts across the edges of Nigeria owes to her demonstration of carelessness in boundary protection and has led to issues including the sneaking in of contrabands and the engagement in several criminal acts (Martin, 2011). This is further aggravated by the incompetency and corruption of Nigerian customs (Osimen et al., 2017). Illegal transborder activities involve many entities which are engaged in gross illegalities and which are capable of employing despicable schemes to dissuade or evade capture (Luna, 2008). Sagir (2013) explicated how these smugglers maneuver their way through customs, e.g. some animal dealers in the north-eastern part of the border have employed more creative strategies for smuggling weapons by stuffing them in grain bags and transporting them on cattle.

The nature of these problems is further amplified as a result of the world becoming a global village that dismantles conventional boundaries via technological improvements and enhanced internationalization. Presently, criminal acts without traveling across physical boundaries are perpetrated via the internet, facilitating the smuggling of goods without proper vetting, illegitimate migration, unlawful transport of arms and human organs, vehicles, lumber, crude as well as diamond amongst others. This has become part of the most difficult issues to treat in recent times. One of the puzzles facing border protection includes terrorism which is on the increase by the day and which is a threat to the lives and properties of citizens. For example, it has been argued that the Boko Haram sect infiltrated these permeable borders into Nigeria (Osimen et al., 2017).

It is recommended, from the challenges above and in tandem with the position of Folarin (2019), that border closure is not the answer to solving smuggling, dumping, transnational crimes, etc., rather, Nigeria should use her big power status to influence neighboring countries to align with trade regulations of ECOWAS which provide structures for smooth and criminal-free trading. And
although Nigeria recently did this (partially) through the tripartite anti-smuggling committee, she should follow up to ensure proper implementation. More important is the area of improvement of neighbouring countries' trade institutions to encourage productivity – this is going to increase the chances of a crime-free trade.

Secondly, the Nigerian government should recognize that the issue facing its borders is an infection from within and not outside. Corruption in border protection agencies is a major bane that is eating the country's border integrity; therefore, the government should focus on ridding these agencies of incompetent personnel. Authorities put in charge of this should themselves possess the quality of integrity and be checked by laws in promoting transparency. Additionally, the fight against corruption has to start from the grassroots level because recruited officials are Nigerians from the grassroots. The entire process should be rid of corruption because unless this is done, Nigeria will not record sustainable progress.

In conclusion, the change should be two-way; since neighbouring nations possess lesser power and cannot effectively challenge Nigeria singlehandedly, thus, they should attend to pursue more feasible integrative policies via the ECOWAS platform with negotiations. Nigeria also should understand that she needs her neighbours to stand as she has always needed them – including during the Boko Haram crisis. Ultimately, the pros of border liberalization far outweigh the cons.
References


Challenging the Politico-Philosophical Foundations of Decolonisation Project in Africa

Anthony Mayowa Oladoyin

Abstract

This article examined the existing narratives about decolonization in Africa. It interrogated the driving objectives for the project after the conscious dismantlement of colonial empires in Africa. It argued that the hitherto distorted politico-philosophical foundations of decolonization project in Africa were indefensible considering contemporary developments and revelations in Africa. In the article, the descriptive narrative style was adopted: it employed the second-order level of analysis coupled with critical argumentation, and critical rationalism based on the analysis of the works of renowned scholars on the subject of decolonization. It showed, inter-alia, that decolonization only apparently ended when the colonialists dismantled the apparatus of colonial governments at independence; recognized the new sovereignty and statehood but what followed was worse than colonization because no African country’s internal and diplomatic affairs have been left in the hands of the leaders and their people. As such, African countries have struggled in futility to be let off the hook of their former colonial overlords. It concluded that disengagement has been an endless project of decolonization. Worse still, Africa is yet to experience the decolonization of knowledge, history, language, literature, and medicine among others. Decolonization by the colonialists is a ruse. It is an alternative form of colonialism, called neo-colonialism. It is recommended that any true decolonization project must come from within the people and political systems grown and nurtured by Africans.

Keywords: Colonial government, Decolonization, Neo-Colonialism, Sovereignty, Statehood
Introduction

The subject of decolonization is intricate. It is not borne out of benevolence as it appears but is simply a naturally-produced project of emancipation in the history of human existence. Decolonization is the official termination of the colonial government in a foreign territory. In other words, decolonization refers to the time when the foreign official domination of foreign territories, often overseas territories came to an end and the structures of foreign rule were dismantled (White, 2014). This paper sets out to decipher the underlying latent philosophy and views shrouding the discourse and veracity of decolonization in Africa. Granted that a few colonial overlords did not want to decolonize, most ‘progressive’ European nations supported the decolonization of their empires abroad as a lofty project immediately after the end of 1st World War on November 11, 1918, based on moral and practically expedient reasons. To show their commitment to that decision, the League of Nations was formed on January 10, 1920 (by the Paris Conference that ended the First World War) to kick-start the immediate decolonization of mainly the former colonies of the defeated powers such as the German and Ottoman Empires and subsequently prepare them for self-government, with the sole aim of adjusting control over both former colonies and mandated territories of the defeated powers (Darwin et. al., 1999). The United Nations merely replaced the League of Nations on October 24, 1945, but simply continued reassignment work continued ‘to adjust control over both former colonies and mandated territories’ but was able to excel in 1960 by issuing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People (Jansen, & Jürgen, 2017).

Decolonization as a Historically Produced Sphere of Life

Africa did not emerge from the blues. The continent evolved as part of the planetary formation over 110 million years ago (Mark Latham, 12 July 2001). After the big bang theory and the super mighty earth broke into pieces due to tectonic plate motions of the earth’s crust, Africa emerged as one of the continents in the world today. Record has it that the tectonic plate movement caused Africa to have emerged from the split between it and South America that we have today. This development of course had its consequences on ocean currents and other global systems including the wind, climate, geology, and culture among others. This explanation becomes necessary because the evolution of the earth is naturally beyond the influence of race or any man. In the same
vein, the social processes that have been taking place in the world have crystalized into patterns affecting development from one continent of the world to the other. This explains the interdependence of every part of the world within the same globe on another (Butler, and Stockwell eds., 2013).

The economy, the weather, climatic changes, wars, and natural disasters that take place in any continent will no doubt have an effect on other parts of the world. These processes define our world today and constitute the basis for the concept of globalization. The global forces operating within the world system affect the entire system, be it market forces, changes in the level of temperature, rainfall, drought, and desertification among others are inevitable forces counterbalancing the world system. For instance, there may be harmattan, rainy season, and dry season in some parts of the world. In other parts of the world, there are winter, autumn, spring, and summer and we do have extreme temperature conditions in Antarctica and desertification in some parts of the Middle East. The world, therefore, has evolved to be what it is, through a constellation of different human activities too. In the bid to fulfill the natural instinct of survival, there have been attempts by some people to dominate others; such a situation in the world has led to the colonization of some countries by some countries, which represented a phase in the world system.

Colonial powers are presumed to have promoted decolonization for very special reasons. Such reasons include a deliberate plan to shed some burdens of governance in the colonies (Mambrol, October 4, 2017). These burdens include financial burden, growing military budget, colonial administrative burden, welfare costs in the colony, physical development costs as well as the growing cost of infrastructural amenities. Notably, those colonial governments were not that kind and benevolent.

However, after some periods of oppression, exploitation, and annihilation in some countries, resistance started to grow through civil disobedience, demonstration, protest, resistance, and counter-resistance in many nations of the world. Britain particularly lost millions of pounds in their colonies and the same applied to other colonial countries such as France, Portugal, Italy, and Germany among others (Cooper, 2014). The wave of colonial unrest was much such that in 1946, there was a general strike in South Africa whereby the British hold on the mines was terribly shaking. Thousands of African miners protested and it was almost uncontrollable. It was the South
African army that quelled the crises. A similar crisis erupted in Ghana called Gold Coast against the evil of colonialism. It was indeed a very long period of unrest. In Senegal in the same year, the Niger-Senegal railway was shut down for about 160 days and one could imagine the economic loss for the French government. There were similar anti-colonial protests and crises in Algeria 1945 and Madagascar in March 1947.

In fact, it was so serious that over 100,000 people were murdered before the crisis could be halted. Furthermore, the anti-colonial war of liberation called Mau-Mau under Kenyata’s leadership of the African Nationalist Movement challenged colonialism to its roots. The crisis that started in 1952 took the British more than 50,000 troops before they could stop the unrest. In the end, 90,000 people were imprisoned and over 10,000 people were killed (Hyam, 2007). In distant China, in 1946, under the leadership of the Congress Party headed by Pandit Nehru, China conducted its own liberation struggle and ultimately established “The People’s Republic of China”. The unforgettable crisis of the French in Vietnam in 1954 was icing on the cake for the popularity of colonialism in Africa. The colonial overlords were divided between abandoning their colonies and finding a decent way of using force to keep them. It was obvious that the reasonable thing for them to do was to give up and set for the reality of the decolonization project mostly in Africa (Jones, Max, et al., 2014). As it appears, they did not happily relinquish their hold on the colonies but ultimately, the immediate period after the Second World War saw many nations of the world getting off the hook of their colonial overlords at least, superficially. It follows therefore that decolonization is a historically produced sphere of life, a face in the world order that has come but not totally gone.

Methodology

The methodology adopted in this paper is the descriptive narrative style, which engages a second order level of analysis based on critical argumentation, critical rationalism, and analysis of the works of renowned historians, philosophers, and theorists on the subject of decolonization, Africanism, colonization. Karl Popper (1996) was the protagonist of the theory of Critical Rationalism. “Critical Rationalism” to Karl Popper (1902-1994) is a modest form of self-critical rationalism, in which he contrasted his view of “uncritical or comprehensive rationalism.” Uncritical or comprehensive rationalism is more or less synonymous with deductive logic or
epistemology based on *a-posteriori* knowledge and knowledge based on incontrovertible relations of ideas on which mathematical truths sit. This however is not obviated of criticism too. This method becomes necessary because of the nature of the title of this paper which appears to be a version of a conspiracy theory, which needs an abundant body of proof to establish its veracity. As such, critical rationalism is a -

…received justificationist view that only what can be proved by reason and/or experience should be accepted. Rationalism is instrumentalist in that direction. It assigns greatest value to insights that enable people efficiently to solve immediate problems. It subordinates all other ways of understanding and acting upon the world. Scientism and instrumentalism of rationalism is conducive to globalisation. Scientific knowledge is non-territorial…The truths revealed by ‘objective’ method are valid for anyone, anywhere, and anytime on earth. Certain production processes, regulations, technologies and art forms are applicable across the planet. Martin Albrow rightly says that reason knows no territorial limits. The growth of globalisation is unlikely to reverse in the foreseeable future. Anarchists challenge the oppressive nature of states and other bureaucratic governance frameworks. Globalisation neglects environmental degradation and equitable gender relations (Popper, 1996).

**Political Foundation of Colonization and Decolonization**

According to the popular definition of politics by Harold Laswell (1990) that politics is all about who gets what, where, and how, it follows therefore that colonization is about the domination of a set of people by a more powerful one in an unequally contested space. It was about wars, conquest, domination, subjugation, and exploitation, often with brutality and shamelessness. Essentially, it was also about trade in persons, called slave trade, and unholy alliances with local powerful rulers to facilitate the trade for them. Colonization thus altered the hitherto existing political systems in the former Dahomey Empire, Mali Empire, Kanem Bornu Empire, Songhai Empire, Ghana Empire, Oyo Empire, Ife Kingdom, Attah Kingdom, Benin Kingdom among others, and replaced them with modern-day governmental structures across the length and breadth of Africa with the exception of Liberia and Ethiopia. The Berlin Conference and the subsequent partition of Africa readily come to mind. No single African man was at the conference and by the stroke of fate, Africa was balkanized and shared among fellow European leaders and their countries without an African voice.
Missionary activities coincided with the period and thus introduced another dimension to colonization. With missionary activities came the European idea of God, morality, justice, gender equality, modernity, and development. The political foundation of colonialism for all intents and purposes is about domination, exploitation, slavery, and resource extraction. The African people were completely deprived of a voice in the administration of their social political and economic lives. The ideology of governance that exists today has no indigenous root. It is alien to the African people and demonstrates to a great extent the dissonance between the political ideology and practical political life of Africans. The countries of Africa were bounded together by Europeans with ties they did not understand.

Some contiguous cultural groups and nations were separated into different countries as happened with respect to Nigeria, Cameroun, Niger, and Benin Republic while some groups or nations with heterogeneous values, cultures, and practices with forcefully associated together as a country thus causing perennial conflict and violence. The issues of corruption nepotism, prebendalism, and ethnicism simply festered in colonial creations. The cultural norms that could serve as checks and balances in the nations created were not just there. The politically imposed structures did not allow cultural bounds to function in most countries of Africa. It is the delight of colonialists that Africa never gets it right as they were not ready for any competition with countries in the continent. African countries are ruled by fascist governments that suppress public voice. Totalitarian regimes of different forms operate as disguised democracies with over-centralized structures. The actual political practices reinforce new forms of the imperialist model evidenced by the manner in which they serve as cronies to imperialist leaders overseas.

Decolonization, which is the offshoot of colonization is embedded in the same political structure described above and sustained by the same (Grimal,1978). One expects that when colonial structures were dismantled, a proper autonomous independent government totally indigenous to the new people will emerge but experience has shown that the string of control to date has not been let go for the colonialists. Companies from Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, and American dominate the exploration and exploitation of natural resources in Africa be it diamond, crude oil, gold iron ore, bauxite, tine platinum, uranium, coal, rubber, and a host of other raw materials and primary products for export abroad. When products are processed with added value, they find their way to African soil and sold for humongous prices. Africa, in this manner, has been
condemned to a level of suppliers of raw materials while Europe is the superior partner with requisite technology to transform the primary product into finished products.

The value of processed products costs a fortune for an average African man. A good example is iPhone. The same story goes for cars, computers, and printing presses just to mention a few. Contrasting the two scenarios, Africa continues to regress while Europe and the remainder of the West continue to blossom economically. Attempts have been made by Nigeria and other countries of Africa have struggled to break into the racket of countries with the know-how in technology and associated scientific knowledge to galvanize the development of their countries. Such effort has yielded little or no success. Nigeria for example tried the idea of technological transfer. It did not work out well too. Even though there are two companies manufacturing cars in Nigeria as of 2022, the processing is not indigenous as most critical components for the production of the vehicle were externally sourced externally. The iron and steel required for production of basic technology as well as intelligence i.e. intel products needed for their production are not available in Africa. The Ajaokuta steel factory in Nigeria was almost completed but only God knows why the commissioning of the project did not see the light of day till today.

Decolonization, which ushered in independence for many countries in Africa has not translated into development of a self-reliant and prosperous Africa. As it stands, with the exception of South Africa, Africans are barely not more than drawers of water and ewers woods. What has compounded the situation is globalization, which is a surrogate manifestation and instrument of neo-colonialism. The new global arrangement which favours the establishment and thriving of multinational companies like Coca-Cola, Pepsi, Toyota, iPhone, Apple, and Mercedes Benz among others required high capital outlay, sophisticated intel, and extremely high running costs that no African country or investor can afford in order to move close to competing. In fact, the border of competition has gone beyond their range.

The political basis of colonization was a natural propensity embedded in humans to explore survive and scout for resources to eke out a worthwhile-cum-much improved livelihood history. Such explanation underpins the quest by the Europeans in the 18th to 20th century to venture abroad for access to items that could better improve their lives. In those days, it was not out of place to wage war and conquer territory to forge a prosperous empire. Colonization was a simple advancement over the African system of empire administration. While the African version took place by persons
within the continent. Colonization was by persons and groups from another continent, Europe. Once conquest of a territory was established, a foreign administration/government was established and proper exploitation-cum-transfer of resources began. When slave trade and colonization ended, another facet of domination started with a new political template. The new political template was not ostensibly immoral like colonialism, but a refined system aided by technology and labour relations initially called capitalism evolved. In other words, decolonization was a necessary change in the mode of European political influence on former colonies through newly established international organizations and grant regimes, global monetary systems, global sporting bodies, international conventions and declarations.

**Philosophical Foundation of Decolonization**

By philosophy, reference shall be made to the guiding principles and ethos driving or underpinning the very essence of every phenomenon in life. It shall be taken to encapsulate the issues of morals (goodness or rightness or wrongness of an event/act/practice), principles, foundational knowledge, rationale, logic, and explanatory theory for any event, practice, or system.

Expedience is the marked philosophical foundation underpinning the decolonization project in Africa. At the time decolonization came to an end in Africa it was indeed a matter of what was the most reasonable thing to do. The summary of events culminating in the decolonization point inadvertently to the inevitability of the project. For instance, the insurrection, demonstrations violence, and the un-lucrativeness of a continued practice of colonial regime made decolonization justifiable and respectable.

A question to be asked is whether or not it came from the heart of the colonizers to relinquish their former colonies. The answer, I think, is no. However, a smart and intelligent group of colonial opportunists in the realization of the end of colonialism presumably thought that replacing colonialism with better-enriched ideology with be a much-improved and fine-tuned way of continuing the political cum economic control in Africa (comfortably) from their respective nations in Europe was a much better thing to do than having to be physically present in the former colonies with myriads of challenges. This brought the idea of corporations and organizations such Commonwealth of Nations championed by Britain (but modernized and expanded afterwards);
World Health Organization (WHO); Federation of International Football Association (FIFA); Olympic sporting events; (United Nations) UN among others.

The establishment of these organizations practically enabled Europe and the West to continue exercising a firm grip on the politics and economy of African countries. Another thing they do is a deliberate ploy to play upon the intelligence and weaknesses of African rulers to do things that will favor Europe and the West at the expense of African people (McNeill, 1991). Rather than wage a direct fight against bad leadership, political decadence and economic failure in Africa. The leadership of Europe and the West simply respect the principle of sovereignty and only play an advisory role. The question of rightness or wrongness of the role of Europe and the West in the aftermath of decolonization and end of the Second World War is not as straightforward as it may appear. Indeed, it is a controversial judgment to make. A rational and logical argument can be provided in that respect. Globalization is the latest of the straw that broke the camel’s back. The point is that with globalization and subsequent interventions of Europe in Africa, the direction of development and evolution of the culture of the people of Africa were indisputably altered. In other words, a lot of the potential in the people to chart a way for themselves was indirectly inhibited. The introduction of European trade changed African taste from their own traditional product to foreign products which spelled doom for Africa. At best, the respect for the values of African products fell to the background in terms of demand and taste.

The situation became worse when food items that came from Europe, which were more refined were preferred, a good example in this category is the importation of rice. It has taken the Nigerian government a lot of fight to encourage consumption of rice in the country. It is hard to ever imagine when the taste of their local politicians and power elites in society for the consumption of local rice will ever be restored again. The same argument applies to the taste and consumption of the products of the African textile industry as products from foreign industries now dominate the African market. The unfortunate development is that African companies stand little chance to compete. In this way, the most significant aspects of African culture are lost. Development along that path is equally lost in most of the former colonies; local languages are now downgraded to subsidiary languages; the art of literature, writing, music, agriculture, clothing, dancing, medicine, and technology among others have changed (Tiffin, Helen (Jan 01, 1987, Ngugi wa Thiong'o,
1986). What is left for Africa is little or nothing. Charting any new course of development and progress becomes a daunting task.

Ascribing value judgement to decolonization without genuine support for growth in Africa is simply bad. Now that the political ideology of good governance enjoys global advocacy and inhumanity, homophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, territorial invasion, corruption, and misrule is frowned at, one can emphatically say that the decolonization project in Africa was not right (Thomas, Bob, and Lawrence, 2015). Since the 1950s and 60s when most African countries apparently got their independence, most aspects of their lives have not genuinely changed. In fact, things have become worse for Africa.

**Philosophical Presuppositions and Ideological Foundations of Decolonization**

The book - *The Africa Diaspora Slavery, Modernity and Globalization* by Toyin Falola is a revelation. It highlighted the semblance between the features of transatlantic slave trade and the current reality of the African State built on similar structures but garnished with mere cosmetic justifications. In fact, chattel slavery coincided with colonialism at a later period of its history. It was argued that while the majority of the world's countries no longer practice chattel slavery, new categories and methods of exploitation have arisen, exhibiting traits that historically defined slavery. As it were in the scheme of the global economy today, the paper argues that economic variables are manipulated just in a similar manner as in the days of transatlantic slave trade. As it were, Africa has been deliberately schemed in a way that makes it perpetually dependent on the West.

The Atlantic slave trade has adversely affected Africa in the four centuries of its existence during which it historically recorded the European conquest of the continent and its concomitant underdevelopment. As despicable as the Trans-Atlantic slavery was, its lesson of evoking identity consciousness and the subsequent drive to address the germane question of ‘African identity’ of a ‘United Africa’ cast on the projection and dream of Africanists like Marcus Garvey, W. E. B. Du Bois, and Kwame Anthony Appiah Asante (Toyin Falola, 2013).
It is however arduous to extricate the quest for African identity from associated issues of race, color, and names that raises the question of identity. Slavery was noted to have also provoked the Pan-Africanist movement, which was a response to counteract racist ideas and regimes.

On average, it cannot be faulted that slavery has always been contributing to underdevelopment in Africa. Transatlantic slave trade was one of the key factors of European growth, technological advancements, and nation-state establishment, which empowered Europe but harmed Africans on the contrary. Nothing compares to the horrifying transatlantic slave trade. The large-scale external demands for raw commodities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries led to indigenous slavery. When a greedy political class saw the opportunity to connect indigenous slavery with the external trade in slaves, the scale of brutality became boundless, and wars—even those justified on the basis of state formation—converted innocent war victims into slaves. African chiefs were driven by economic gain. Africa became the source of labor that supported the New World businesses established by European settlers.

Reforms were not brought about by decolonization because the colonialists transferred control to a political class whose ideals were similar to their own. On the contrary, the postcolonial leaders did not pursue a real goal of development but kept maintaining and utilizing the existing logic of exploitation. Consequently, they were able to maintain neocolonial dependency, Africa's marginalization, and the continent's poverty continued.

Slavery provided inexpensive labor for the colonial administrations in ways similar to the use of forced labor, poorly paid labor, and semi-slave labor to produce lucrative crops. Utilizing inexpensive labor, it is feasible to establish and run states, consolidate authority, and amass wealth. Power and accumulating wealth are related to servitude (Toyin Falola, 2013).

First, modern politics and war-lordism have many similarities to the bloodshed and crime of the time of the slave trade. Modern politicians are analogous to colonial masters and slave owners who operate as collaborators and compradors to utilize violence and repressive force to run organizations and States that pursue excessive profits. In this way, the pursuit of genuine societal growth is hindered. Behind the scene of corruption are the compradors and the political elites that were supplied slaves. Slavery-related situations must be discouraged in the global economic, social, and political systems.
Stages, Theories, and Pitfalls of Decolonization

Using the example of Hawaii after 1959, there are five stages to decolonization.

1. Rediscovery and Recovery Stage: This is the stage when the colonized fully comes to realization of its position that it has lost. It is the stage when the colonized becomes conscious and rediscovers its origin, ancestry, and heritages, which the colonized has come to the point of repossessing. The colonized, at this stage is conscious of the superiority of its own culture, literature, mores, values, history, and traditions of its own society. This stage, for example, has been observed in Hawaii beginning around the 1960s, with new movements in Hawaiian music and literature.

2. Mourning Stage: This is the actual stage of consciousness of the exploitation, oppression, and cruelty of colonization. At this stage, the people are prepared to confront their colonizers with protests, demonstration, and physical show of frustration in terms of sorts of civil unrest. Process of building the future of the proposed independent colony. This is the stage the colonizers and the colonized are willing to come together to discuss, consult, make proposals, concessions and reach agreements. The process takes place most commonly through debate or meetings to address the future of the colony, the plans about how the new government will be governed, and how the lost culture will be reinstated.

3. Addressing the path or direction for the envisaged independent colony. At this stage, if the third stage is successful third, the people will demonstrate their love and commitment to the progressive cause and direction for the supposedly independent colony. At this stage, the unison of the voices of the people in the new country is essential for determining and charting a progressive course of growth and development.

4. Action towards said unified goal. This is the stage when the people finally take action that can be expressed in diverse ways viz.: through violence to reclaim their colony, which existed once upon a time. This final phase involves the final disengagement of the colonizers with the entire apparatus of colonial administration.it is the stage when the colonizers eventually hand the reins of colonial government back to the original people who own the colonized territory. Now, the responsibility for foreign relations and security hitherto exercised by the colonial powers are transferred to the new independent government with due recognition of new sovereignty. The former colonial government and new independent governments now relate as co-equals, but their respective political governments are safeguarded by bilateral treaties.
between each other. They can collaborate, engage in mutual trading, and joint security missions as the situation may warrant whenever necessary.

**Theories for Trends in Decolonization**

Two theories of decolonization came out strikingly among various explanations for trends in decolonization. The first is World Polity Theory while the second is Indigenous decolonization theory.

1. **World polity theory**

   World Polity Theory stresses the absorption of the nation-state form and practices obtainable in the politics, administration, security system, and economic systems of Western Europe to its dependencies and contagion processes. In this way, when Western Europe decided to decolonize, its allies in Western Europe follow suit. It was why a trend was established because similar justifications adduced by one were supported as a rational decision by colleague nations in Europe. The justifications for abandoning colonialism such as the argument colonization was no longer profitable; that it was no longer sustainable and cost-effective to maintain a strong military in the colonies in terms of personnel, logistics, and machinery culminated into the eventual decolonization of European colonial empires in Africa. Additional explanations show how colonial overlords could not contain with ease militarily against rising insecurity, protests, and armed insurgency in the colonies sequel to a drift in the 19th century strong coordinated agitations, strong political will, unpredictable international environment coupled with disappearing collaborators reduced all available rational choices, leaving out the only option to decolonize. This process aligns with the critical rationalism method.

2. **Indigenous decolonization theory**

   Indigenous Decolonization theory is a theory that rejects the Eurocentric Western historical account that views historical, cultural, and political discourse as something that alienates the African reality, presenting the African account in a negative perspective. Eurocentrism is a political construct that paints the African people as bereft of anything rational, capable of development, vicious, dark, and corrupt. The implication is that Indigenous Decolonization theory
“negate all Eurocentric colonization projects and the resulting historical constructs, popular discourse, conceptualizations, and theory” (Kohn & McBride, 2011).

**Decolonization Critique as a Variant of Conspiracy Theory**

Decolonization is a theory seen by many as a form of conspiracy theory. A conspiracy theory is understood to involve an agreement by a group of people to conceal the truth about something, event or an activity for a reason known to the group alone, while a completely different explanation is provided to the wider public through different channels/media and such explanations are usually justified and sustained over a long period of time in history so much that almost everyone takes the explanation as gospel truth. Any counter explanation or model of explanation against such a suspiciously held position is usually tagged ‘conspiracy theory’. Examples are – COVID-19 pandemic, HIV-Aids, the death of Princess Dianna, the Holocaust, and of course, decolonization.

Decolonization is argued to be motivated and executed based on certain realities and reasons different from what was presented to the Africans and the World at large as the simple explanation for Decolonization. The deliberate subjugation and erosion of the culture of colonies. Worse still is the argument that the colonizers only dismantled physical structures like buildings, files and equipment whereas they did not let go of economic and political power in colonies supposedly decolonized. It is apparent how the advanced countries, who were former colonizers meddle in the politics, monetary policies and economies of their former colonies. Notorious among these former colonizers is France (Ikeda, 2015). With their policy of assimilation that entitles a citizen of any former French colony to automatically qualify as a French citizen, it is a tricky ploy to captivate and subjugate the people perpetually to France’s servitude. The situation has remained till now in 2022. Just on October 6, 2022, when a military coup occurred in Burkina Faso, the people of the country demonstrated their tiredness with French domination by burning the flag of France and destroying France’s embassy in Ouagadougou. Togo also followed suit in October 2022 declaring an end to French domination in Togo (Chafer, 2002).

There are similar subtle protests in virtually every country under France’s tutelage. In Senegal, there were mass youth protests over worsening economic hardship occasioned by over-bearing tinkering of France with internal politics, trade economic policies, and diplomatic relations.
between France and other States outside Africa. In short, the complaints over the media, during conferences, social media, and private confessions of friends and colleagues from Abidjan, Togo, and Cotonou among others is that “imperialist monetary policies from Paris continue to cripple domestic economies and undermine democracy” in Francophone West Africa. As the situation is present in Francophone West Africa, colonialism persists because the Franco-phone sub-region of West-Africa is yet to have a taste of true independence. They are not politically, financially and economically sovereign. In March 2021, Ndongo Samba Sylla and Fanny Pigeaud’s book, *Africa’s Last Colonial Currency: The CFA Franc Story* was translated into English.

The book lays out the French state’s continuous meddling in Africa—a master class in capitalist villainy, victim-blaming, and versatility. After the abolition of slavery, huge “reparations” were paid to the French former slave owners. These were used in part to establish colonial banks in Africa, later joined by others, which would strive to ensure that French domination would endure post-slavery by maintaining “the colonial pact.” This pact involved the deliberate under-developing of the colonies’ economies, their forced reliance on raw material exports, and a French monopoly on shipping, exports, and imports. The CFA franc was the currency designed by France to ensure French control survived colonialism’s official demise.

**Sovereignty, Decolonization, and Globalization**

Yes, Africa wants to be active within this global economy, but not as suppliers of slaves and labor or as producers of cash crops. However, as creators, inventors, managers, leaders, and entrepreneurs in charge of the economic forces that define our lives, rather than as domestic helpers and other exploitable groups. The exploitative application of globalization's dynamics in support of Western hegemony or the relentless infiltration of global capitalism is nothing short of criminality (Rothermund, 2015).

However, having access to computers and Internet resources is necessary for remaining connected. Access to digital technology is still a challenge in many areas of Africa that will take time and money to fix. It is morally right to make amends for previous transgressions, thus blame should be placed where it is due and apologies should be extended and expected. Whatever their name or cover, persistent occurrences of labor abuse should be condemned. A protracted crisis in a country like Darfur must end because it upholds slavery and the repercussions of colonial and postcolonial exploitation (Ferguson, 2011).
Discussion of Findings: Deductions from the Presented Expositions

Apart from Guinea, which, without independence broke away from France two years before the rest. France ensured that all other aspiring to be independent French colonies were not granted unconditional independence. France only agreed to sign their independence declaration agreement on the condition of signing “cooperation agreements” with the foreknowledge that the new countries will perpetually depend on them. Paris will remain as the imperial headquarters of all the quasi-sovereign new French-speaking countries of West Africa (Smith, 1978). The status quo remains unshaken until today because no leader of those countries dares do anything contrary to what Paris sanctions or blesses, otherwise, there will be dire consequences for such a leader.

France has kept military bases in several countries since independence–Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Senegal, among others–and currently has five thousand soldiers on the field in the Sahel … France used military force to create the politics it wanted in Côte d’Ivoire in 2011, for example.

France is shameless considering the manner it is conducting its imperialistic ambition in Africa. Can a sane person imagine the French soldiers coming to Côte d’Ivoire in 2011 in their might to install a government of their choice in the twenty-first century? Their expansionist financial integration agenda is another worrying concern. How can France be thinking she wise to hijack ECOWAS to suggest eco as a unifying currency for all states in West Africa with the headquarters in Paris? Is that not proper neo-colonialism? Here France is finding it difficult to disquiet the youths in Senegal who destroyed France’s properties in their country. Burkina Faso’s case is equally striking. In short, the CFA franc is colonialism rebranded.

Irrespective of Macron’s reform from the CFA franc system to eco, the age-long practice whereby the Franco-phone African central banks have for decades been depositing 50% of their foreign currency reserves into the French treasury. As if the governments of African States were fools, Paris usually grants them aids, which only represents a miserable fraction of their deposits in Paris. Let someone now tell me where a rational theory or equitable system of coexistence obtain. France has overdone the colonialism business for too long. The curtain needs drawn permanently now and be torn. Coming under the pretext that the new system will not require the obligation to deposit 50 percent of foreign exchange reserves into the French Treasury is a new repackaged deceitful formula because ultimately, it is a smart ploy to orchestrate another regime of monetary
domination. Even when Paris promised under the slogan of “convertibility guarantee,” that conversion of Franc to Euro will enjoy easy conversion, the promise was never kept. Besides, it introduced another level of hardship of having to make recourse again and again to Paris.

Whatever reforms that were carried out with respect to CFA franc, the main link to Paris will remain. These countries will still have to report to France daily by virtue of France’s promise to lend as many euros as needed by the Central Bank of West African States—will remain a subterfuge promise never to be expected to be delivered as previous similar promises were never delivered.

It is also criminal with the envisaged new reforms that it will lead to an irrational enlargement of the CFA franc zone to the other countries of West Africa such as Guinea and Ghana. The government of Italy criticized the system of CFA franc as an impoverishment instrument, arguing that it was demagogic. It was alleged to have exacerbated the influx of many French-speaking African migrants to Italy. Rather than repackage the CFA franc, it ought to be dismantled (Clayton, 2014).

**Table 1: Former colonial powers and their organizations to perpetually keep hold on their old colonies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Former Colonial Power</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Founded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Kingdom</strong></td>
<td>Commonwealth of Nations</td>
<td>1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td>French Union</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French Community</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>La Francophonie</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spain &amp; Portugal</strong></td>
<td>Organisation of Ibero-American States</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Portugal</strong></td>
<td>Community of Portuguese Language Countries</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Russia</strong></td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United States</strong></td>
<td>Commonwealths</td>
<td>1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freely Associated States</td>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Netherlands</strong></td>
<td>De Nederlandse Unie</td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>De Nederlandse Taalunie</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion

Decolonization is an unavoidable concomitant of history. It was rightly observed that the history of conflict and real human development did not change markedly after obtaining independence because the colonies continued to be tied to the apron string of the colonizers even after they left. Most citizens of African countries still yearn to return to the colonial era considering the level of comparative hardship. Decolonization is an act of disenfranchising many citizens during the colonial era and the whole scheme of decolonization, which was undertaken by the United Nations did not give an African man a voice even though the consequences of the decisions taken affected them mostly. After becoming independent countries, they lost still did not have their voice heard in metropolitan assemblies.

The Way Forward for Africa

The paper has elucidated on some latent truth about decolonization; that even though, it was an event in human history that has come and gone, nevertheless, certain crucial issues remain to be addressed because the world yesterday determines the world today and the world today will most likely determine the world tomorrow. If theft was committed yesterday, it is important to recover what was stolen yesterday for the good of tomorrow in a fair and just society, where democracy, good governance, egalitarianism, and probity are preached. It is against this position that this paper recommends that Western Europe should specifically establish a genuine program that will sincerely address the problem of poverty, industrialization, insecurity, corruption, and power generation in Africa. It is in the light of these challenges occasioned historically by slavery and colonialism that most African youths are fleeing their native countries to seek greener pastures abroad in spite of abundant mineral and human resources in their countries.

Even if reparations are paid to Africa for the evils of slavery and colonialism, the kind of rulers in Africa are not any different from brutal emperors of past empires. Primitive accumulation, greed, ethnic sentiments, and self-centredness pervade their minds. Such resources will never be put to good use.

The advanced countries of the world should also see this world as a place to be protected from power-mongers as we try to salvage the ecosystem from climate change and Satanists. Sovereignty
should be redefined and set aside in any country where the innocent blood of citizens is shed on account of land grabbing, power contestation, and religion.
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Influence of Online-Based Media on Governance in Nigeria: Sahara Reporters as a Case Study

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Abstract

This paper examined the impact of online-based media on governance in Nigeria with Sahara Reporters as a case study. The internet has changed the face of journalism, and brought about participatory journalism, by which everyone who has something to say finds it easy to say it quickly and conveniently without being censored. This has made online journalism very popular and the number of online-based news platforms to be on the increase. As these platforms have given the citizens means to interact and added to the content of the news, they have also succeeded in promoting politics. It thus becomes necessary to study the influence of Sahara Reporters, one of these online news platforms on governance in the country. Very few studies have discussed the role of online platforms other than Facebook and Twitter on governance in the country. Through an analysis of contents from the medium’s website and interaction with few respondents, this study found that through uncensored reporting and citizen participation on the platform of Sahara Reporters, the medium has influenced governance in the country. The study also recognized the presence of counter-forces in the online community, which try to discredit the information on the site. However, using media dependency theory, the study concluded that the public increasingly depends on online news media for information and the more news it provides, the more the people depend on it, making it easy for them to influence governance.

Keywords: Governance, Media, Online news, Sahara Reporters
Introduction

The media in Nigeria started as early as the time of colonialism. It was used by the Europeans to broadcast programs that would indoctrinate the natives. After independence, those who inherited government embraced the media as an instrument for disseminating information. The media grew over time to help the public understand government decisions as well as react to it. Since the government was in charge of the media, it was easy for it to be censored hence, limiting its role as the watchdog (Anatsui and Adekanye, 2014). This limitation led to the emergence of privately owned media, a development that was also later curtailed in 2004 by the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC). This action was considered a censor by a government that politically self-doubts (Olukotun, 1996).

In Nigeria, the media have played a major role in electioneering. During the regime of the late General Sani Abacha, the media had magnified the Nigeria-South Africa face-off in the heat of the hanging of Ogoni 9, to compel the international community to pay more attention to the country. Thus, South Africa used economic forces to frustrate the junta and make it to honor the June 12 mandate (Folarin, Ibietan and Chidozie, 2015).

It is also important to note that, accountability is made possible by the media. For instance, the Nigerian Diaspora makes enormous contributions in one way or the other to the Nigerian state (Folarin and Folarin, 2018), which the media keenly monitors and reports for accountability. In the same vein, the social media, which is more ubiquitous, wields influence on the electorate and elected.

Like foreign influences, including market forces in the politics and voting patterns of countries in the Global South (Folarin, Ayo, Oni and Gberevbie, 2014), social media is a powerful tool in the elections of countries, Nigeria inclusive. The April 2011 general election recorded the earliest use of social media for election purposes in Nigeria.

The appearance of the internet changed the world of the media. The face of communication was rebranded and journalists began to have a new way of packaging and broadcasting news to the public, while easily avoiding censorship from the government (Talabi, 2011). It also gave citizens easy access to uncensored news. In the words of Chukwu,

Online journalism allowed for connection and discussion at levels that traditional media did not offer. People could comment on articles and start discussion boards to discuss articles. Before the internet, spontaneous discussions between readers who had never met were impossible. The process of discussing a news item was a big portion of what made online journalism. Online journalism created an opportunity for niche audiences allowing people to have more options as to what to view and read. The speed in which a story was posted affected the accuracy of the reporting in a way that had never happened with traditional media (Chukwu, 2014:3).
This made the worldwide dimension of news and political communication experience a tremendous change, which started contributing to transformation in the society (Volkmer, 2010). The internet also made the role of the media as a watchdog more effective. It was no longer a tool used by the government but a tool used by the people to hold government officials accountable. According to Flanigin and Metzger,

…traditional media has always had its limitations; it was a broadcast technology – a one-to-many dissemination of information. Print, radio, film and television have been used by governments to distribute a message. Up until recently, if one wanted to communicate with any government body, they would have a few options: Show up in person, telephone or mail and there was never a guarantee that your voice would be heard, or if you would get a response. The internet changed all these and has given everyone a voice (Flanigin & Metzger, 2007:177).

The internet changed the face of journalism, and brought about participatory journalism where everyone who has something to say finds it easy to say it quickly and conveniently without being edited. All of the above advantages made online journalism very popular and the number of online-based news platforms has been increasing since then. As these platforms have given the citizens means to interact and add to the content of the news, they have also succeeded in promoting politics.

One of such online-based news platforms is Sahara Reporters. Attempts are made to investigate the influence of Sahara Reporters on governance in Nigeria. Thus, this article investigates the impact of online-based news media on the governance of Nigeria, with particular attention to Sahara reporters. It is a famous online news journal comprised of both professional journalist and ordinary citizens gathering information and publishing it. The tenet of good governance occupies a strategic position in the growth of every country. The increasing demand for demand and adoption of good governance globally is premised on this fact (Ojedokun, 2010). Among the many factors that are responsible for promoting good governance is the media.

**Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis**

Several studies on online-based news media and governance have been undertaken by different researchers. It is pertinent to note that there are more related studies such as, social media and politics or the difference between traditional media and online media, than there are exact studies on the interconnectedness of online-based news media and governance. This chapter comprehensively reviews previous studies and identifies the gaps that this study seeks to fill. The chapter also attempts to explore the theoretical framework relevant to the field of study.

Just like most concepts, the meaning of governance is highly contested. The term was introduced in France in the 14th century and it simply described “the seat of government” (Pierre and Peters, 2000:1). However, the concept became popular as scholars began to come up with different definitions based on their different perceptions of the concept.

4.3
Based on its generic definition, governance is seen as the task of running the government, decision making, and who to involve in the decision making. As Francis Fukuyama puts it, “Governance is a government's ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not” (Fukuyama, 2013: 352).

The definition of the World Bank supports that of Fukuyama when it defines governance as, “the exercise of political power to manage a nation’s affairs” (World Bank, 1989:60).

According to Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006), governance also involves different methods through which a government handles socio-economic and political challenges because the main function of any government is to provide good, effective and efficient governance.

From the above definitions, it is obvious that the scholars centered their definitions of governance on how a government runs the state and manages its affairs. This suits the generic definition of governance which emphasizes the responsibility of the government in the administration of the state. However, there is a second set of definitions. These scholars agree with the generic definition but added the general public, the process of interaction between the government and the society, and the responsibility of the public in the act of governance.

According to the UNDP (1997), Governance addresses the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the management of either the world or an individual country’s affairs at all levels. Governance is a concept encompassing the complex mechanisms, resources, processes and institutions by which citizens, legal entities, gender and social groups articulate their interests mediate their differences and exercise their legal rights and duties. Governance transcends the State to include as well the private sector, civil society and international organizations in overall development process at global, national, regional and local levels (UNDP, 1997).

To support this definition is Bevir’s definition, “Governance refers to all processes of governing undertaken by a government, network, market etc. it is what governments do to their citizens and it is also the activities that link the government and the society” (Bevir, 2012:20). According to Graham, Amos & Plumptre (2003), governance is a process in which societies or organizations make important decisions, and this process also involves determining who gets involved in the decision process. To back up the definition of Graham, Amos & Plumptre, Governance according to Kaufmann, Kraay & Zoido-Lobatón (2000) refers to three things. First, it is those institutions that determine how governments are selected, held accountable, monitored, and replaced. Secondly, it is the ability of governments to manage resources efficiently and formulate, implement, and enforce sound policies and regulations. Lastly, it is the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.

It is impossible to talk about governance without mentioning good governance because the purpose of governance is to warrant respect for the rule of law, protection of human rights, gender equality,
equal distribution of power, accountability and macro-economic stability, equipped for adequate human development (Intermedia Consultants, 2005). Therefore, good governance is, “a system of government based on good leadership, respect for the rule of law and due process, the accountability of the political leadership to the electorate, as well as transparency in the operations of government” (Odock, 2006:5).

However, news social media is a channel of communication through which people exchange information. In the words of Heywood, “the media comprise(s) those institutions that are concerned with the production and distribution of all forms of knowledge, information, and entertainment.” (Heywood, 2007:232). News media therefore, refers to the different means by which news is communicated to the public. These means include radio, television, and newspapers, which are referred to as traditional media. The spread and accessibility of the internet easily made it a source of information consequently introducing online news media which is also referred to as online journalism.

Online journalism can be generally defined as journalism practiced online. Just like every other concept, there have been different definitions given by different scholars on the concept of online journalism. For some, it is simply regurgitating the contents of traditional media on the internet while others include new means of communication and the contribution of the ordinary citizen (Kawamoto, 2003).

According to Chukwu (2014), Online journalism involves publishing news content on the internet with text, audio, video and some interactive forms, for better presentation and lower cost. The most acceptable definition of online news media which is also the one that will be used for this paper is that of Deuze.

Online journalism is produced more or less exclusively for the World Wide Web (as the graphic interface of the internet). It can be functionally differentiated from other kinds of journalism by using its technological component as a determining factor in terms of a definition. The online journalist has to make decisions as to which media format or formats best convey a certain story (multimediality), consider options for the public to respond, interact or even customize certain stories (interactivity), and think about ways to connect the story to other stories, archives, resources and so forth through hyperlinks (Deuze, 2003: 206).

He also added that online-based news platforms consist of news published immediately and can be archived so that the reader can access it later, videos, sound or images can be added to a story, and hyperlinks are added to the writings so that the readers can relate to other contents and readers can respond through emails, comments or shares.
Evolution of Online-Based Social Media

Communication has never been as easy as it is today. In those days, distance meant lack of communication because the farther a person was, the harder it was to communicate. As the years went by, people started coming up with different means of communication like, pigeons telegraph, light and telephones, but these mediums meant waiting a long time for a response. Scientists did not give up and they found better means as we approached the 20\textsuperscript{th} and 21\textsuperscript{st} century (Gupta and Jasra, 2002).

The ARPANET is the first thing that is closest to the internet and it first came about in 1969 during the cold war. The U.S. Department of Defense came up with programmes known as protocols, which allowed the exchange of information between computers. The goal was to withstand nuclear attacks thus it was available only to the military officials at that time. By 1993, servers began to exist on the World Wide Web which led to the release of the graphical web browser known as mosaic. It allowed email services, making it easy to retrieve the simplest of information. The internet service also became accessible to civilians at this time (Rodman, 2012). Civilian accessibility to the internet gave way to the creation of social networking sites, and in 1994 geocities was created. It allowed people to create content on the internet, as well as well as interact with other people. In 1997, sites such as AOL Instant Messenger and SixDegrees.com were launched. These new sites allowed people to create profiles which included a short biography, and they could search for other people’s profile and it allowed them to chat with friends. Other sites that followed include, Classmates, Friendzy, Hi-5, and My Space, most of which were dating sites (1\textsuperscript{st} webdesigner, 2016). As social networking exploded, online publishing also exploded. Newspapers began to establish their territory online. There were up to 78 newspapers online in early 1995, and then it became 511 in mid-1995 and 1000 in 1996. As newspapers were taking over the internet other media began to show up. Radio stations and television broadcast networks joined the trend as well. (Gupta and Jasra, 2002).

The birth of web 2.0 transformed the idea of the internet. It involved features that allowed anyone to put things on the internet. This was in the 2000s, and it also introduced blogs and present social networking sites. LinkedIn was established in 2003 as one of the first business social networks. It had about 30 million registered members as of January 2016 (1\textsuperscript{st} webdesigner, 2016). In 2004, the bloggers beat the mainstream media to deliver on the tsunami that ravaged south East Asia with videos and this gave the internet an edge over mainstream media in terms of delivering breaking news fast. As of 2006, newspaper, radio and television stations on the internet started using user generated content and encouraging citizen media so that they can meet up with the bloggers. By 2008, Facebook which started as a thing for only Harvard students became a worldwide network. Facebook connects people, allows people to post their opinions and helps spread information faster. Facebook was like an upgrade of all the previous social networking sites. After Facebook, other sites like Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat and Google plus were created and they became a major source of news. This is because they allowed user generated content. As of 2009, almost any form of traditional news media used at least two out of the available social networking sites.
Selected Online-based Media in Political Mobilization in Nigeria

Online media has facilitated social and political movements around the world and Nigeria is not an exception to this trend. Even though it is not a trend that started as far back as it did in the west, its impact cannot be denied within this short period.

Nigeria’s first real contact with the use of online media for political mobilization was during the 2011 general elections and there were three major sites responsible for this. Twitter, Facebook and Revoda. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) wanted to follow the example of the 2008 USA elections. In March 2011, INEC had announced that they needed the support of community volunteers with its social media pages, particularly Facebook and Twitter account. Their plan was to enable the general populace interact with the INEC office throughout the election process as it will enhance political participation and free elections (Adibe, Odoemelam and Orji, 2012). Nigerian politicians also took advantage of social media for their campaigns by creating Facebook pages to win support. President Goodluck Jonathan announced his intentions to run for office on Facebook. His announcement attracted lots followers making him the most liked head of state in the world, second to Barack Obama (Adibe, Odoemelam and Orji, 2012). The sites were used to upload audio-visual content from polling stations to help people keep track of the voting process. Also on the lookout were online media activists whose mandate was to monitor the process and disseminate information about bombings or civil unrest at polling stations. This helped the authorities to keep track and control any form of violence. This election which is recognized as the freest and fairest at the time owes its success to many factors but at the top of the list is technological innovation, especially integration of online media in the political and electoral process (Omenugha, 2011).

Revoda is another online platform that was effective during the 2011 elections. It is a site created by a group of IT experts. It enabled voters to post live reports of delayed voting materials and violent uprising at their local polling stations to their database, after which reports are sent to INEC officials and Western observers who were active on the site daily. This allowed people within and to follow the election process, both within and outside the country (Adibe, Odoemelam and Orji, 2012).

Another event that further exposed Nigerians to social and political mobilization through online media platforms was the anti-fuel subsidy protest in 2012. Most Nigerians, especially the youths, showed up in the streets which eventually formed the mass Occupy Nigeria Movement. The protest was considered as a transfer of intense online activity through Twitter, Facebook, Nairaland and
the rest. Information about the subsidy removal was widely circulated, the ongoing budget discussions, as well as the progress of the street protests. The anonymity that can be granted by the online media encouraged young Nigerians to speak without fear, and express their feelings about the subsidy removal (Uji, 2015). These platforms became very popular among Nigerians at home and abroad. The platform that was used the most for the occupy movement was BudgIT.

*BudgIT* is an online community that applies technology to interconnect citizen engagement with institutional improvement, to facilitate social change. *BudgIT* uses a range of technical tools to abridge the budget and matters of public spending for citizens, with the primary objective of raising the standard of transparency and accountability in government. Their core areas are budget access, extractive transparency, institutional support and project tracking. Over the past five years, they have bridged the public finance information gap between government and citizens, increased awareness around budgets and increased the number of people who are concerned about the status quo of governance in Nigeria (Abayomi, 2017). *BudgIT* was able to reach thousands of Nigerians on the issue of budget at that time. They published the budget for year 2012, which revealed that the country spends about N3m ($20,000) on the president and vice-president’s feeding, and that a sum of N18bn ($120m) is allocated to the State House for its operations. This further agitated the crowd as they believed the money could be used to solve the issue of fuel subsidy (Stiftung, 2012).

In 2014, internet activism was further expressed in the country when over two hundred girls were abducted from a school in Chibok, Borno State. The issue was already fizzling out of the news space until digital campaign with a classic social media strategy was dedicated to it, using the ‘hashtag’ which is represented with ‘#’. The #bringbackourgirls campaign started on twitter and later became a household phrase when other online platforms adopted the strategy. This led to widespread advocacy on both international and local media. People realized that the situation was underreported and not properly handled, and therefore resulted to raising awareness and support for the missing girls online (Uji, 2015).

In the same year, there was another twitter campaign demanding for a proactiveness of the government to a situation in Taraba State. On 17th of April, 2014, there was crisis in Wukari of Taraba State which led to death and injuries of quite a number of people. Internet users uploaded the information on Twitter quickly, calling on the Police to assist the community promptly. Shortly after this, the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) responded via its Twitter handle that officers had been deployed to quell the unrest, and the issue addressed (Uji, 2015).

**Online-based media and socio-political orientation**

These events show how the people’s orientation concerning politics and participation in politics has gradually changed. Online-based media has made public participation easier in the political process especially with improved interest of younger generation. With increasing access and affordability, more youths are spending significant amount of time surfing the web. Certainly, they
encounter posts focusing on governance and socio-political issues, and may learn or have opinions from and on the conversations. In the last few years, issues of insecurity and terrorism have stressed Nigeria. Young Nigerians now consider social media a reliable source of information and updates, they also count on online media sources for assessments and justification of the situation together with other users. With increasing computer appreciation and technological sophistication, both the politicians and electorates now subscribe to blogs, websites and other social media platforms to discuss political issues (Booshparrot.com, 2016).

There is also an increase in the use of the Internet in Nigeria. 43,982,200 out of 110,948,420 total Internet users in Africa are Nigerians, this record is as of June 2010 representing 28.9% of the Nigerian population at the time. The leading global networking site ‘Facebook’ has 2,189,900 users in Nigeria as of December 31, 2010 out of 17,607,440 users in Africa which is 2.0% penetration rate of Nigerian population. From an internet penetration level of just 0.1 per cent in the late 1990s, internet usage in Nigeria had recorded an exponential growth to 16.1% of the population. Similarly, mobile technology has become the seventh mass information medium after traditional media sources, like: film, television, radio, print and sound recording. Online media now play interconnected roles of empowerment and democratization of human relations. The implication of this on the socio-political orientation of the society is that, information sharing has been made easier and people can now express themselves allowing ordinary citizens demand for good governance. Also, the internet is becoming the center for activism in the society. This makes it easier for online mediums like Sahara Reporters have great influence on the society (Morah, 2012: 153).

**Sahara Reporters, Agenda Setting and Governance**

Agenda setting by the media reflects the degree of influence it has on topics discussed by the public. That is, the more the media emphasizes a news item, the more the audience will regard it as important (McCombs, 2005). This has been a means for the media to ensure good governance in the society. By emphasizing on government actions and policies, the audience regards it as important and question the government where necessary. In the advent of the 21st century, the role of agenda setting by the media started to shift gradually to the internet and today the internet has taken the lead role. Whatever is prominent online is perceived as important and this does not only cover politics but economic and socio-cultural issues as well. The internet has achieved this role through the share, like and comment buttons that are present on every online platform, and through the speed of the internet in disseminating information (ByungGu, Jinha and Dietram, 2016). Sahara Reporters is one of those online platforms in Nigeria that has taken up the responsibility of agenda setting to ensure good governance.

Over the years, the site has done a lot to attack corrupt practices among public office holders through its investigative reporting. One of these cases is the case of James Ibori the former
governor of Delta state. The site followed the case closely for 5 years before he was finally taken to court. He became the governor of Delta state in 1999 and he served two terms of four years each. After his tenure he was accused of stealing more than 196 million pounds from state funds and transferring it to an offshore account in the UK. A court in London froze 35 million pounds worth of assets but he had come back to Nigeria when this happened. He was already a wanted man by this time and there were stories about his criminal past everywhere in the media. Sahara Reporters was one of the media platforms with the most information. They exposed a lot of things about his past and this includes how he was the errand boy of the former military head of state, Sani Abacha. They also exposed a case of theft he was involved in 1995 (Dare, 2011). He stole some building materials. Sahara Reporters also released a comprehensive report about all the court cases against James Ibori including evidence of how he escaped judgment in Nigeria by paying the judges to ploy his case. The information posted on the website made it impossible for the government to cover the case up. In May 2010, President Goodluck Jonathan ordered his arrest and trial. The EFCC also declared him a wanted man for diverting over 44 billion naira to an offshore account. After resisting arrest for a while by hiding in different countries, he was caught in Dubai in May 2012. Sahara reporters carefully followed all the details of the court case in UK, Nigeria and Dubai. Between 2006 and 2010, and they recorded 104 news and investigative reports on James Ibori (Dare, 2011).

In March 2016, Sahara Reporters released a list of 91 people who were related to highly placed politician in the country. These people were offered important positions at the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) (Saharareporters.com, 2016). This employment process was secret until the list was leaked by Sahara Reporters. The issue became controversial and it caused great embarrassment to the CBN leadership and the government. Reporters for the site posted an interview with a top official from CBN who revealed that Mr. Emefiele (the CBN governor) hired the relatives of influential people in the country as a strategy to keep his job. He also revealed that since President Buhari came to power in 2015, Mr. Emefiele has been using job offers to get the support of the current administration and this went unnoticed because he was using their middle names instead of their last names. This became an issue among the population because, they did not publicly announce the job openings in order to allow all Nigerians who are qualified to apply. Their action was against federal character principle used by government agencies and public institutions. Also, those hired were never interviewed. Nigerians began to react and comment. One of such includes that of Ben Murray Bruce. He said `it is called Central Bank of Nigeria and not central bank of powerful Nigerians. This nepotism must be investigated and punished`. This comment was shared on social media platforms repeatedly in addition to many other comments that followed. Once again, it was impossible for the government to ignore the issue. The CBN governor was publicly questioned by the government and other top central bank officials. The bank also brought forensic experts to investigate the computers used at the human resources department. Sahara Reporters later released an addition to the list, making it 121 names on the list (saharareporters.com, 2016).
In 2013, the news outlet was the first to publish the scandal of former minister of aviation, Mrs. Stella Oduah. They obtained certain documents that showed the former minister had bought two armored cars each costing 800,000 dollars. Through investigative reporting, a correspondent of theirs got a statement from car dealers in New York and Europe saying that the most expensive - BMW bullet proof cost only 300,000 dollars. This means that if someone paid 800,000 dollars, the person must have paid an extra 500,000 dollars and that was impossible. They also revealed that Coscharis motors did not supply the cars to Nigerian civil aviation authorities and the authority signed the documents without seeing the cars (Mojeed, 2014). This report was the beginning of the revealing of fraudulent acts by the former minister. The public began to share the story and post comments demanding the government to investigate these allegations and the EFCC began an investigation on Mrs. Oduah. The investigators discovered 3.6 billion that she acquired illegally and distributed among 8 companies. In 2015 she applied to the federal high court to stop the EFCC from investigating the allegations brought against her on the grounds of human rights. The judge who was believed to have been bought off by her granted her application (saharareporters.com, 2015). This brought a pause on the investigations but Sahara Reporters kept posting incriminating reports. They revealed how she spent about 225 million naira on luxurious things. However, after the judge was transferred, another federal high court judge granted EFCC the permission to carry on the investigation. The EFCC also discovered a sum of 2.5 billion in the bank account of her maid. Sources from EFCC revealed to sources of Sahara Reporters that her maid did not know about the bank account. After that, Sahara Reporters revealed again that she had been going around and asking top officials of the Buhari government to help her bury her case. She wanted to meet with the EFCC chairperson.

This report only made Nigerians more alert (saharareporters.com, 2015). The site later released another exclusive document, which showed that she bought an oil tanker for her oil company. Maritime expert revealed to Sahara reporters that the tanker is worth between 13 million dollars and 15 million dollars (Saharareporters.com, 2016). Following this report was another report about her educational background. They had proof that she was never awarded an MBA programme in St. Paul’s college as she claimed. Officials at the school revealed to sources of Sahara Reporters that they do not even have a graduate school programme (Mojeed, 2014). Succeeding the series of exposing reports from Sahara Reporters and the investigations by the EFCC was President Goodluck Jonathan’s decision to sack her (saharareporters.com, 2015).

In addition to exposing the corrupt practices of government officials, the 2015 elections are another example of how Sahara Reporters has aided good governance and democratic accountability. The site was able to achieve this through scrutinizing the contestants of the election, encouraging people to vote, encouraging discourse among the populace concerning the quality of the contestants and their policies, and reporting the results on time to avoid any contrary results. The site followed up every detail about the election and by extension, the public followed every detail. They do this quite easily due to sheer number of users who have an opportunity to weigh in on
trending topics, share ideas, provoke reactions and, offer clarifications (Olesin, 2017). According to Duruji (2017):

I was not in the country during the elections but through Sahara Reporters, I was more updated than some people in the country.

Just before the elections were held, they conducted an online poll and Buhari won (saharareporters.com, 2014). On the Election Day, they had citizen reporters who posted the progress of the elections at the different polling stations, who reported to the site concerning the turnouts at the different stations (Reid, 2015). Sahara Reporters also reported the news about how the Labour groups and prominent Nigerians led a massive protest to Ojota Freedom Park and the Lagos State power are, Alausa, on Thursday, 9th of February 2017. The protest was tagged “National Day of Action Against Corruption and for Good Governance”, featured prominent and ordinary members of the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) and the Trade Union Congress (TUC) gravitating in huge numbers towards the Government House to request improved working conditions for workers and better living standard for the masses (Olesin, 2017). The site reported every movement of the protest to show their support for the demand for good governance.

Duruji (2017) also asserted that by posting news about corrupt practices of government officials and giving citizens opportunities to comment and share news, Sahara Reporters is heralding a new age of media governance.

Sahara Reporters and Counterforces in the Online Community

It is evident from the discussions above that Sahara Reporters has been contributing a great deal to governance in the country. It is also predictable that there are certain forces who have criticized the site. First of all, journalists of the mainstream media have accused Sahara reporters of lacking the major ethics of journalism. This is why they often carry fake news or gossip. The journalists and media experts who were interviewed in the cause of this study admitted that, Sahara reporters carry fake news and this is because they receive stories from citizens who do not have any journalism experience.

Secondly, Sahara Reporters has been accused of having the sole aim of exposing the weakness of the government. In 2010 a young journalist, who was looking up to the site posted his recruitment experience. A minute after he sent his application, this was the reply he got:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your application to the organization. As part of (our) company policy, eligible candidates must possess the following: A penchant for government dirty news, ownership of a covert camera, ownership of dual passports, ownership of a facemask, ability to pick up arms and revolt, ability to incite the public against the government, [and] guerilla warfare experience will be
an added advantage. If you meet the above-mentioned qualifications, please feel free to give us a call. Regards, The Sahara Team.

The story of the young journalist is evidence of its revolutionary commitments. It also captures the unswervingly antagonistic editorial philosophy of the site. The young Nigerian who described himself as a faithful reader of the site said he was stunned. He expected to read about educational qualifications and years of experience as a journalist as yardsticks to measure his appropriateness for the work. He concluded his report with these words,

    My fellow Nigerians, yes we know all is not well with our nation [but] Sahara reporters is not doing us any good. We need to focus and re-strategize not with the likes of Sahara reporters exposing our weaknesses like a cancerous growth. Corruption and bad leadership are not exclusively Nigerian (Ochega, 2010).

It is pertinent to note that Sahara Reporters editors never decried this letter nor deny its content. In fact, they published the account on their website.

Thirdly, some online forces have criticized the participatory feature of Sahara Reporters. Allowing citizens to submit stories and comment at will only allow them reflect ethnicity and disunity. Farooq Kperogi, a Nigerian journalist who has written extensively on citizen journalism and its co-option by mainstream media houses such as CNN, describes most of the comments on the site as “primitive cacophony of rank ignorance and bigotry that now pass for comments.” He said when people comment and tackle each other at the comment section; it shows the religious and ethnic disunity that plagues the country. People give positive comments for stories that support their ethnic or religious sentiments. He believes that this downplays the quality of the conversations at the comment section (Kperogi, 2011). For example, during the 2015 elections, whenever there was a post, the Christians would post good comments about Goodluck Jonathan criticize President Buhari while the Muslims did the vice versa. In March 23rd, 2015, when the site conducted the online polls and Buhari won, below are the comments from a northerner and easterner respectively,

- Augustine Omenachi posted, “All of you want that Hausa man to Islamize all of us in this country”;
- Ahmed Salim posted, “Change is coming to stay” (Saharareporters.com, 2015)

In addition, Sahara Reporters has experienced counter-forces from the government as well. In fact, they serve as their biggest counter forces because they are the prey in most of the stories. Ever since its inception, the government has tried so hard to shut down the site. In 2008, Dr. Paul Orhii, the director-general of National Food and Drug Law Administration, sued Sahara Reporters in a Texas court and asked for $25 million in punitive damages. The Media Legal Defense Initiative, the London-based NGO that provides legal support to journalists and media outlets who seek to protect their right to freedom of expression said Dr. Orhii’s case was being handled by the high-powered Cook law firm in Houston (Media Legal Defense Initiative 2010). The NGO linked up with US-based Media Law Resource Center, which asked Julie Ford, an experienced Texas-based
media lawyer, to defend Sahara Reporters for free, therefore defending Mr. Omoyele on grounds of personal jurisdiction. She argued that since the publication was clearly aimed at a Nigerian readership and the defendant had no links with Texas, it was outside Houston courts’ jurisdiction (Media Legal Defence Initiative, 2010).

In early 2016, a site called Sahara Reporters Rescue was created. According to Omoloye Sowore, the site was created by senate president Bukola Saraki. The site came up when Sahara Reporters revealed his false declaration of assets to the public. To salvage his image, he came up with the site to circulate favorable news about him and other government officials. According to Sowore, the site copied everything from Sahara Reporters including the bio and its mission and vision. Mr. Saraki on the other hand denied this accusation (saharareporters.com, 2016). Sahara reporters rescue still exists today and they have over 30,000 subscribers. The site still circulates news that is contrary to what is on Sahara Reporters so as to redeem any incriminating stories on the latter site. However, the structure of Sahara Reporters Rescue is not like that of Sahara Reporters. They do not rely on Citizen Journalism, they are pro government officials and they are funded by the politicians they support (Naij.com, 2016).

Due to its zeal to release news first and expose government officials, Sahara reporters have posted false information. According to Oyero (2017),

Sahara Reporters has posted false news about Covenant University on several occasions. I know it is false because as a lecturer at the university, I cannot attest to it. This is why I am cautious of what I read on their website.

Also in 2015, the site reported that the election of Senator Godswill Akpabio was voided and he would be sacked by the government. This turned out to be false and they had to apologize to the public. The apology on their twitter account is stated below,

Sahara Reporters wishes to apologize to the public over a report carried out by our medium erroneously that election of @senAkpabio had been voided yesterday (Naij.com, 2015).

These are proofs that although Sahara Reporters has had moments of glory when they aided and promoted good governance in the country, they also have moments when over-zealousness made people doubt their credibility.

**Conclusion**

It is evident that because of the proliferation of the internet, platforms like Sahara Reporters are easily accessed, thus making it easy for whatever is posted on the site to go viral. This has made it easy for the penetration of information in the society thereby, making the actions and policies of government to be easily monitored by the citizens. Also, through this method, the citizens can
demand for good governance. The uncensored reports on the site have also promoted transparency between the people and the government. This new development has gradually influenced the actions of government as Sahara Reporters has bridged the gap between citizens and the government through participation and the government is on its toes as such sites constantly monitor any form of governance other than good governance. Therefore, the importance of these platforms cannot be overemphasized.

Thus, having studied the impact of online-based media on governance in Nigeria with Sahara Reporters as a case study, it can be asserted that the site, along with other online platforms, have contributed to a large extent to good governance in the country. Below are some recommendations to ensure that the site continues its role as a watchdog.

- Mainstream media should join forces with online media instead of countering them. By working together, they will be stronger at addressing corruption issues. For instance, instead of serving as defense mechanisms for the government by opposing stories reported by these platforms, the mainstream media can use their resources to prove the validity of the story thereby supporting it.

- It will be good to have other citizen reporting sites like Sahara Reporters that will emerge. Having more platforms like this other than social networking websites like Facebook, Twitter and the rest, will empower the citizens the more and alert the government officials and checkmate the monopoly and excesses of Sahara Reporters.

- Citizens should embrace the opportunities provided by these sites for them to participate in politics and to hold government officials accountable. Some people would rather stick to traditional media because they believe online media platforms are mostly for gossip. This is common with the older generation. This can be achieved through digital education.

- The government should accept these platforms as tools that enable the citizens demand accountability and transparency instead of tools that attack their reputation. By doing this, the media may not necessarily be antagonists of government and there would likely be fewer cases of government trying to silence some of these sites.
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Revisiting Poverty Reduction Policies in South Africa: Challenges and Way Forward

Anuoluwapo Durokifa

Abstract
South Africa, like other developing countries, has faced the menace of poverty with a present rate of 57%. In an attempt to change this status quo, successive governments have implemented various poverty reduction policies that have paradoxically yielded limited results. Statistics have revealed that a considerable gap exists between the program’s objective and achievement. Since 2015, there has been a steady increase in the poverty index in the country. Thus, using a qualitative research method with a focus on desk-based research, the paper critically analyses the poverty reduction policies in the post-apartheid era. The study highlights the poverty reduction programs implemented and the challenges disabling them from yielding perceptible results. The study stresses that for poverty reduction to be viable, the root cause of poverty has to be identified. It also accentuates the role government and policymakers have to play to get feasible results while coming up with suggestions going forward on how these policies can bring appreciable progress to poverty reduction and poverty reduction programs like the National Development Plan and the Sustainable Development Goals.

Keywords: Poverty, Poverty reduction, Public policy, South Africa
Introduction

Poverty has been a global menace that affects countries and individuals to varying degrees. According to a report by World Vision, 689 million people globally live in extreme poverty (Peer, 2021) and 1.4 billion people live in poverty (Essiet, 2022). This figure has been estimated to have gained increased due to the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and conflicts, for instance, the Russian-Ukrainian war and climate change. According to a projection by the World Bank, between 75 and 98 million additional people could be living in extreme poverty in 2022 due to the lingering effects of the pandemic, the war between Russia and Ukraine, and rising inflation (World Bank, 2022). These indices have slowed down poverty reduction results gathered before COVID. According to World Bank (ibid), during the pandemic, there were decreased income and job losses damaging the status of households. Inequality rose amongst countries as lots of countries plunged into debt to sustain their citizens. Worryingly, the majority of the poor live in Sub-Saharan Africa. A report by World Bank shows that the first nine countries with the highest poverty rates fall in Sub-Saharan Africa. South Sudan-82.30%, Equatorial Guinea- 76.80%, Madagascar-70.70%, Guinea-Bissau- 69.30%, Eritrea- 69%, Sao-Tome and Principe- 66.70%, Burundi-64.90%, Democratic Republic of Congo-63.90%, Central African Republic-62% (World Population Review, 2022).

In breaking or reducing the cycle of poverty globally, organizations like the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank have worked alongside various governments to help citizens out of poverty through the implementation of policies such as the Structural Adjustment Program [SAP], Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers [PRSP], Sustainable Development Goals (formerly Millennium Development Goals), et cetera. Ironically, the outcome of these policies has been low compared to expectations.

Nationally, countries still battle with high poverty statistics, particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (Ayoo, 2021). In South Africa, a report by the UN Human Development Index in 2020 shows that the country has been grappling with inequalities which have thus affected its poverty statistics (Mlaba, 2020). As stressed in the report, South Africa’s inequality is the worst in the world and following the impact of COVID, it is expected to get worse (Mlaba, ibid). A report by StatsSA in March 2022, showed the poverty statistic to be at 57%, a figure which is unacceptably high according to the Department of Social Development (Business Tech, 2021;
The trajectory of poverty in the country has been startling. While the poverty level in the country witnessed an improvement between 2005-2015, it worsened again post-2015. This has questioned the effectiveness of the policies and programs set up by the Government to address this menace. Hence, the study using secondary data will be reviewing South Africa’s poverty reduction policies and programs such as the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), New Growth Plan (NGP), National Development Plan (NDP) etc. It will analyse the programs that have been introduced post-apartheid. What obstacles could have hindered the results of these policies and what can be done to improve the effectiveness of the poverty reduction programme in South Africa?

Research Methodology

The study utilized a qualitative method, and secondary data as its research instrument. This method allows the researchers to consult and make sense of written documents that are available either in the public or private domain. To analyse, the researcher made use of document analysis to make deductions on the study.

Contextual Terms

Poverty: Poverty is multifaceted. Hence, different scholars come up with different meanings based on their views and perceptions. However, one thing that has remained recurrent in poverty definition, is the deprivation of a need, choice or opportunity (Aku et al, 1997; Chaundary & Malik, 2009; Chandrasekaran, 2013; Yinus, 2016; Ukeje et al, 2020). The many-side to poverty has led to inconsistency in identifying who the poor is. According to Hettne (2002:2), there are five classifications of poverty: a. Absolute poverty- sometimes referred to as extreme poverty (Chandrasekaran, 2013) is the severe deprivation of basic human needs such as clothing, feeding, safe drinking water, health shelter etc. b. Relative poverty- this infers to be when people have access to income or basic needs but it is low in comparison to the generality of the community or populace, they are in. Specifically, they live below what the community tasks as acceptable. c. factors. d. Transient Poverty- This is caused by natural or man-made disasters such as wars and environmental degradation. Unlike chronic poverty, the transient is short-term. e. Location
Poverty - This refers to geographical or regional spread. It involves rural poverty characterised by poor conditions of living, urban squalor characterised by the existence of ghettos and slums in metropolitan cities.

Studies have shown that the majority of the extremely poor exist in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (Ayoo, 2021). According to Hamel et al (2019), one in three Africans 422 million people, representing more than 70% of the world’s poorest people live below the global poverty line. Based on a World Bank report, the global poverty line which stands at $1.90 per day is a threshold under which an individual is considered to be living in extreme poverty (Kenton, 2020; Aikins and McLachlan, 2022). In 2019, 478 million people in the world lived in extreme poverty, and in 2021, it is estimated that 490 million people live in extreme poverty (UNCTAD, 2021).

In South Africa, one in five South Africans lives in extreme poverty, a state which has been linked to inequality going on (Mlaba, 2020). According to a report by World Bank in 2019 and the 2020 Human Development Index (HDI) and Human Development Report [HDR], South Africa is the most unequal country in the world (Mlaba, ibid). The country’s wealthiest 10% possesses more than half of the Nation’s income (Mlaba, ibid). This statistic can be linked to the country’s history (Aliber, 2003). South Africa has witnessed chronic poverty which has alternatively culminated in its extreme poverty statistic. South Africa’s legacy of apartheid has created deeply entrenched characteristics in the country’s poverty rates and distributions of income (inequality). As highlighted by Armstrong et al (2008), poverty rates among blacks and coloured still stayed higher. Apart from this, there have also been inequalities based on gender and geographical region (Levisha, 2015; Mlaba, 2020a). Close to three decades of democracy, the poverty statistic in the country is still high. This has laid questions about the poverty reduction programmes/policies that had been set up by successive governments.

**Poverty Reduction:** These are strategic policy measures or programmes intended to lift people out of poverty (Ukeje et al 2020). Poverty reduction is crucial to the development of Nations and the globe. Hence, there have been diverse policies formulated both globally and nationally to address this.

Poverty reduction policies have evolved at different times from economic growth to a basic need, rural development, target approach, participatory approach and the people-centred approach. Yet, there have been minimal results compared to expectations; particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (The
This has led to a debate between formulation and expectation. Some scholars (May, 2019; Durokifa and Ijeoma, ibid; Ukeje et al, ibid) have argued that many poverty reduction policies are unidimensional causing friction with poverty’s multidimensional nature. Hence, this study will be reviewing poverty policies in the state and what can be done to make the results of these programmes more effective.

**South Africa’s Poverty Profile**

South Africa’s poverty profile has been startling. Despite the priority given to reducing poverty and inequality at the transition into democracy by the government, 28 years down the line, it is still a menace that is being dealt with.

According to the governing party in 1994, “No political democracy can survive and flourish if the majority of its people remain in poverty...attacking poverty and deprivation will be the priority of the democratic government” (ANC,1994:5). Thus, this area has been a core focus to subsequent governments in power leading to various poverty reduction strategies been implemented. Paradoxically, there has been minimal result based on their outcome. Instead, the poverty statistics have continued to witness an exponential increase in questioning the effectiveness of these programmes.

However, to assess the programmes, it is necessary to understand the cause of poverty in the state. As argued by Durokifa (2017), poverty eradication is effective when policies are set up to address the causes of poverty.

**Causes of Poverty in South Africa**

Understanding the causes of poverty will make it easy to comprehend the problem into designing a workable policy. For South Africa, the scale of poverty has a long history. The country’s legacy of apartheid has created an entrenched characteristic of inequality and deep-rooted poverty. The segregation has impacted the factorial poverty still witnessed in the country in terms of region, colour and gender. During apartheid, the whites had access to better facilities (housing, education, healthcare) compared to the coloureds and Indians, with the black at the receiving end (see fig 1). According to a report by World Bank (2014), the majority of blacks were isolated in rural areas. Geographically, poverty rates differ based on province. While some provinces were able to rise
above the trenches of the aftermath of apartheid, some were deep-necked into it. According to StatsSA (2014) and World Bank report (2018), Limpopo, Eastern Cape and Kwazulu Natal have consistently been the three poorest provinces. Also, in terms of gender, females are more marginalised and poorer compared to men. While in age, the youths are trapped in poverty from an early age, a vicious cycle which continues into adulthood and continues to transfer. As stressed by Chutel (2022), 43.5% of citizens under the age of 17 live in a household that earns below the median income of 797 rands ($60) per month.

![Graph showing South Africans living below the poverty line](image)

*Fig 1: adapted from Chutel (2022)*

Aside from the segmented patterns of poverty in the country, there are also some causes of poverty as seen in works of literature (May, 2010; Brynard, 2011; Davids and Gouws, 2013; Taylor, 2011; Ramphoma, 2014; Levisha, 2015; Maseko et al, 2015; World Bank,2018). These include:

**Unemployment:** High unemployment remains a challenge for South Africa as the country struggles to generate sufficient jobs. A challenge which impacts poverty statistics. A lot of the citizens want skilled jobs (Ramphoma, 2014). However, the formal sector has been filled up and the informal sector is not seen as a substitute for formal skills. Also, due to technological advancement, the need for labour productivity has been reduced (Parsons, 2013). Importantly, based on the country’s history, racial and gender disparities are still predominant in South Africa’s labour market. According to a report by World Bank (2022), the unemployment statistic reached 35.3% in the fourth quarter of 2021.
Unemployment leads to a low level of skill generation due to the absence of befitting jobs which in turn adds to the poverty statistics.

**Education:** South Africa faces a huge skill shortage with a majority of the workforce being either unskilled or semiskilled (BusinessTech, 2022). This impacts the limited capacity to earn an income. Education has a strong influence on the probability of labour market participation. According to World Bank (2018), poverty declines with a rising level of education. In 2015, households with a breadwinner who had completed primary school experienced a fast decline in poverty compared to those with no schooling (World Bank, ibid). It has been stressed that South Africa’s poor public education system is sustaining the poverty cycle instead of breaking it (African reporter, 2014; BusinessTech, 2019). Also, in a finding by Nortje (2017), the current education system is of a low standard that increases poverty rather than empowering people to break free from the cycle.

**Healthcare Services:** There is a knitted relationship between poverty and health. Poverty is a major cause of ill health. Ill health in turn is a major cause of poverty. According to Godlonton and Keswell (2004), households that contain more unhealthy individuals are most likely to be poor. This is attributable to the truism that a person who is unhealthy cannot work efficiently and earn an income. In South Africa, the incidence of those with HIV/AIDS, communicable and non-communicable diseases is high. According to UNAIDS (2019), South Africa has the world’s largest population of people living with HIV, a growing burden of chronic non-communicable disease, and one of the highest incidence rates of multi-drug resistant tuberculosis in the world. All these vulnerabilities impact the ability to develop full human capabilities.

**Crime and Violence:** There have been scholarly debates that poverty is a contributing factor to criminal activity and violence. However, there have been compelling reasons to attest that crime and violence cause poverty. Globally, South Africa is among the first ten countries for high crime and violence (Quinonez, 2021). Crime and violence which is not a new phenomenon predated the closing stages of apartheid and increased more during its transition in 1994. According to Blackmore (2003), South Africa’s crime rate earned it the second most dangerous country in the world in 1994.

Crimes and violence through burglary, robbery, car hijacking, etc keep pushing people into poverty as they lose the little assets that they have contributing to economic deprivation.
Poverty Reduction Policies in South Africa: An Analysis

The reduction of poverty has been a consistent theme of successive South African Governments since 1994. According to Thabo Mbeki,

> endemic and widespread poverty continues to disfigure the country. It will always be impossible for us to say that we have fully restored the dignity of all our people as long as this situation persists. For this reason, the struggle to eradicate poverty has been and will continue to be a central part of the national effort to build the new South Africa” (President Thabo Mbeki, 2004).

On this notion, there have been different poverty reduction policies set up. Hence, this section would be analysing the poverty reduction programmes that had been set up in the country. The intent is to highlight the successes and issues faced to provide a viable suggestion. The policies include:

*Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP)*: The RDP was the first post-apartheid policy set up to reduce poverty and balance the inequalities that were caused by apartheid. The RDP aimed to establish a more equal society through reconstruction and development. To do this, the RDP focuses on building the economy by increasing access to education, healthcare, employment, water and land for all citizens (Ministry in the office of the President, 1995:5-16; Aliber, 2003). A study by Corder (1997) revealed that there was a strong awareness of the program, yet its benefits weren’t commensurate. While citizens particularly the blacks, coloured and Indians enjoyed improved facilities such as social security, free health care, free houses to live in, etc, the RDP did not envisage large-scale redistribution in most sectors hence, it paid less attention to economic growth (Francis, 2006). Particularly, as expectations for employment increased and education showed a decline. Also, there was fiscal constraint due to the poor fiscal and economic legacy it inherited. Thus, at the beginning of 1996, RDP was dissolved for a broader policy that will accommodate the country’s stance.

*Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR)*: The GEAR programme is attached to the government’s macroeconomic stabilisation and structural framework. Following the RDP outcome, the South African Government pointed out the need for economic adjustment, improved revenue collection and the need to garner investors’ confidence. While the policy encompassed most of the social objectives of the RDP, it was also aimed to boost jobs and economic growth.
through promoting export promotion and privatisation (Chagunda, 2006; Francis, 2006). This shift was intended to make the South African economy more attractive for foreign direct investment, expand exports, make the public finances more sustainable and stimulate economic growth. Though this intention was slightly met, its poverty response was ineffective. While there was macroeconomic stability, increased accountability, and improvement in the management of public finances, private investment, job creation and GDP growth indicators were disappointing (Francis, 2006). Based on the objective of this policy, formal sector employment was expected to increase over five years to 1.3 million. Ironically, the period witnessed a rapid increase in job losses. Adelzadeh et al (1998) in their study highlighted a job loss of more than 800 000 individuals during the GEAR 1996-2000 period. For the FDI, South Africa recorded a lower FDI, which means fewer employment opportunities for the population thus having little impact on poverty reduction. This policy achieved very little success with the distribution of wealth. While it was sufficient for the achievement of macro-economic objectives, it fell short concerning the social challenges of the country like unemployment. This policy’s failure can be attributed to its formulation and implementation. According to Streak (2004), GEAR did not set specific targets for poverty reduction. Instead, the policy was premised on a neoliberal approach promoted by the World Bank and IMF (COSATU, 2001; Ndlovu, 2002). The Government failed to recognize that heavy reliance on sound macro-economic policy, liberalization and efficiency reforms and private sector investment was unlikely to produce rapid growth and development in South Africa (Streak, 1997:313-315).

Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA): ASGISA was approved in 2005 following the dissolution of GEAR. In line with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and taking into account the first 2 developmental strategies Post 1994 and the challenges encountered, the policy aimed to reduce poverty and halve unemployment by 2014 from 28% in 2004 to 14% by 2012 (SA history, 2014). The ASGISA was able to record a level of success such as GDP Growth, skills improvement, and the provision of jobs through the Extended Public Works Program (EPWP) (TMG, 2007; ASGISA, 2008). Although to Mosala et al (2017), unemployment and poverty remained unchanged nor worsened. Contestable, it is difficult to measure its success or otherwise as it was short-lived.
New Growth Plan (NGP): After President Mbeki’s tenure came to an end, the succeeding President Jacob Zuma replaced ASGISA with NGP. The NGP like other policies before it recognises the structural imbalance amongst citizens, the country’s poverty level and the high unemployment and seeks to rapidly reduce poverty, unemployment and inequality (Morris, 2013). The NGP aspired to create five million jobs by 2020 and reduce unemployment by 10% - largely through a public infrastructure programme (Morris, 2013). This means creating 500,000 jobs yearly. A year after, the minister of Economic Development who is handling the programme, Ebrahim Patel in a report stated that close to 200,000 jobs has been created (Baloyi, 2011). This is against the 500,000 jobs aimed for. However, determining the success or otherwise of this policy is difficult given its short span as the NDP was built on the NGP. However, scholars like Tregenna (2011) and Nattrass (2011) do not see the policy achieving a success rate due to ambiguity in the policy and the unrealistic goals set. For example, the NGP placed strong reliance on the private sector for the majority of its employment creation. Also, the institutional mechanism was unclear. According to Tregenna (2011), NGP acknowledges the many issues that needed to be addressed in the country. However, it gave little or no clear direction on how it is to be achieved.

National Development Plan (NDP): The NDP is the latest policy set up in reducing poverty in South Africa. Implemented three years before the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (formerly the Millennium Development Goals), NDP seeks to address poverty, unemployment, inequality, access to quality and affordable health care etc. Remarkably, 92% of the NDP objectives are in alignment with the UN SDGs 169 targets. According to a report by the National Planning Commission (NPC), before the formulation of the policy, the commission made up of 26 individuals came up with a diagnostic report as to the shortcoming and challenges faced by South African citizens. This report formed the basis of NDP which was adopted in September 2012. The NDP shows a long-term strategy to boost employment opportunities, quality education, and accessible and affordable health care while eliminating poverty and reducing inequality. According to World Bank (2015), South Africa’s NDP aims to generate 5 million jobs between the years 2010 and 2020; reducing unemployment and poverty to a low level in 2030). However, with this policy still ongoing, it is difficult to assess its success or failure. Nonetheless, studies so far have reflected its result to be far from expectation. There has been an increase in unemployment, inequality and the country’s poverty level which can be
attested to have been even before the break of the pandemic in late 2019 to early 2020. In the fourth quarter of 2021, South Africa’s unemployment was at 35.3%, in 2019, it was at 29% and in 2012, at the start of the implementation, it was at 24.73% (Statista, 2022).

Also, the inequality gap has widened and in March 2022, World Bank rated South Africa the most unequal country in the world (African News, 2022).

*Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)*: This is an international development policy set up with the onus of combating poverty globally (UNDP, 2010). Before it being known as SDGs, it was formerly known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The SDG entails 17 goals that work together to create a better world. These goals are formulated to end poverty, and inequality, and stop climate change while promoting global partnership amongst countries. Like other African countries that adopted the policy, South Africa is using the NDP to drive the realization of the goal.

*Social Assistance*: South Africa’s social assistance is another programme implemented by the government to reduce poverty. The programme which started in the ’80s was then and still is put to use with slight modifications to how it was when it was first implemented.

Social assistance is a mandate where the department of Government Social Welfare and Development provides social assistance to the poor and vulnerable people in society. This assistance includes the compensation fund, the unemployment insurance fund, the road accident fund, social relief of distress assistance and the common Grants-in-aid (Lings, 2014). These grants are directed at specific categories of vulnerable people and are given regularly (Ferreira, 2015). In South Africa, there are 6 main types of grants. They are child support, care dependency, foster care, state old, disability and war veterans’ grants.

Studies have shown that grants are mainly used in many households to survive in South Africa. According to a report by SASSA on the 4th of May 2022, nearly 50% of South Africans rely on social grants (Felix, 2022). Corroborating this is the evidence in the number of beneficiaries yearly. There has been an increase in the number of beneficiaries of grants, from 2.9 million in 1994 to 12 million in 2007, 13.4 million in 2009, 17 million in the 2017/2018 fiscal year then 18.2 million in 2019 (Budget Speech, 2007; May 2014; Meyer, 2021).
While this program is laudable following its contribution towards reducing poverty, its sustainability can be questioned. According to the National Treasury, for the 2021/2022 financial year, R195.5 billion was allocated to social grants and it is said to increase to R205.3 billion in 2022/23 (Meyer, 2021). Laying an argument, Meyer stressed the percentage of the Government budget that goes to the economic affair of the country is the same amount that goes towards grant allocation. The amount spent on the grant can be used for job creation or skill advancement because the grant has led some people who can work to rely solely on that (Meyer, 2021). Expressly, grants have created a dependency syndrome (Potts, 2012). Many of the beneficiaries of this programme do not value paying jobs and are satisfied and happy to rely on the government for their survival in form of grants. This indirectly increases the poverty rate instead of reducing it. Cheteni et al (2019) and Zikhali (2021) in their studies discovered that despite the measure of the grant provided by the Government, the lives of the people receiving them have not improved to a significant level, instead, it appears to be worsening. Dependency syndrome has inculcated more people into believing it’s a normal way of life and by that poverty continues to be recycled.

**Challenges facing Poverty Reduction Programs in South Africa**

As analysed in the preceding section, the South African government had adopted diverse policies to reduce poverty in the country. While these policies are good on paper with most of them being similar, the results do not equate to the outcome judging from the high poverty rate. Studies (Hulme and Sheperd, 2003; Francis, 2006; Brynard, 2011; Davids and Gouws, 2013; Ramphoma, 2014; World Bank, 2018) have attributed South Africa’s poverty figure despite the poverty reduction set up to chronic poverty entrenched over a long period due to the country’s history. However, the country’s long-standing history of inequality has not only been the underlying challenge affecting the results of the programms. Instead, the challenges can be attributed to factors such as:

*Policy Inconsistency:* This is occasioned by the frequent change in government. Most governments want to have projects to their name even when the framework is similar to that of the preceding governments. Thus, they fail to sustain or continue with projects initiated by their predecessors. For instance, ASGISA was changed to NGP.

Governments change focus or become preoccupied with another form of policy and in the end, fail to provide a comprehensive policy on poverty reduction.
**Corruption:** This is a major constraint to the effective implementation of the policies. As stated in the preceding section, corruption is one of the major factors that affect the full output of poverty reduction programmes. President Thabo Mbeki 2006 stressed corruption as a major hindrance to the country’s effort in alleviating poverty in the country (PSC, 2006). Corruption has a disproportionate impact on the poor and vulnerable. Levisha (2015) in her study attributed the lack of a clear framework for poverty reduction to be an underlying basis for corruption.

**Unrealistic Targets:** Many South African poverty reduction policies are laced with unrealistic targets making it difficult to achieve their outcome. For example, the GEAR and ASGISA policies as emphasized in the preceding section. Also, the NDP while good on paper, has been questioned to have unrealistic targets. According to the policy, 11 million new jobs are expected to have been established by 2030 with 90% of the jobs to be created by Small and Medium enterprises. This according to IEJ (2018) amounts to 9.9 million jobs out of the 11 million targets. However, the prospect of achieving this goal is slim as the country does not provide an enabling environment to support new and established entrepreneurs as it should. A report by the National Integrated Small Enterprise Development (NISED) gave the number of SMEs in the country has not grown from the 800,000 estimated in 1995, and from 1995 to 2022, only 330,000 can provide formal employment (NISED, 2022).

**Poor Implementation:** Many South African poverty reduction policies have been tholed with poor policy implementation. On paper, these policies look good but in delivery, it becomes difficult to execute. Most poverty reduction targets have been focused on tackling unemployment to combat ‘income poverty’ which has been regarded as a major factor for poverty increase. However, the strategies which the Government have employed to tackle this has been unproductive due to inefficient government bureaucracy. For example, tasking SMEs as major employment providers has created a heavy burden limiting their effectiveness since they have limited means to just go by. Likewise, many SMEs are disorganized with different sectors and spheres of government acting without any clear plan.

**Absence of Clear and Concise Framework:** There has been no clear and concrete framework to show how poverty can be tackled in the policies implemented. Thus, affecting the outcomes of the programme implemented. Reviewing 501 legislative policies and strategy documents under the Medium Strategic Framework outcomes of the NDP implementation strategy [2014-2019],
researchers at the Centre for Social Development in Africa discovered that while more than half of all the policy and strategy documents seek to address poverty, there isn’t a clear framework on how it seeks to execute these policies (Plagerson, 2021). Implicitly, implementation will be a mirage if there is no clear plan towards the execution.

**Neo-Liberal Policies:** The poor outcome of some poverty reduction policies has been based on neo-liberal policies adopted by the Government. The policies were believed to lead to economic growth that could translate to social development, job creation etc. thereby assisting with poverty reduction (Government of South Africa 1998, 58). Corroborating this, Harvey (2005:12) emphasized that neo-liberal policies were adopted on the misguided belief that they would benefit everyone. Ironically, the lens through which the program operates shows more concern with costs than actual empowerment and self-emancipation of the poor. Instead of addressing the poverty problems and balancing inequality, it deepened the problem. For instance, the result of the RDP and GEAR strategy. Nonetheless, this does not seem to resolve soon. As provided by Schneider (2018), every other economic and poverty reduction policy since GEAR has followed some version of neo-liberal policies. Implicitly, this equates that the result gotten might be similar based on past experiences.

**Policy Politicking:** Some of the programs implemented are to satisfy political interests or groups. The ANC government from its commencement stage seeks to rectify and address the deep-seated and racially charged inequality within the country. To do this, leaders emanating from the party are laced with the responsibility of restructuring the system in ensuring an equitable society. However, the interference from the party manifesto to state deliverables continues to lead to friction in a result. Fourie (2022) in his study analysed that RDP faced problems with the implementation of policies. According to Fourie, RDP’s problem was due to limited resources that were fiercely guided by those in the ANC parliament.

**Concluding Remarks and Way Forward**
South Africa has initiated many strategies in addressing poverty. However, these programs have fallen short in their results. South Africa’s government has linked many of its poverty reduction programs to macroeconomic policy. Based on the ANC manifesto, economic growth is a way to deal with the challenges of unemployment, inequality, poverty and redistribution. However, this
belief is debatable. Streak (1997) in her findings stressed that heavy reliance on macroeconomic policy is not enough to produce a result. Corroborating this, Heltberg (2002), revealed that economic growth does not translate to the prosperity of the population. In other words, you can have economic growth [which is a focal part of South Africa’s poverty reduction strategy] and still be poor. For instance, Nigeria witnessed an increase in its economic growth in 2017, and 2021, yet they are among the poorest in the world (AFDB, 2022; Aylward et al, 2017).

South African government has to base its poverty reduction programs on the combination of both macro-economic and developmental policies. Nevertheless, policies are not a guarantee to eradicate poverty. Many factors evolve around getting an unequivocal result from the policies. These include and are not limited to:

**Strict Monitoring and Evaluation (M and E):** One of the challenges affecting poverty reduction programmes is not supporting them with a monitoring and evaluation plan. Although the Government had established the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, the outcome of these policies is still in limbo with no monitoring and evaluation in place. Wotela (2017), in his study, stressed why monitoring and evaluation are not put in place with developmental interventions like poverty reduction. According to him, most findings of M and E are not politically desirable. The proper and effective application of M and E will ensure that the policy goals are clearly defined, problems and challenges swiftly identified and resolved, and beneficiaries easily identified. Ultimately, failures will be limited and successfully replicated.

**Focus-Oriented:** There should be a systematic and clear framework for poverty reduction. The government has many strategies in place but falls short in terms of implementation and delivery. Often at times, the policies come up to be similar making it difficult to analyse its progress, discover its limitations and rectify challenges that can be worked on.

**Ownership:** Continental targets should be a starting point and not a takeover. South Africa should take charge of its development trajectory. Each sphere of government must take ownership of its poverty reduction mandate. Country-level targets should play a significant role in shaping agenda-setting but not be the main focus or a replica. For instance, while the National Development Plan (NDP) exists with its own goals, strategies and objectives, each sphere can contextualize its policies to align with NDP objectives.
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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of digitalization on poverty entrepreneurship and social exclusion in three African countries: Nigeria, South Africa, and Morocco. The study aims to identify the challenges and opportunities presented by digitalization for entrepreneurs in low-income communities and examine how digital technologies affect social exclusion. The article employs a qualitative approach, combining desk research with an analysis of existing literature and reports. The findings reveal that digitalization has enabled poverty entrepreneurs to access new markets, reduce costs, and improve their business efficiency. However, the digital divide remains a significant obstacle, limiting access to digital technologies and skills. The study recommends a holistic approach that addresses the structural issues that perpetuate poverty and social exclusion, including investing in infrastructure, providing training and skills acquisition, and establishing entrepreneurship education. It conducts a literature review in the Moroccan context by exploring the correlation between digitalization, entrepreneurship, and poverty. The article highlights the need for policymakers and stakeholders to prioritize digitalization as a means of enhancing social inclusion for poverty entrepreneurs in Africa.

Keywords: Developing countries, Digitalization, Digital technology, Poverty entrepreneurship, Social exclusion
Introduction

Over the past few decades, digitalization has transformed the world, particularly the developing countries, in profound ways. It has opened up new avenues for economic growth and has created opportunities for poverty entrepreneurship. Digitalization, as a transformative force, has been widely discussed in the literature as a potential solution to the challenges faced by developing economies, such as high levels of poverty and unemployment. When entrepreneurship and digitalization are combined, the results are overwhelmingly beneficial for the socioeconomic growth of particular regions and countries (Kwilinski et al., 2020). However, the impact of digitalization on poverty entrepreneurship and social exclusion in Africa remains a contested issue that requires further exploration.

The research focuses on exploring the impact of digitalization on poverty entrepreneurship and social exclusion in three African countries: Morocco, Nigeria, and South Africa. The selection of the three African countries is motivated by their varying levels of economic development, technological infrastructure, and policy frameworks. This comparative approach will allow for a nuanced understanding of the factors that influence the impact of digitalization on poverty entrepreneurship and social exclusion in Africa.

This study uses desk research method, which involves collecting and analyzing existing data and information from secondary sources such as academic literature, government reports, journals, conference papers, working papers, websites, and other forms of written communication by various scholars and experts in the field. The data has been carefully gathered from multiple sources to provide a detailed overview of the topic. In this study, we purposely incorporates a diverse range of articles to ensure that we thoroughly integrate this literature. This paper delves into entrepreneurship, poverty, and digitalization, as well as the assumptions and viewpoints of each phenomenon.

The findings of this study have important implications for policymakers, entrepreneurs, and other stakeholders involved in promoting economic development, poverty reduction, and social inclusion. By understanding the challenges and opportunities presented by digitalization in these three countries, we can develop more effective policies and programs that promote economic growth and reduce poverty while ensuring that the benefits of digitalization are accessible to all.
Clarification of Concepts

**Poverty**
The World Bank states that the poverty line for emerging economies is when individuals live with an income of less than $2 per day. Currently, an estimated 2.47 billion people are living in this type of poverty globally. Poverty is a complex and challenging phenomenon marked by poor living conditions. It manifests in various forms, expressions, and circumstances (Odhiambo et al., 2005). "Poverty is hunger," according to a World Bank statement on understanding poverty. Poverty is defined as a lack of shelter. Being sick and not being able to see a doctor is an indication of poverty. Poverty is defined as the inability to read and the lack of educational opportunities. A lack of employment characterizes poverty, worry about the future and survival day-to-day. Poverty is a multi-faceted concept that encompasses both monetary deprivation and deprivation in terms of capability, susceptibility, and power over institutions that affect one's life (Bolnick, 2006).

**Entrepreneurship**
Entrepreneurship is critical for success and well-being at the individual, familial, communal, and national levels (Hisrich et al., 2007). In the 1700s, the term "Entrepreneurship" was meant to describe the risk of purchasing at a fixed price and selling at a variable price (James & Cantillon, 1953). As one of the critical drivers of economic development, entrepreneurship is considered a feasible strategy for supporting emerging economies in their development (Christensen et al., 2010; Kimmitt et al., 2020). Furthermore, poverty's main difficulties are overcome in developing countries (Si et al., 2020; Sutter et al., 2019).

Entrepreneurship is the process of starting a new business from the ground up. It is the process of making something valuable by dedicating significant time and effort and embracing the associated financial and societal risks (Salako and Adebusuyi, 2008).

**Poverty Entrepreneurship**
Poverty entrepreneurship is the key concept of the study, it is a form of entrepreneurship that focuses on creating economic opportunities for people living in poverty. It is a way for people to use their skills, resources, and creativity to improve their lives and create sustainable livelihoods. Poverty entrepreneurs create and develop businesses that provide goods and services to people at
the base of the economic pyramid, often in their own communities. These businesses can be anything from small-scale retail shops to larger production facilities or services. Poverty entrepreneurs often operate in the informal sector of the economy, where they have limited access to capital, infrastructure, and skilled labor. Poverty entrepreneurs also have to face the challenge of limited access to markets, including local, regional, and global markets (He, 2019), which can make it difficult for them to reach potential customers and earn a profit.

**Digitalization**

Digitalization refers to the use of digital technologies in business, the economy, and society and the ability to connect products, people, and entire organizations (Autio, 2017). Acquisition, integration, and technical infrastructure support scientific and technological activities, create innovation skills, and ensure long-term business success (Soh & Subramanian, 2014). Digital technologies may be used to improve, extend, and enhance interactions between economic and societal constituents (Autio & Thomas, 2016). The use of computer-based solutions for business objectives is called digital technology adoption (Urbinati et al., 2020). Such smartphone apps can assist in cost reduction, profit growth, and competitive advantage (Soluk et al., 2021).

**Intersection between Digitalization, Entrepreneurship and Poverty**

Entrepreneurship, digitalization, and poverty are all interconnected and have the potential to impact one another. Digitalization, which refers to the integration of technology into various aspects of society, can provide new opportunities for entrepreneurship, especially in developing countries where traditional forms of economic activity may be limited. This can help to create jobs, stimulate economic growth, and reduce poverty.

However, access to technology and digital skills can be a barrier to entrepreneurship for individuals living in poverty. This is often referred to as the "digital divide," which refers to the gap between those who have access to technology and digital skills and those who do not (van Dijk, 2006). Adding significant barriers to digitalizing entrepreneurship are lack of access to market distribution channels, lack of initial startup capital, human capital, and skilled labor, lack of business culture and literacy, lack of business support at different stages of development, especially growth management, financing, investing (He, 2019). To bridge the digital divide and address these barriers in order to ensure that all individuals have an equal opportunity to participate
in the digital economy, governments and other organizations may need to invest in programs and initiatives to provide access to technology and training in digital skills.

Digitalization enables small businesses to become more competitive by removing the exclusivity of previously unexplored markets (Darbyshire, 2008). Given the emphasis on increasing and accelerating the use of internet technologies in underdeveloped countries (Martin & Matlay, 2001). The Internet is a medium for commerce and marketing (Sparkes & Thomas, 2001), it allows these small entrepreneurs to gain market share and achieve competitive advantage (Darbyshire, 2008).

In today's digital age, the term information and communication technology (ICT) has broadened to embrace many areas of computing technology and is more widely recognized than ever before (Ouajdouni Abdelaziz et al., 2022). Big data and cloud computing adoption enable sophisticated business analytics to deliver real-time information about demand and supply, which helps entrepreneurs successfully target and explore niche markets (He, 2019).

Even though digital technology adoption is becoming increasingly important for any entity in developing countries, few studies have looked into the role of digital technology in boosting entrepreneurship (Martin-Rojas et al., 2019).

**African Benchmarking Perspective**

*The Case of Nigeria (2019):*

In Nigeria, and according to (Ogundele & al., 2012), if entrepreneurship is supported at all levels of government, particularly at the local and community level, it will help to alleviate poverty by promoting youth empowerment and the growth of social welfare services. The Nigerian government declared war on poverty by promoting entrepreneurship and expanding numerous poverty alleviation programs (Ezeanyeji, Imoagwu and Ejefobihi, 2020). Similarly, (Osuagwu, 2002) highlighted the importance of entrepreneurial development in Nigeria as a turning point for accelerating economic growth, creating jobs, reducing manufactured product imports, and reducing trade imbalances caused by such imports. In Nigeria, entrepreneurship is the key to long-term wealth creation (Ogundele, O.J.K, 2000).

The study led by Ezeanyeji Clement, Imoagwu Chika, and Ejefobihi Ugochukwu is titled “entrepreneurship development and poverty reduction in Nigeria: the synergy” (Ezeanyeji,
Imoagwu & Ejefobihi, 2020). The theoretical research they conducted suggested that education has a favorable impact on production in both the non-agricultural and agricultural sectors. Pinkney (1997) demonstrates a significant reduction in poverty due to increased academic achievement. They believe that to enhance entrepreneurial activities; basic human needs should all be satisfied first. Van De Wale (1990) conducted a study on poverty reduction in Nigeria, and she concluded that meeting basic needs alleviates some of the worst effects of poverty. She argued that those who are well, well-nourished, and educated have a greater living level than those who are sick, hungry, and uneducated. The report highlights the obstacles of government officials pressuring entrepreneurs for money, a lack of infrastructure, such as inadequate roads, water shortages, intermittent electricity supply, a weak telecommunication system, and difficulty obtaining bank credits. The most severe and harmful issue affecting Nigerian entrepreneurship is the government's lack of interest in and support for micro and macro enterprises. Access to finance, access to licenses/permits, corruption, courts, crime, customs and trade registration, electricity, an inadequately educated labor force, employment laws, political uncertainty, informal sector practices, tax system, business taxes, and logistics were also mentioned as challenges in the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (Ezeanyeji, Imoagwu & Ejefobihi, 2020).

**The Case of South Africa (2010)**

The study led by S.N.-A. Mensah and E. Benedict titled ‘Entrepreneurship training and poverty alleviation Empowering the poor in the Eastern Free State of South Africa’ has a purpose to determine the role of entrepreneurship training in poverty alleviation and job creation in the poorest regions of South Africa. The methodology used is desk research and quantitative analysis of survey data collected. They discussed the government's focus on poverty alleviation strategies since 1994. They concluded that poverty alleviation handouts should be granted only to those who are not employed or who are undertaking training to gain skills that are relevant to the job market or to learn how to run their own businesses (Mensah & Benedict, 2010). They suggested that hand-out measures alone may not be sufficient to effectively address the poverty problem in South Africa, as they may simply be a form of consumption that leads to frustration and protests. To make these measures more effective, they should be used as conditions for providing training and
skills acquisition, with a particular focus on entrepreneurship training, to help people out of poverty.

The paper has argued that providing entrepreneurship training could help to increase the capacity of the MSE sector to generate growth and create jobs and that such training would be most effective when combined with a proactive approach from existing government micro-credit and micro-finance structures. The fact that neither industrialized nor resource-rich countries have been able to completely eradicate poverty shows the difficulty of the problem. Therefore, poverty alleviation programs must be implemented with care and focus on empowering the poor.

*The Case of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa (2018)*

Lekhanya (2018) has revealed that most participants choose to utilize their digital equipment for personal conversations and social networking rather than for business. He discovered additional layers of digitalization used by entrepreneurs in developing countries. The study aimed to display how entrepreneurs can use entrepreneurship in the region for survival, growth, and success.

The study presented the internal factors affecting the performance of small business owners, such as management skills and expertise, technical skills that are a must, and education and training. External factors include political, sociodemographic, socioeconomics, Technology, and competitive environment. Entrepreneurship education played a significant role in the study; it has been established that the primary hindrance to the economic progress of entrepreneurs is a lack of training and education, which results in the inability to mobilize and coordinate all required input materials. The main difficulty mentioned is the poor diffusion rate of Technology, which can only highlight the massive impact digitalization, has on the productivity and effectiveness of entrepreneurship. Technology is essential because it helps small businesses access mass markets, connect with global supply chains, track customers cost-effectively, and improve internal processes.

The study also demonstrated that information and communication technologies (ICTs) could promote socioeconomic development, such as poverty reduction, and, more specifically, facilitate the growth of small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs).
The findings of the study were the following:

- Regarding the attitude toward entrepreneurial digitalization, the most frequent variable is that Internet costs are very high.
- The most frequent method of digitalization is social media.
- As for the benefits of entrepreneurial digitalization, access to international markets is the most frequent.
- The factors affecting entrepreneurial digitalization are mainly economic factors.
- Internet marketing is the central area of knowledge and understanding of entrepreneurial digitalization.
- Reducing advertising costs is the primary reason behind the implication of entrepreneurial digitalization.

**The Moroccan Context**

In order to define the economic structure in which we will work, we sought to study feminine entrepreneurship; most of the extant research on digital adoption by entrepreneurs has focused on men, leaving feminine entrepreneurship in absolute obscurity. Several studies have shown the differences and gender inequalities in entrepreneurship, such as obtaining funding due to skepticism about women's capacity to start or run a business (OCDE, 2004); Moroccan women face this difficulty the most (Asli, Amina, and Nour, 2018).

**The Moroccan culture**

We sought to look first at the cultural aspect, women's labor outside the home has long been frowned upon in Moroccan culture; Islam highly influences our culture. Even though Islam kept women's rights safe, after all, human interpretations have accumulated in religious production, as well as in mentalities, and that have been aided by sociocultural and political contexts that are structurally hostile to the presence of women (Lamrabet, 2015). It has been proven that Moroccan society's patriarchal and sexist nature impedes female entrepreneurship (Asli, Amina and Nour, 2018). This has been an issue for women since their childhood, their education was never based on developing their self-assurance, autonomy, a feeling of risk, and a zest for invention are all skills that any individual who desires to start and run their own firm must have (Rachdi, 2006). Morocco ranked 144 out of 156 in the World Economic Forum on Gender Equality's March 2021
global gender gap report (World Economic Forum, 2021), a rank that keeps getting lower and lower over the years, in 2019, Morocco ranked 139 out of 156. This is a dismal ranking, given the country's attempts to establish gender equality as promised by the constitution.

**Positioning of the Study**

We will acknowledge poverty as an entry variable since women are more affected by unemployment than men, especially in urban areas (20.6% compared to 11.5% for men) (Constantinidis & al., 2017). Digitalization is the moderating variable between poverty and entrepreneurship, also taking the cultural aspect into account. We hypothesize that if women employ digital tools more in their entrepreneurial ventures, the rates of poverty and social exclusion will decrease significantly.

**Conclusion**

This article has explored the impact of digitalization on poverty entrepreneurship and social inclusion in Morocco, Nigeria, and South Africa. Through a Desk research approach, we have highlighted the challenges and opportunities presented by digitalization in these countries and the potential for digital technologies to promote economic growth, reduce poverty, and foster social inclusion.

Our findings show that digitalization has the potential to create new opportunities for poverty entrepreneurship and promote economic growth, but it also presents new challenges related to social exclusion and the digital divide. We found that digitalization has the potential to widen the gap between those who have access to digital technologies and those who do not, exacerbating poverty and inequality. For instance, access to the internet and digital technologies is often limited in rural areas and among low-income communities, perpetuating poverty and inequality. Additionally, digital platforms and technologies can also exacerbate existing inequalities by favoring certain groups over others, such as those with higher levels of education and technological literacy.

Our study highlights the need for policies and programs that address these challenges and ensure that the benefits of digitalization are accessible to all. Policymakers can play a critical role in promoting digitalization and entrepreneurship by providing funding and support for digital
infrastructure, education, and training and addressing the underlying structural issues that perpetuate poverty and social exclusion, such as limited access to education and training, inadequate infrastructure, and inadequate regulatory frameworks. They can also implement regulations and policies that promote digital inclusion, such as promoting access to affordable internet services and supporting the development of digital skills. Moreover, we suggest that policies and programs aimed at promoting digitalization and entrepreneurship need to be tailored to the specific contexts of each country, taking into account the cultural, social, and economic factors that shape the local entrepreneurship ecosystems. Furthermore, we argue that policymakers Our study has several limitations, including the use of secondary data and the limited scope of our primary data collection. Future research should utilize more extensive primary data collection methods, including surveys and interviews with a more diverse range of stakeholders.

Despite these limitations, our study provides valuable insights into the impact of digitalization on poverty entrepreneurship in Morocco, Nigeria, and South Africa. We hope that our findings will contribute to the development of more effective policies and programs that promote poverty reduction and economic growth through digital entrepreneurship.
References:


Governance Practices and Performance of the Territorialized Networks of Organizations (TNOs): The Case of the Port Tangier

Mohamed Makkaoui and Hind Belaziz

Abstract
This article discussed the role of the growth of territorialized networks of organizations in improving territorial attractiveness, contributing to competitiveness, and the place of territorial actors in the public in terms of management and economic development. The mode of governance put in place by the state is one of the key elements in achieving these ambitious and strategic objectives. Commitments and the obligation to control costs and impacts on the territory have led the Moroccan state to initiate an innovative mode of governance with the creation in 2003 of the Tangier-Mediterranean Special Agency (TMSA), which is a public limited company with a Management and Supervisory Board. This research is a contribution to the analysis of the relationship between the governance practices of territorialized networks of organizations and the role of public management in these networks. Through library search and a qualitative exploration, the research sought to understand the strategic role played by the actors and how this has strengthened the confidence of stakeholders; examined the role of the leadership and the decision-making bodies managing this network, and the contribution of participatory public management practices in promoting innovation among member companies. The findings showed that the leadership has contributed significantly in improving the performance of TNOs’ member companies by good governance practices, which has encouraged a more participatory public management.

Keywords: Collaborative governance, Governance practices, GPI Tangier Med, Public management, Territorialized Networks of Organizations.
**Introduction**

Territorialized Networks of Organizations (TNOs) are the engines and tools of economic development\(^1\). This explains why there are more territorialized networks of innovative organizations and companies throughout the world. Emerging companies work together on collaborative innovation projects. These innovation hubs aim to combine industrial and research skills at the regional level. In this context, the network appears as a real regional policy tool, because it has a positive impact on innovation, business performance, regional economic growth, and national competitiveness (Rocha, 2004). In fact, these territorial networks are not identical in their performance; on the contrary, they are very heterogeneous, and some succeed and develop while others fail at the start-up stage.

We can contend that in the broader sense, the concept of governance is an overall arrangement characterizing, from the strategic point of view, the distribution of powers, the collective decision-making processes, and the management within a community. It is therefore a meta-coordination combining different coordination mechanisms and different modes of regulation (Malo, 2003).

Therefore, the question arises about the link between governance and innovation performance of these TNOs and their public management efficiency. Indeed, the study of the relationship between the practices of the governance of this network, the public management, and the innovation performance of member companies, constitute the general problem of this study. To answer the problem, we employed a qualitative methodology to investigate a Moroccan TNO, which constitutes the empirical perimeter of this article, which is presented in four stages. We will first analyze the impact of network governance practices; and then discuss the practices of building trust and leadership among business innovation members. We will then present the methodology adopted as well as our field of study chosen to deal with our problem; and finally, we will present a synthesis and discuss the findings from the research.

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\(^1\) Regional Economic Development Plan, Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur Regional Council, 2006, p.13
Analysis of the Impact of Network Governance Practices on the Innovation Performance of TNOs

First, let us deal with the evolution, specificities and practices of governance, particularly the practices for establishing trust and leadership of RTOs. Secondly, we shall examine their impact on the innovation performance of members companies

**Innovative TNOs Governance**

TNOs bring together various stakeholders, internal or external, public or private, autonomous or interdependent, in competition or in cooperation, thus inducing complexity, even confusion. Moreover, the term network suggests the idea of “tangle” and illustrates the need for the establishment of a more or less structured coordination, and governance. Governance steers networks and ensures their stability (McGuire and Agranoff, 2007), their sustainability (Ehlinger, et al., 2007), and their performance (Provan and Milward, 1999; Dumoulin, et al., 2000; Provan, et al., 2007).

**The Diversity of TNOs Shapes**

There is a large diversity in the forms of the TNOs, among which we can mention: the Marshallian industrial district, the local production systems (SPL), the innovative environment, and the cluster. These are business-to-business relationships based on the existence of savings agglomeration. This refers to external economies of scale linked to the geographical location of the collocated companies. The result is a progressive division of the work, pooling of resources, and specialization of knowledge, ensuring that businesses benefit from reduced transaction and infrastructure costs and a sharing of labor market, suppliers, knowledge and technical expertise (Berthinier, 2013).

Elhinger, Perret and Chabaud (2007) define territorial networks of organizations as coordinated sets of heterogeneous actors, geographically close, who cooperate and collectively participate in a production process. This definition makes it possible to target the specific characteristics of TNOs compared to other networks of organizations. The heterogeneity of the actors comes at different levels. Members can thus have different sizes ranging from very small businesses to multinational companies, based on the logic different economies, or even belong to different organizational fields (Mendez and Bardet, 2009).
From Corporate Governance to the Governance of TNOs

Innovation is a structuring element making it possible to ensure the stability, growth and performance of TNOs, although research on their modes of governance is still very limited (Ehlinger et al, 2007). Governance of the TNO’s is indeed explained by several factors including the variety of stakeholders, the heterogeneity of the logics to be considered, as well as the form and nature of the respective contributions of the actors to the value creation process.

In this sense, the members or actors of the TNOs are very heterogeneous. They encompass private and public actors, individual and collective stakeholders too, without any relationship of subordination and enjoy total freedom of entry and exit, depending on their own strategic interest (Gomez, 2009). The study and analysis of the governance of the TNOs therefore encourage us to take into consideration other dimensions different from the traditional conceptions of corporate governance.

The Impact of Trust-building Practices and TNOs’ Leadership on Innovation and Performance of Member Companies

Work on TNOs’ governance has revolutionized public management. The analysis of its role as a determinant of business innovation members remains a fertile field and little approached. We first present the role of the governance practices of these structures, in particular the implementation practices and leadership in mobilizing member companies towards more innovation.

Roles of TNOs’ Governance Practices and Public Management in Mobilizing Stakeholders towards More of Innovation

Governance is a concept understood as a steering and coordination structure. In this context, we distinguish three main methods around which actions to promote innovation are organized by stakeholder governance (Baron, 2003):

- Governance as a mode of coordination: This allows authorities in the management of these structures to initiate, organize relations between actors and contribute to the emergence of collaborative dynamics (Mendez et al, 2009).
- Governance as a mode of regulation: This involves the formalization and regulation of issues of power and delegation of authority for decision-making strategic decisions, given
that the members of these structures are very diverse with divergent and sometimes contradictory interests (Leroux et al, 2010).

- Governance as a mode of knowledge management: It makes it possible to stimulate the creation of new knowledge by promoting the emergence of opportunities for exchanges of knowledge between companies in these structures (Arikan, 2011).

The purpose of public management is to study organizations in order to improve: the functioning of organizations and institutions, the development of public policies, the principles of management and governance in order to build the brand image of a territory.

The Conceptual Model and Theoretical Assumptions of the Study

From existing literature, it was noted that very few studies have quantitatively analyzed this relationship in the Moroccan context. The research model will show that the innovation performance of member companies of the TNOs does not only depend on the positive externalities linked to the structure but also of a determining element, namely the practices of the governance of the various stakeholders and public management, which prompts us to ask ourselves specific questions. The interest of the latter consists in knowing:

- To what extent does the degree of trust in the TNO positively influence the product innovation of TNO member companies?
- To what extent does leadership positively influence the innovation of member companies?

We will therefore answer our main question of research: “What is the impact of TNOs’ governance practices and public management on the innovation performance of member companies?”

Research Methodology

According to Gauthier (1993), a paradigm designates a set of rules that guide research science by providing, based on universally recognized knowledge, ways to pose problems, to carry out research and to find solutions. Given the relative novelty of our research theme in the Moroccan context, we have chosen to begin our study with a qualitative exploration. We stopped our collection of data at the level of ten people when we reached theoretical saturation, which is according to Yin (2003), when we no longer find additional information to enrich the theory. The choice of the qualitative approach is explained by the following reasons:
• Not much has been done in the area of corporate governance and TNOs practices as it relates to Morocco, a gap that this study attempted to fill.
• The qualitative study will allow us to take into account the specificity of the Moroccan context regarding TNOs governance practices. This will allow us to better identify these different variables and determinants in order to be able to give meaning to the articulations between the variables of the research.
• In addition, the qualitative study will allow us to clearly define the extent to which the variables from the review of the literature manifest in reality, and specify the positive or negative natures of the respective effects.

However, the emerging nature of our research encouraged us to adopt an exploratory approach based on the administration of a semi-directive interview guide with institutions and heads of governance bodies of the targeted TNOs. Our interviews were conducted face-to-face, and the interviews took an average of more than 40 minutes, and we were able to answer all the questions in our interview guide.

Presentation of the Field of the Study
To address the problem, we chose the large industrial Port Tangier Med as TNO, and TMSA as governance of the network.

Genesis of the Large Industrial Port Tangier Med
This section is devoted to the presentation of the genesis of the large industrial port Tangier Med, its ecosystem, and its mode of governance. Tangier Med is a Moroccan industrial port complex, located on the Straits of Gibraltar, with a processing capacity of up to 9 million containers and 4.7 million passengers. Tangier Med is also made up of an industrial platform that currently houses nearly 1,100 companies representing an annual business volume in 2020 of EUR 5.3 billion operating in various sectors such as automotive, aeronautics, food, logistics and textiles.

The port complex of Tangier Med extends over 1000 Ha and includes:
- the Tangier Med 1 port, which includes two container terminals, a rail terminal, a hydrocarbon terminal, a general cargo terminal, and a vehicle terminal
- the Tangier Med 2 port, which includes two container terminals
- the Tangier Med Passengers port, which includes the passenger and truck boarding docks, the regulation areas, and the ferry terminal a Tangier Med business center (Tangier Med Port Center)
- The Tangier Med platform includes: Tangier Free Zone, Tangier Automotive City, Tetouan Park, Tetouan Shore, Zone Franche Logistique and Renault Tangier Med

There are two types of stakeholders in this sphere. These are:

*External stakeholders:* External stakeholders include all actors physically external to the large industrial port Tangier Med, but whose activity has an influence on its functioning. External stakeholders operate a strategic governance, which translates into the representative bodies of the actors, who intervene in the management committee of the large industrial port Tangier Med in order to develop collective rules, these are:

- **The state:** The representatives of MICNT and the Ministry of the Economy and Finance personify the state. These two stakeholders represent the central power and their main mission is to ensure the conformity of the project of the national strategy and national programs initiated to promote PII and new MMMs. They also play a role of transmission coordination and political orientations taken at the central level.

- **Local authorities:** The local authorities are represented by the Tangier -Tétouan- regional council AL Hoceima, the regional investment center (CRI) and the urban municipality of Tangier. The local authorities are responsible for urban development, basic services, commercial equipment and various facilities at socio-economic vocation benefited from the GPI Tangier Med.

- **Other private/public institutions and funding bodies:** These include the CDG, CIMR, Attijari Capital Development, Hassan II Fund for Development Economic and Social, BMCE Bank, FIPAR Holdings, Asma Investment, RMA WATAIYA, AZIT (Association of the Industrial Zone of Tangier) and the Agency for the Promotion and Development of the North (APDN). All of these parts play an extremely important role in the development of GPI.
The Tangier Mediterranean Special Agency (TMSA): The TMSA was created by a decree-law in 2003, the TMS is a public limited company with a Management Board and a Supervisory Board, with a capital of 818,000,000 dirhams. TMSA is controlled directly by the State through the Hassan II Fund for Economic and Social Development. It plays the role of pilot, metronome and interface between the government, major contractors, institutions GPI. Tangier Mediterranean Special Agency (TMSA) has been able to adapt its port offer to changes in the maritime environment and port. It has thus established a favorable framework for the emergence of new economic dynamics. In 2011, TMSA set up a new organization dedicated to the spin-off strategy for its operational activities, for better governance of the GPI. This organization is based on three major actions (TMPA, 2014):

1. Organization of TMSA in a “Holding” structure
2. Adoption of the company "Tangier Free Zone" (TFZ) as the exclusive support of TMSA holding company devoted to the management of free zones and industrial zones.
3. Subsidiary of the port activity through the company “Tangier Med Port Authority” (TAMPA).

Companies: Companies were invited to play the role of locomotive and leader. The idea behind the creation of the GPI Tangier Med is to attract as many foreign companies as possible. Therefore, we can notice that the vast majority of established companies are foreign companies in different industries. This does not exclude the existence of Moroccan companies, most of which are subcontractors in the automotive and textile industries.

The OFPPT: To support the upskilling of the workforce Morocco, the Tangier Med group has facilitated the installation, in its areas of activity. Educational establishments and specialized institutes such as the OFPPT, offer courses and continuing education in branches related to the activities developed in these areas. Also, the Tangier Med Foundation has signed a partnership agreement with the OFPPT for the creation of the training center and capacity building for the women of Ksar Al Majaz.

ANAPEC: The professional integration of young people is one of the projects to which the foundation places special interest. A partnership agreement has been signed with Fahs Anjra Province and the National Agency for the Promotion of Employment and ANAPEC skills for the creation of a platform dedicated to support young people from the Fahs Anjra
province seeking employment. The platform opened its doors to young job seekers who are integrating into the local job market or entrepreneurship (Self-employment, income-generating activities income). The Tangier Med Foundation took charge of the development work and equipment for the platform and mobilized a budget envelope of operation for a period of 2 years. Since its conception, the Tangier Med project has enabled the creation of 75,000 jobs, including 5,000 exclusively at the port level. In total, five activity areas contribute to the creation of wealth and jobs, depend on Tangier Med, and arouse emulation behind the port complex. In this sense, an agreement has been signed with ANAPEC and the local authorities for the opening of an orientation and assistance center for the integration of young people into the province of Ksar-Sghir. This helps them to avoid having to travel to Tangier to find out about available employment opportunities.

- **Tangier Med Foundation:** The Tangier Med Foundation consolidates the TMSA's corporate social responsibility and sustainability strategy. Created in May 2007, the Tangier Med Foundation carries, realizes and accompanies the initiatives of the Tangier-Tetouan region by working for structuring projects in partnership with local authorities, governmental institutions and local associations. The actions of the Foundation are mainly focused on the fields of education and health as well as vocational and sociocultural training. Its main projects were: 1. Education: Tangier Med Prize for Excellence, School Transport, ecological schools, technical schools. 2. Health: Medical Caravan, Hemodialysis Center, Fnideq Maternity Home. 3. Vocational training: Transport of young people from the communes of Ksar Sghir, Ksar AL Majaz, Melloussa and Jouamaa. 4. Socio-cultural: Women's Training and Skills Building Center of Ksar Al Majaz, Melloussa local center, Belyounech women's home, Construction of an Aydada cheese dairy, cheese-making cooperative traditional Melloussa.

- **Abdelmalek Essaadi University (UAE):** The UAE has signed a one-year agreement duration of 3 years with TMSA on December 20, 2004. It is a cooperation agreement to develop projects to support the installation of the Tangier port MED and the development of the region. The objectives of the convention are to mobilize the knowledge, expertise and knowledge of the university at the service of development economic and social development of the Tangier Med zone. The university launched a call for proposal on April
13, 2005, for carrying out the studies, they received 13 research axis proposals and they retained 3 projects.

**Governance of the Tangier Med Industrial Port**
The formal structure of the governance of the large Tangier Med port includes a general assembly, a board of directors called "steering committee" and an animation team. The members of the governance also called the steering committee to represent the various constituent members of the stakeholders of these structures, that is to say, the companies, the research and training centers. Among the missions of this committee of piloting we evoke the support and the development of the strategic vision of these structures.

**Analysis and Implications of Research Results**
In this paragraph we will first analyze the impact of the leadership practices of the steering bodies of the TNO's and practices for creating trust and public management on the innovation of co-tenant companies. We will then present the managerial implications of our research.

**Analysis of the Impact of the Leadership of the Steering Bodies on Innovation**
Initially, we looked at the role of the leadership of the steering bodies of the large industrial port Tangier Med in the development of innovation. We were able to find in all of the interviews carried out that leadership retains a prominent place in the conduct and success of innovation projects.

That said, leadership is the main guarantor of success or failure of innovation projects. According to the response of a director of a company within the TNO, "leadership plays a very important role in the success and incitement to innovation and commercial performance of member companies, through the establishment of good practices that would push towards a more participative public management…"

It was noted from the interviews that the leadership at the level of the governance bodies of this structure has a very important place in the determination of good management practices allowing, thanks to its involvement, to motivate and ensure the adherence of members and stakeholders. It was also noticed that, thanks to its strong implication and its clear and shared vision, this leadership can bring its organization towards a clear and precise language on the way that its structure will
pursue towards innovation and performance. This is an essential effort that leadership will play in order to ensure the consistency of actions. In most of the interviews, we were able to highlight the importance of the notion of a shared vision of leadership of the steering bodies with the parties’ stakeholders in particular member companies. Indeed, leadership and governance and public management are, in general, a factor that stimulates innovation.

**Analysis of the Impact of Stakeholder Trust on Innovation**

According to our interviews, we were able to observe that the mutual trust between the actors or stakeholders and in particular the member companies is a determining factor in the success of collaborative work leading to innovation in this kind of structure. However, among the missions of the governance of the great Tangier Med port is the creation of trust between the different members and actors of this structure. Time is indeed an important factor in creating trust which can be seen as the basis for the development of collaborative collective work. In this sense, one of our respondents noted that “…trust is important for the success of collaborative projects and that is the role of the steering committee…”.

**Managerial Implications of Research**

The managerial contribution of this research is of interest to those in charge of regions and local authorities, as well as members of governance, since it contributes to defining the conditions for the success or failure of innovation structures and public management especially by the NWT’s. Indeed, these officials should seek the best practices of territorial governance likely to adhere to the various stakeholders in order to ensure the territorial attractiveness of these structures to attract investors and local and foreign entrepreneurs to promote innovation, employment and the growth of their territories and region. In this context, we propose to:

- Better develop trust, which is an influential contextual variable in a context of innovation.
- Ensure the training of managers of the TNOs possessing the qualities of leadership so that they can ensure the involvement, mobilization and accountability of all internal and external stakeholders.
Conclusion

It can be argued that the governance practices of the Grand Port Tangier Med has contributed to the innovation performance of co-located companies and to the network performance. The first contribution of this research is the proposal of targeted and limited indicators allowing the members of the governance and the public management of this network and company managers to measure the innovation performance of member companies.

Indeed, the results of our study have enabled us to confirm that trust and leadership contribute to improving the innovation performance of network member companies by establishing good practices such as the ones that would push towards more participatory public management.

However, these results remain limited by time, which brings us back to a certain number of questions and perspectives that can push us towards the development of other avenues of research. Therefore, the results of this study may have excluded other governance variables that could have helped to better explain the innovation behavior of member companies.
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Transforming Conflict in a Post-Genocide Society: An Evaluation of the ‘One Cow Per Poor Family’ Program in Rwanda

Francois Masabo, Jean Baptiste Ndikubwimana, Marie Claire Uwamahoro

Abstract

This study is a collaborative research of three scholars from the College of Arts and Social Sciences, which benefitted from a research grant provided by the University of Rwanda. The study’s objectives were, to evaluate the uniqueness of the ‘One Cow Per Poor Family’ program as compared to other programs in post-conflict reconstruction; and to capture the transformation process of attitudes, feelings, and judgments across the divides between genocide survivors and genocide perpetrators. It used interpretivist epistemology. Through a human needs theory, findings indicated that the uniqueness of ‘One Cow Per Poor’ Family program lies in the strength of restoring unity and reconciliation through the satisfaction of psychosocial and economic needs at the same time. The program enabled conflict transformation because beneficiaries were able to meet their basic needs and that the program worked towards restoring broken relationships during the genocide. Some shortfalls hindering the program to become more effective include too much involvement of the local leaders in the implementation of the policy. Such involvement includes fixing or influencing the list of beneficiaries of the program, thus hijacking the palliative measures from the masses that really should benefit. This changes the course and becomes an elitist monopoly, which may prevent the program from its uniqueness. The study suggests perpetuating the uniqueness of the program that espouses a model of peace from the bottom embedded in the process of peace sustenance through interpersonal relationship rehabilitation.

Keywords: One Cow Per Family, Post-conflict reconstruction, Post-genocide Rwanda
Introduction

In the aftermath of the genocide committed against the Tutsi population in July 1994, the Rwandan government initiated various strategies aiming at the reconstruction of the country in all sectors. Public and private infrastructure had been destroyed, and many people were desperate, homeless, and without food. The insecurity was still rampant all over the country. Among many needy groups, the genocide survivors were the most vulnerable even though the entire country presented an image of ruin and desolation.

In 1998, the government established the “Fonds d'Assistance aux Rescapés du Genocide” (FARG) by Law No 02/98 of 22/01/1998, purposely created to address the precarious situation of genocide survivors and contribute to reconciliation. FARG was feeds into five sectors, including education, health, shelter, social rehabilitation, and income-generating activities. In addition, a number of local and international NGOs, charity organizations, bilateral and multilateral agencies were supporting the projects in favor of survivors.

In 1999, the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC, 1999) was created with a mandate of reinforcing institutional capacities and mainstreaming the implementation of the national policy on unity and reconciliation in both public and private sectors. Among other strategies to achieve its mission were effective coordination of the implementation of the Unity and Reconciliation Policy in public and private institutions, conducting periodic assessments for long-lasting peace, holding dialogues on issues that are concerned with unity and reconciliation at local, national, and international levels. Furthermore, it was charged with carrying out research and making dissemination of findings on peace, unity and reconciliation achievements in Rwanda. A civic education program called “Ndi Umunyarwanda”, literally “I’m Rwandan” was initiated by Unit Club, an association of senior officials, at the national level meant for all categories of the population (Unit Club, 2016).

There were also economic-oriented policies, such as the Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan (PRSP), substituted by a more comprehensive and customized development framework known as “Vision 2020” and other associated programs whose aims were to alleviate poverty among the Rwandan community (MINECOFIN, 2020). The implementation strategy of the vision has required a mid-term framework branded as the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) (MINECOFIN, 2012).
The government also tried homemade and community-based mechanisms, which portray the unique experience of Rwanda in the peace-building process. A Pro-poor program called HIMO, an acronym in French meaning: “Haute intensité de main d’oeuvre”. The concept “HIMO” would be translated as ‘Labor Intensive Public Works’. The global objective of HIMO is to widen the economic base of the country through the decentralization of socioeconomic activities and by the monetarization of the rural economy (Musoni Protais, 2003). Ubudehe is another mechanism put in place in order to reduce poverty in Rwanda following the 1994 genocide against Tutsi (MINALOC, 2013). In Rwanda’s early history, Ubudehe was a time for individuals to assist each other with collective activities, such as planting crops and building houses and the program also enables communities across the country to undertake priority projects (Niringiye A., 2015).

It is worth noting that a great deal of those poverty reduction policies were by nature oriented towards the side of social and cultural aspects, on the one hand; and on the other hand, were purely economically oriented. In other words, there were reconciliatory policies that were socio-culturally oriented whose aim was not only to glue the social and cultural fabric torn by the genocide but also recreate the means of psychological needs satisfaction in terms of love, respect, trust, appreciation, friendship, and a sense of belonging as opposed to hatred, disrespect, alienation, fear, threat, repression and isolation.

Since 2006, the government of Rwanda has inaugurated a project called “One Cow Per Poor Family” program, commonly known by the Rwandan name “Girinka Program”. Which can be translated as” May you possess a cow”. The project was initiated by His Excellency the President of the Republic and managed by the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI) through its agency “Rwanda Agricultural Development Authority” (RADA). The project has two main objectives: first, to improve the economic livelihood of the poorest families by providing them with a milk-production cow, a source of fertilizer, and nutrition improvement by using milk; second, to mitigate the conflict among individuals and groups by reinforcing the relationship and social interaction among people living in the same community. (MINAGRI: 2006).

Therefore, it is clear that the strength of the ‘One Cow Per Poor Family’ program not only lies in the fact that it enhances social solidarity and social cohesion through the practice of ‘pass on of a cow’ principle, or “Koroza”. The program also plays a significant role in promoting the economic
enhancement of the beneficiaries who used to live in extreme poverty (Brian C., 2012). Eleven years after the launching of the project, it appears that there is scant scientific research carried out to discover whether the objectives assigned were achieved or not. The only information at the disposal of the public is success stories shared by the beneficiaries and other official reports that indicate only the progress of the program (Nshya, 2011:2). There is a scant study on the role of the One Cow Per Poor Family program in post-conflict reconstruction. The problem around which this study is built is to investigate the contribution of one cow per poor family to conflict transformation post-genocide period.

Relevance of the Study

While other social safety nets are one-sided because they tackle only one aspect, the uniqueness of One Cow Per Poor Family uses a holistic approach. It has a multifunction approach in its nature. It, at the same time, tackles physical needs satisfaction and psychosocial needs satisfaction. The program attracted our attention in so much as, if an empirical verification is carried out, knowledge will be produced in the area of conflict transformation and peacebuilding in Rwanda post-genocide period. While the general objective of the study is to analyze the role of One Cow Per Poor Family Program in conflict transformation in the post-genocide in Rwanda. The specific objectives are: to evaluate the uniqueness of the One Cow Per Poor Family program as compared to other programs in post-conflict reconstruction; to capture the transformation process of attitudes, feelings, and judgments across the divides between genocide survivors and genocide perpetrators; to create and add knowledge to the peacebuilding theory in Rwanda resulting from One Cow Per Poor Family program in post-genocide period; to identify challenges in the policy at all stages and finally; to formulate recommendations resulting empirical verification to improve the project.

Literature Review

Conflict Transformation

The question of conflict transformation in divided societies attracted many researchers in the disciplines of political science, anthropology, conflict and peace studies, sociology, and the
like(Lijphart,1985). Scholars such as John Burton, Ho-Won Jeong and Roger seemed to retain human needs satisfaction as a way to build peace because for them unsatisfied human psychological and physical needs lead to social disorganization (Ho-Won Jeong 1999; Roger A. Coate and Gerel A. Rosati. 1988). The central debate of the above scholars is that satisfying human needs is building peace as people whose needs are satisfied will never resort to conflict or violence. While human needs are divided into a set of physical or material needs such as food, water, shelter, sex, and medical care for our bodies, the set of psychological needs includes among others, love, respect, trust, appreciation, friendship, and a sense of belonging as opposed to hatred, disrespect, alienation, fear, threat, repression and isolation. (Ho-Won Jeong 1999).

The conflict transformation is a process that comprises an array of activities that consist of unifying the community in a sustainable manner. Therefore, conflict transformation could be treated at individual, national/system level. Other scholars consider that conflict transformation comprises activities at individual level and institutional level. According to Osita Agbu and others at the personal level, conflict transformation involves the pursuit of awareness, growth, and commitment to change which may occur through the recognition of fear, anger, grief, and bitterness. These emotions must be outwardly acknowledged and dealt with in order for effective conflict transformation to occur (Agbu, et al., 2006). At the system level, conflict transformation seems here an affair of the official authority, the government. In that perspective, conflict transformation is the process of increasing justice and equality in the social system as a whole. This may involve the elimination of oppression, improved sharing of resources, and the non-violent resolution of the conflict between groups of people (Ramsbotham et. al. 2011).

In the late 1960s Johan Galtung (1969; see also 1996: 72) retained also conflict transformation involves activities that resolve contradictions. The author proposed an influential model of conflict that encompasses both symmetric and asymmetric conflicts. He suggested that conflict could be viewed as a triangle, with contradiction (C), attitude (A), and behavior (B) at its vertices. In line with Rwanda, a community in which a jus cogens crime of genocide (Bassioun. 2000) was committed and resulted in a social disorganization where the normal functioning of the entire society cease (Chitambar, J.B. 2005) it requires tremendous actions to restore social, political and economic fabrics destroyed.
One cannot discuss conflict transformation and leave out the concept of peacebuilding as both concepts seem to be synonymous. Peacebuilding is a process comprising the effort of the entire society to restore social bonds, to strengthen interpersonal relationships that have been torn by violence or deadly conflict (Puechguirbal, 2003; Sandole and Sandole-Staroste, 1987). According to these authors, peace is not general tranquility but rather a network of interpersonal relationships full of energy and conflict which is nevertheless kept under societal control (Sandole and Sandole-Staroste, 1987). Evolutionarily, peacebuilding was progressively recognized as an international momentum in the aftermath of the international deadly conflict such as World War I, World War II, and the Cold War (Sentama, 2009). This means peacebuilding ensues each deadly national or international conflict through the creation of mechanisms to reduce mistrust and suspicion among the former antagonists as a way of bringing about sustainable peace. In that perspective, we have the League of the Nations in the aftermath of World War I, The United Nations Organization (UNO) mechanism in the framework of World War II, and the rapprochement such as Strategic Armament Limitation Talks (SALT) I and II in the framework of Cold War. In this regard, a series of policies initiated by the Rwandan government in the aftermath of the genocide comes in line within that framework of reconstructing a society through mechanisms that do not only reduce mistrust but also consolidate the welfare of the populations.

The Function of the Cow in Rwanda

From time immemorial, a cow had social, political as well as economic functions (Kagame, 1954, Marquet, 1954). In the past (just as now) a cow was/is given as a dowry for marriage. A cow was an instrument of wealth and in this regard, it was used as an instrument of the feudal system that characterized the monarchical system till 1954 when it was abolished. Further, the economic aspect of cows in the feudal system was practiced through a phenomenon of ‘ubuhake” which can be translated as “Master serving”. In this phenomenon a person called “umugaragi” meaning “the servant” coming from the lowest class in term of social prestige of cow possession served another person with a different status (that is someone who had a higher social status) who due to this phenomenon was called “shebuja” meaning “the lord”. This person then became the boss of the servant and deserved the right to assign him some tasks from which he could be rewarded. Some of the tasks included accompanying the lord to the court (at the king’s), sending a message to the
King, and building or repairing his lord’s house. While carrying out his services, the servant could bring beer and express his feelings to his lord, saying “give me milk, “make me rich”, “think about me” “be my father”, “I”, in return, “will become your child”. Later on, the boss could give him cows (Marquet, 1954). He also had to be both respectful and trustful to his lord. Failing to do so, the servant could be replaced by another one and give back the cattle that he had inherited (Kagame, A. 1969). According to Marquet (1954), the lords deserved the right to find another servant or otherwise terminate the contract and retake his cows. This means that cows were indicators and determiners of richness.

Politically, after the military expedition, a cow called “Inka y’ubumanzi, a cow of excellence” would also be rewarded to the best military who performed extraordinary deeds on the battlefield. Culturally, in the burial ceremonies, a child who was selected to officially present the farewell to the parent who passed away was given a cow called “inkuracyobo/a cow removing him from the tomb” (Aloys, 2004: 181). Cow was socialized in the Rwandan community in so much as it emerged the Rwandan literature called “amazina y’inka” translated as “names of cow”, in which they invented conflict between two different troops of cows and were praising cows as if they were people fighting. Cows was internalized in the Rwandan culture such that some people got proper names related to cow (Nkurikiyimfura, 1994).

For example, “Ntakirutinka” translated as “nothing else is better than a cow”, “Zaninka” translated as “bring a cow”. The latter has a connotation of dowry insinuating that if you do not provide a cow as dowry, you do not get a pretendant girl. Gaju, Mukagaju “the Brown”, Rusine “the black”, are proper names referring to cow’s colors (Ndekezi, A. 1984). The dynastic poems were also associated with cows. An excellent poet could be rewarded a cow. This happened during the enthronization of Mutara II Rwogera in 1857, father of the famous conqueror Kigeli IV Rwabugiri. During that enthronization, the famous poet Nyakayonga son of Musare conceived a poem called “Ukwibyara” Because artful was the poem, the author Nyakayonga son of Musare was rewarded 30 cows. Most time, a poet could not conclude a poem without requesting the king to provide him with a cow. This happened in the poem “Urukumbuzi rwa Sekarama, translated as “the nostalgic remembrance of Sekarama”. He wound up the poem while asking the king to give him a cow (Nkurikiyimfura, 1994, Kagame, 1988).
Given that the cow has paramount importance in the Rwandan community, it was also used in peacebuilding in the post-genocide period with a multifunction approach. Such multidimensionality implies that one cow per poor family program involves social, cultural as well as economic problems in the process of conflict transformation. It is a uniqueness located in the intrinsic values given to “a cow” in Rwandan Community.

**Research Approach**

This research addresses the problem of building sustainable peace in a genocide and war-torn society like Rwanda by using cultural based mechanisms of giving and receiving a cow from the community. It intends to capture the transformation process of attitudes, feelings, and judgments across the divides between genocide survivors and genocide perpetrators, as well as their respective families. It intends to analyze to what extent the community divided into “us” and “them” during the genocide has gained social cohesion through different mechanisms put in place in general and “Girinka program” in particular by the government of Rwanda. For this purpose, the study adopted a constructivist approach, collected qualitative data, and analyzed data by interpretive methods.

**Population of the Study**

The *Girinka* program is a governmental program implemented nationwide by local administration entities, from district to village levels. The program is community-driven and citizen-centered. This means that many stakeholders are involved in the management of the program: the population, local leaders, technicians like veterinaries, and national leaders intervening in the area of livestock likewise from the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI), the Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC), and the Ministry of Economy and Finances (MINECOFIN). Moreover, the program is spreading all over the country. This is to say the whole Rwandan population is concerned. However, because of the limit of time and means, the researchers cannot reach everyone concerned by the study. This is why we selected a sample.
Sample Technique and Size

The program under study is community centered. The study considers a village, the smallest administrative entity, as the unit of analysis in the sense that it establishes the list of beneficiaries of the program, it monitors the implementation of the decisions. The study took the village as a cluster where we can find the population and their leaders.

The study preferred a mix-up of purposive and random sampling methods in the process of selecting the sample. In the first step, two provinces out of five we selected because they benefited a big number of calves distributed among the population: Southern and Eastern provinces with respectively 71,929 and 75,259 cows distributed between 2006 and 2016 according to the assessment of the program curried out by Rwanda Governance Board, (RGB 2018, 13). In the second step, two districts were selected randomly in each province. Specifically, the districts of Nyaruguru and Kamonyi in the southern province and Kirehe and Rwamagana in the Eastern were selected. In the third step, two sectors in each district were selected randomly. Then after, we proceeded in the same way to select two cells in each identified sector. Finally, in each cells, we selected two villages. In total, we conducted the research within 32 villages.

As the population of the research is composed of all citizens, we manage to submit the interview to 5 beneficiaries of the program and 5 non-beneficiaries from the village, an Executive Secretary, responsible of the cell, a technical veterinarian of the sector. In total, 384 persons were identified to respond to the interview. In each cell, we conducted a focus group discussion composed of 4 beneficiaries, 4 non-beneficiaries, 2 responsible of concerned villages, veterinary of the sector. We organized 16 focus group discussions (See appendix).

At the national level, we submit interviews to the responsible in charge with the girinka program in the Ministry of Agriculture, in the Ministry of local government, and in the Ministry of economic planning and finance. Respondents will be reached by using the snowball technique. The responsible of the village will be the first person to contact who will indicate others.
Instruments for Data Collection

In this study, the interview was used as an appropriate technique to collect primary data. Primary data are the ones which are collected by the investigator himself for the purpose of a specific inquiry or study.

Interview

Social sciences research methods avail different tools to collect data. This study chose the very often used in qualitative research which are individual and collective interviews. Qualitative research interviews are defined as “attempts to understand the world from the subjects” point of view, to unfold the meaning of peoples’ experiences, to uncover their lived world prior to scientific explanations. The purpose of interview is to find out what is in and on someone else’s mind. An interview is a purposeful discussion between two or more people or two-way method which permits an exchange of ideas and information. A qualitative research has “an interpretative character, aimed at discovering the meaning events have for the individuals who experience them and interpretations of those meanings by the researcher. For the purpose of this study, the data collecting technique was interviewing using semi-structured standardized open-ended interviews (Leedy and Ormrod 2005:101-102).

Desk Review

For the secondary data, this study used desk research method. Secondary data refer to the data which have already been collected and analysed by someone else and was used at the data collection process (Bluman, 2004:111). Accordingly, in-depth research must be conducted in order to understand all issues surrounding the subject (Clarke, 1999:67). Among the sources consulted in include internet, books, articles, thesis, laws, reports, and other publications from different public and private institutions.

The whole technique will help us to construct literature review and clarify well the concepts and variables that make up of our topic and objectives.
Validity of Methods
Validity concerns the accuracy of the question asked, the data collected and the explanation offered. Generally, it relates to the data and analysis used in the research. Equally, the data and information were obtained from specific reliable and valid literature and individual and collective interviews used in a combined fashion to establish patterns and trends to ensure trustworthiness and validity of data and information that would be intended to measure as accurately as possible.

Reliability of Instruments
The study availed itself of data from interviewed respondents who are concerned with the girinka program either as beneficiary or as witness of the process and who are among the most experienced people. This ensured that data collected were from reliable sources.

Data Analysis
Narrative data obtained from individual and collective interviews were analyzed using thematic and textual analysis methods. Since good analysis depends on understanding the data, this method involved reading and re-reading the data in order to extract relevant meaning (Powell and Renner, 2003). To bring meaning to the organized words, the researcher identified themes - ideas, concepts, behaviors or phrases used. These were then organized into coherent categories that summarized and brought meaning to the text. Thus, helping to determine key ideas being expressed within each category and the similarities and differences. During this process, the researcher was able to determine consistencies and differences of opinions.

Ethical Considerations
In this research, all the ethical implications (population’s protection from harm, informed consent, right to privacy, and honesty with professional colleagues) were closely taken into consideration (Leedy and Ormrod, 2005:101-102). The participants were informed about the topic of the research and its objectives and had got the choice of participating or not without expecting any rewards. The interview questions were answered in a safe environment, and the anonymity of respondents and confidentiality of information were observed without any exception. The researcher strove to maintain objectivity and honesty in reports without intentionally misrepresenting or misleading others about research (Merriam, 1988:178). All literature sources used throughout this research report were acknowledged and this ensured a particular richness of data in this research.
Presentation of Findings
The study was carried out in four districts namely, Nyaruguru and Kamonyi from the Southern Province and Kirehe and Rwamagana from Eastern Province. The core objectives of this study were to evaluate the uniqueness of One Cow Per Poor Family program as compared to other programs in conflict transformation in Rwanda, to create and add knowledge to the peacebuilding theory informed by the One Cow Per Family program in the post-genocide period, to identify challenges in the policy and finally to formulate recommendations resulting empirical verification to improve the program. Therefore, all findings turn around the stated objectives.

The Uniqueness of the Program in Conflict Transformation in Rwanda
From the empirical findings, it was noted that the One Cow Per Poor Family Program has become a unique program because of its functions in conflict transformation that range from psycho-social to economic interventions. On the one hand, the psycho-social to conflict transformation in a society torn by the conflict that resulted into the genocide is indicated by the dimensions of peaceful interaction, transformation of attitudes, feelings and judgments, recognition of the cow provider, social status and dignity among peers resulting from the process of the passing on the cow among beneficiaries in the program.

Peaceful Interaction
In this research, it was found that the program enabled the population to create social networks that in return contribute to peace. One of the respondents from Kamasare Village, Cyamigurwa Cell revealed that the transmission of a cow from one person to another results to interpersonal relationship enhancement and a strong friendship. “The person to whom I transmitted the cow became the godfather of my child”, he added. The same testimonies were provided in Nyaruguru District. Respondents in FGD said that the program allowed them in the process of unification and tied their relationship. The relationship, according to respondents in Nyaruguru District resulted from the program that was extended to a financial scheme of self-help in which each member contributes money such a self-help scheme removes suspicion among members, and it is an indicator towards unity and reconciliation. The contribution of the program to peaceful interaction was reiterated by respondents from Rwamagana District. For these respondents, the cow has become a knot that unifies the people. They said: “many people come to request milk. When a neighbor give birth, he proudly presents to us a demand of milk and we do not hesitate to give it
to them. That is what the government teaches us. We were given for free and we give for free. Even the people we give milk help in supplying pastures. They allow us to graze in their sorghum remains after harvesting. They help us in getting pastures”.

Another respondent from Rwamagana District revealed that there was no suspicious climate in his neighborhood and that he was generous to give products from the cow. He said for instance that he produced ghee from milk that he gave to parents in his neighborhood. These parents became happy because of that ghee. He further said that in his neighborhood people needed each other where for example they may exchange medication to wash cows which makes them meet often. He concluded that cow has become a unifying knot through dialogue, counseling, and discussions related to socio-economic development. The above testimonies have been reiterated by the chief of the village through an example where one person to which a cow was transmitted under aegis of administration authorities became very close friend to a person from where the cow originated while before were enemies. “This program unifies people”, he concluded. Another respondent from Kirehe village in the Cell revealed that his neighbor got a cow from him. He continued “the time I gave him a cow she was still single and after she got married she invited me to her wedding. I contributed to the wedding and afterward, the two families became friends. All the visited respondents reiterated that the cow helped them to interweave social relationships by providing milk to those who do not have it and assisting each other in other social problems.

In Nyaruguru District, respondents unanimously said cows distributed by the program are like a ransom as unity and reconciliation should not be possible if cows eaten during genocide without a replacement could that to happen. Therefore, as the cow quickened the perpetration of the genocide, it quickened also unity and reconciliation. This was held by respondents from Nyaruguru District in the FGD: the defeated government used the strategy of mobilizing the population to eat the cows of Tutsi because cow was a knot or a tying rope. That government assumed that if perpetrators of genocide start by eating Tutsi’s cows, they would have destroyed them. You see, it was a social pact that was destroyed. The defeated government knew well that cows was a tool of unity among Rwandans. Then, destroying them was a root of hatred that constituted an impetus of the genocide perpetration. If you eat the cow of someone, will you want to see him more alive? Therefore, this girinka is a resuscitation of life, love and friendship in the reconstruction of the
nation. Someone who has given you a cow has given you a life, love. You praise him. His property is yours!”

The program increased also forgiveness. For example, if a person was found guilty of having looted the property or eaten the cows of his neighbor, this neighbor reduced the cost supposed to be paid by the perpetrator. One respondent from Nyaruguru District revealed that he was supposed to pay Sekunde RWF 70,000. However, he gave the latter only RWF 10,000.

From interviews, we noted that other survivals of the genocide renounced compensation and gave priority to togetherness. Respondents hailed the president of the republic of Rwanda for having long-sightedness to initiate the program that links families. That is why one of the respondents revealed that his former fathers used to call cow “akoya ko mu mazuru!” and that the cow provided was considered as one’s an everlasting parent as he pulled you from death to life. He further said that a person whose cows were destroyed in the genocide would have resentment to someone whose cows were not destroyed. Therefore, the “girinka program” came to fill the gap that could contribute to resentment and social disintegration. So, it came to attract and tie such relationships and friendships.

Transformation of Attitudes, Feelings, and Judgments

The program has transformed attitudes, feelings, and judgments beyond the restraint circle of genocide survivors and perpetrators to extend to the whole population. All respondents commonly affirm that the program enabled them to unify and make them live in peaceful lifestyle without suspicion. According to respondents, such peaceful lifestyle is achieved through sharing almost, helping each other, intermarriage etc. One of the respondents from Rwesero Village in the Rwesero cell said: “This village has become a melting pot between citizens who were here and those who came after the genocide. Due to the program, we all live together without any suspicion”.

Another citizen from Kirehe cell reiterated: “I repatriated from Tanzania. My neighbors are the one I met here. We shared the land property. The person whom we shared land is a friend in need and a friend in deed. Where there is poverty there is also conflict. But because of wellness resulted from the program, we live in harmony”. In addition, the program has become also an instrument of shamelessness. As testified by respondents, when perpetrators of the genocide slaughtered cows
of the victims, they got a shame when they were to account for that in Gacaca courts. By introducing the program, such shame was removed. Further, the program removed hate. Respondents from Rwamagana District explained: “the program pulled us from solitude and tears and it further get back our hope because the cows became a socio-economic panacea. The cow made us forget our cattle lost in the genocide. Thanks to this program initiated by the president of the republic, the cow made us proud. It resuscitates our hope for life. Intensive cattle raising prevent us also intrigues”. Another respondent from Nyaruguru remarked that where there was cow there was no hate to purport that cows linked people. He said that discussing the problems related to cows has an occasion for the beneficiaries to interweave their interpersonal relationships.

**Recognition of the Cow Provider**

The aim of the research was also to investigate if the population recognize the provider of the cow. It was a common cultural practice for Rwandans that the receiver of the cow ought to praise publicly who had given him a cow as a sign of recognition. With regard to this research, we wanted to find out if this trend still exists. The reality from the findings was that all people praise the President of the Republic as a sign of recognition. One of the respondents said this: “Though I always remember the neighbor who passed on a cow to me, but I praise the State that brought about this program, specifically his excellency Paul Kagame.

One respondent from Rwamagana district said: “the person whom I gave cow gathered all his children to inform them I was the provider of the cow. He told them that the cow I gave was a friendship pact that should be strengthened by visiting and sharing beers. We now visit each other and we live as brothers who share almost because of cow exchange. You cannot prevent a friendship from someone who gave you a cow. That friendship is special: you cordially chat and you share almost. I follow up with the person whom I gave the cow. I do not praise him because all of us thank the initiator of the program who is the president of the republic. That is why the celebration act of passing on the cow (kwitura) is done in the scheme planned by the cell administration. It is organized through random sampling but this act does not remove the interpersonal relationship that link those whom cows were exchanged”.

We wanted to find out who is acknowledged for this program and the respondents said that they praised the president of the republic. This program, according to respondents from Rwamagana
enabled them to know each other and to interweave social relationships through social events organized, gifts and visits exchanges. They finally asserted that the act of passing on cows happened among neighbors. Testimonies from respondents from Nyaruguru Districts corroborate the information from Rwamagana district: “for example when it was my round, I organized a feast. I received people and we socially shared almost. So, the giver of the cow is an old woman who is still a close friend to me. The initiator of girinka, the president of the republic, we do not have any kind of gift to offer him. For the initiator, it is not easy to find compensation worthier than that cow. Because to give a cow insinuate a blessing of wealth. What we can give the president of the republic is a heart of love and only prayers from God”.

**Economic Significance of Girinka Program**

The research aimed also at investigating the role of the program on social and economic development of the citizens. Respondents commonly said: “we thank the state that shifted us from the bottleneck of poverty and enabled us to touch money”. One respondent from Rwesero Village and Rwesero Cell said: “taking into account how important One cow per family program is, the state has a duty to extend it to other citizens!”

He went on: “I got a cow in 2010 and gave birth five times out of which I gained 820,000 Rwfs and sold also fertilizer to increase the agricultural productivity. The money from the sold cows and agricultural harvest enabled me to construct a house and educate four children. Among these children, one has completed university, two are still in secondary and another in primary!”

The fact that the citizens in the program were able to construct improved houses was reiterated by another respondent from Kirehe Village, Kirehe Cell. He testified: “It is not only the house I got due to the program, but also my agricultural activities improved because of the manure from cows dunk!” He said that he was cropping banana and tomatoes.

Building one’s house is one of the most important achievement that girinka brought about to many respondents. In Rwamagana District the respondents had these testimonies: “we were able to shift from houses made with mud to house made with paint and cement and equipped with electricity and water. We are able to generate income from milk. There is for example our fellow living in Nsinda Cell, Muhazi sector who produce biogas from the program. Another one from Kabuye village, Bwana Cell Munyiginya Sector was able to buy a bicycle and his fellow has got a shop”.

8.16
Social Status and Dignity Among Peers

We wanted to find out also if the program increased the dignity among those who received cows and the neighbors. Below are transcripts from interviewees.

One person from Rubimba Village of the Rwanyamuhanga Cell said: “*Girinka Program helped me to restore dignity among my peers because before the program all my cows had already disappeared. Now as I have cows, I feel proud among my peers*”. Another person from Impala Village, Cyamigurwa cell with exclamation said: “*the population gave me value where I graded from the 2nd to the 3rd category of Ubudehe due to Girinka!*” (MINALOC, 2015). His neighbors in the same village confirmed that he was able to put on clothes and went to join other in public places due to the money obtained from selling milk. He asserted that when his neighbors had noted that he was able to harvest a bunch of bananas weighing 40 kgs while before the program he could get a bunch of bananas weighing 10 kgs and even less, they gave him to value and also aspired to have a cow.

Another visited interviewee from Nyaruhanga village, Rwanyamuhanga Cell revealed to us: “*I revalue myself and when I employ other people, it gives me dignity among peers!*”. According to respondents, there is a general saying in Rwandan culture that when you give out milk, manure and ghee you obtain in return the social value and dignity among the peers. The above was retained by one citizen from Gahogo village, Nyarusange Cell in Muhazi Sector: “*after you have eaten and put on well, you join your peers with proudness to provide opinions. One day, I attended a meeting in which I raised my hand and asked some questions and provided suggestions. Afterwards, I was elected among the health counsellors in my village. You see, without cow, I could not have graded such social status in my neighborhood. Further, being able to buy a bottle and share it with your neighbor not only prevents you from isolation but also increases warm social relationship. Cow has become our children, very old I am, the cow replaced my lost children and husband. I feel warm because of the cow*”.

In addition to social status and dignity, the findings confirmed that the program was also an instrument of political legitimization. The latter is explained as a process of willingness to comply with a political system (Heywood, 2002). Different authorities from grassroots’ institutions where the study was conducted corroborated the above thesis. For instance, the chief of the Binunga Cell, Munyiginya Sector from Rwamagana District confirmed that “*the program made the citizens*
obedient to the administration because they are kept busy through looking for cattle’s feeds, milking, supplying milk to the collection center, to look for medications and other duties involved while nurturing for the cow”.

Results Discussion and Interpretation

As it was indicated in the previous pages, there is a scanty of programs in the conflict transformation in Rwanda post-genocide. Apart from one cow per poor family program that has multidimensional in its nature tackling physical needs satisfaction and psychological needs satisfaction at the same time, other social protection programs were one-sided or two-sided. Multidimensionality implies the satisfaction of physical needs and psychological needs as well as economic needs. The uniqueness of one cow per a poor family program conflict transformation locates in the intrinsic values given to “a cow” in Rwandan Community. On the one hand, the practice of the ‘pass on of a cow’ principle, or Koroza’, enhances solidarity and social cohesion. The program has also a significant role in promoting the economic development of the beneficiaries who used to live in very extreme poverty (Brian C., 2012; Ndikubwimana, 2013) because in post-genocide Rwanda only Vulnerable people, such as genocide survivors, orphans, people living with disabilities, Historically Marginalized Community, are the target of the social policies (Ndikubwimana, 2011). While so far scholars who researched the field of peacebuilding in the post-genocide period of Rwanda seemed to have approached other programs as elite models in their nature (Rwanyiziri, 2009; Hayman, 2009; Cooke, 2011; Zorbas, 2004), one cow per poor family program is safe from those shortfalls. In fact, the peculiarity of the Girinka program is its characteristics of community inclusiveness participation in its nature. While other programs (FARG, VUP, et cetera) in conflict transformation are considered as shallow and ephemeral, the process of Girinka in conflict transformation is community-based program and continual as it concerns the entire community made of all social layers and does not focus on one group as does FARG, meant for Genocide survivors or Solidarity Camp for ex-combatants. For instance, through Gacaca the survivors have known the killers of their relatives but there was no reconciliation mechanism to unify two people in a continual process. There are people who were jailed for a long time, as they were presumed guilty of genocide perpetration but later on, they were found innocent and were released without compensation and as a result, they may have anger and resentment.
However, there was no mechanism to heal their anger. The general attitude of denial of genocide perpetrated against Tutsi which is contained through classical lawsuit and coercive judicial measures does not ensure community involvement and perpetuation of interpersonal relationship restoration. The uniqueness of Girinka is that it goes beyond where other programs fail: to perpetuate the interpersonal relationship recreation, inclusiveness and participatory.

Conclusion
On the basis of the empirical findings from the districts of Nyaruguru, Kamonyi, in the Southern Province and from Kirehe and Rwamagana in the Eastern Province, the program of One Cow Per Poor Family contributed to the process of conflict transformation. The study was conducted to investigate the role of one cow per poor family program in conflict transformation. Through a human needs’ theory, findings indicated that the uniqueness of One Cow Per Family Program lies in the strength of restoring unity and reconciliation through the satisfaction of psycho-social and economic needs at the same time. Genocide perpetrated against Tutsi left the Rwandan social fabric broken. The latter results from mistrust, suspicion, de-humanization, anger, hostility, etc. One cow per poor family in the post genocide period created an environment of building a common future through the complementarity of the satisfaction of physical needs and satisfaction of psychological needs. The findings indicated that the program of one cow per poor family enabled peaceful interaction, attitudes, feeling and judgment change, recognition of the cow provider, the raise of social status and dignity and economic wellness for those who are beneficiaries of the program. One cow per poor family in the post genocide period insists on the activities that accentuate interpersonal relationships in addressing the negative attitudes relationships in order to bring about mutual cooperation. The findings indicated also that the initiator of the program, His Excellency the president of the republic, brought about the political legitimacy of the Rwandan political institutions due to the fact that beneficiaries of the program consider him as a socio-political and economic panacea. This retrieval of the program by top authorities, however, prevents it from being felt and lived by local citizens as a “traditional conflict management system” (Albert, 2008: 31) but, instead, a new source of political conflict if not readjusted on time.
Conclusion and Recommendation

Two recommendations emerged from this study. First, because the model of “passing on the cow” is done based on the initiator and local administrators are much involved in the process, we recommend that the program be readjusted to remain a grassroots-led program and to be led by and beneficial to local citizens from the Rwandan cultural context. Such new model of peace from the bottom will sustain the process of conflict transformation and prevent the program from the demerits of peace from the top that some academic discourses do not hesitate to associate with ephemerality. Second, because the research was not exhaustive, further research may focus at the other side of cult of personality, neo-patrimonial paradigm from One Cow Per Poor Family.

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La Gouvernance des Aires Protégées au Rwanda L’intégration des Populations Locales en Question. NUR, Butare.


Appendix

Table 1: sample size

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<th>Provinces</th>
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<th>Sectors</th>
<th>Cells</th>
<th>Villages</th>
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8.25
Abstract
This article examined the intersection between public administration and peacebuilding in fostering peace among pastoral communities. Pastoral communities constantly compete for limited available resources, including grazing land and water points for their animals, which leads to inter-ethnic or communal conflicts. Theoretically, the study employed literature on public administration, peace studies, and conflict, as it highlighted the need to share the limited available resources between warring communities to enhance peace. The study adopted the descriptive research design for data collection and analysis. It used questionnaires, interviews, and focused group discussions to collect primary data from respondents. The collected data were analyzed qualitatively to generate descriptive statistics. The study findings revealed that public administration promotes communal healing, reconciliation, and enhances cohesion among the warring communities. Therefore, to enhance their effectiveness, the programs and efforts of the officers should be supported by the residents, local leaders, and the national government by providing sufficient support. This study seeks to contribute significantly to the understanding of the significance of public administrators and the role of trust in fostering peace in pastoralist communities.

Keywords: Communal healing, Communal cohesion, Ethnic clashes, Pastoralist communities, Public administration
Introduction

Political instability that has characterized the Horn of Africa (HOA) continues to threaten long-term peace, security, and socio-economic development in various parts of that part of East Africa. This instability affects regions that fall within the boundaries of HOA, including Northern Kenya and the pastoralist communities dwelling there. A large section of the population in these conflict-prone areas often faces displacement and consequent destitution risks arising from frequent internal and cross-border wars (Adetula, et al. 2020). Traditionally, the conflicts have been over limited natural resources in the regions, including grazing lands and animal watering points. As a result, most pastoralist communities are constantly moving from place to place in search of the availability of resources, and as they encroach on other people’s lands, war erupts.

The conflicts stemming from this region have been significant concern over the years since it limits the region’s ability to exploit its resources for economic development fully. The establishment of a local administrative system has contributed significantly to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The process has initiated modern approaches to conflict management instead of the indigenous methods previously used (McPeak, et al 2011). However, to find a lasting solution to the rising conflicts among these communities, the local public administration must demonstrate its commitment to addressing the underlying causes of the conflicts and involving the pastoralist communities in decision-making regarding peace. A number of studies have been conducted on the causes of insecurities, the roles of public administration, and conflict resolution in different parts of the world. However, such studies have failed to provide a clear picture on the role of public administrators in fostering peace among pastoralist communities. This paper, therefore, intends to examine the role of public administrators in fostering peace among pastoralist communities in Isiolo County. Based on the current study, the main causes of farmer-pastoralist conflicts included water pollution, destruction of crops by animals, and competition for limited resources, namely land and water. Some of the preventive measures that PSC had adopted included fine payment by violators of the set regulations, education of herders and farmers, and the formation of a local community association (Sangotegbe et al. 2016).

Public administrators play a significant role in ensuring peace and tranquility in their respective areas of jurisdiction. They are the representative of the responsible government agencies in the 22
local areas. According to Amusan et al (2017), decentralization and localization of government services are crucial developments with multifaceted implications on pastoral communities. Decentralization is designed to bring about local development issues closer to the people, including security between communities. A study (Issifu, 2016) examined the role of Local Peace Committees (LPCs) in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Africa. According to the scholar, conflicts emanating from competition for natural resources, politics, ethnicity, and religion remain protracted in Africa despite the efforts from the international community and local government to promote peace and social cohesion.

Adebayo et al. (2016) examined the role of indigenous institutions for collective actions in promoting peace for sustainable land management among pastoral communities and crop farmers in Ogun State, Nigeria. The researchers used the purposive sampling technique to select 200 respondents, including Fulani pastoralists and crop farmers. The study findings showed that the Fulani respondents were facing challenges such as loose collaboration between statutory and indigenous institutions, illegal entry of new herders, and interruption of migratory pastoralists. The researchers concluded that self-regulation and intervention as critical components of collective actions procedures designed to promote peace, security and ensure sustainable utilization of the biophysical environment. Thus, the indigenous institutions among pastoralist communities should be formalized to enhance their capacities to effectively foster peace and cooperation among the local people.

Locally, (Tagi, 2011) investigated the effects of social media usage by public administration on community mobilization and security improvement in Umoja Ward, Lanet Sub County, Nakuru County, Kenya. The study used a sample of 28,012 participants, comprising are chief, assistant chiefs, administration police officers, support staff, and adult residents. The study findings revealed that the key motivators for the widespread use of social media by the public administrator included government policies, technological advancement, community staff, and mounting pressure from other government agencies. According to scholars, the use of social media led to increased community involvement and participation in public affairs, including community policing. It also led to enhanced public administrative transparency and increased accessibility of the public services by the local communities. In their view, whereas public administrators are
increasingly using various social media platforms, there has been no research that has investigated the implications of these platforms to the officers’ daily work.

The number of conflicts in the county has decreased generally, as a result of several peace-building measures, with the exception of conflicts over natural resources. Socio-cultural traditions and historical competitiveness had substantially reduced conflicts. Fights over pasture and water control and access in the county and surrounding counties, on the other hand, persisted and were linked to extreme weather events. This subtitle entails peacebuilding concepts, which the researchers feel, are important for the study and are linked so that the reader gets to comprehends the discourse. Public administrators play a critical role in fostering peace among pastoralist communities. These roles are initiated through the following ways: NGO’s and educational programs, community-driven development projects, cultural and sporting activities disarmament programs, mediation and alternative dispute resolutions and communal treaties

**NGO’s and Educational Programs**

According to (Lind, 2016), donor agency operations in “pastoral areas of eastern Ethiopia, northern Kenya, southeastern Sudan, and northern Uganda are centered on conflict resolution and peacebuilding”. The World Vision Kenya (WVK) and Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS) had created peace-building interventions in the county. The World Vision peace intervention, for example, started operating in 1997 with the goal of educating enemy groups about the benefits of living peacefully, providing formal education, piping and drilling water from the highlands to the low areas, and providing drought-resistant cattle breed like the Sahiwal. For example, the WVK launched a water project in 2010 in Chepareria, West Pokot, Kenya, that delivered safe drinking water to almost 68,000 people. The Kenya Red Cross made a significant effort by distributing food and other supplies towards the impacted people. The provision of food resulted in a decrease in the frequency and intensity of disputes. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) main focus was to prevent conflict, protect conflict victims, develop and strengthen the initiatives that enhance peace within the communities, and promoting collaborations with formal and grassroots institutions such as peace agencies in West Pokot County, thanks to a grant from Japan (IOM, 2011).
The Pokot Education and Development Programme (PEDP) took part in a number of community development activities, most of which focused on conflict resolution. PEDP facilitated inter-community peace talks between warring factions. On March 28th, 2003, for example, PEDP hosted a peace convention between the Pokot and Marakwet communities (ITDG Practical Action, 2003). Women Peace Crusader and Daima Initiative for Peace and Development (DiPaP) were two more NGOs interested in conflict mediation. These non-governmental organizations focused on a participative collective approach to achieving peace and nonviolent cohabitation.

Though WVK recognizes that the best way to achieve long-term peace is to improve sustainable livelihoods sources, it has urged for a transition away from pastoralism and toward more viable alternatives (Weiss, 2014). As a result, climate change mitigation as a method for avoiding future fights on natural resources was lowly prioritized. In pastoral areas, conflict resolution is based on favorable climatic circumstances. As a result, all peace-building efforts must include climate mitigation measures, which have been a missing link in conflict-resolution attempts.

**Community-driven Development Projects**

Activities targeted toward climate change mitigation should be the focal topic if pastoral communities are to enjoy long-term harmony. This happens since substantial and consistent rainfall would provide a stable source of income and improve food security while also reducing rivalry for natural resources. This statement is in line with (Juma's, 2000) that the process of peace-building entails improving the socioeconomic circumstances of contending communities instead of stopping and taming the warriors. Nevertheless, an examination of the peace-building projects’ activities in West Pokot County indicated that long-run solutions to battles brought on by climate change were insufficiently considered. The majority of the county's peace programs focused on averting prevailing crisis situations rather than addressing the core causes of the crises.

Most peace-building programs, on the other hand, focus on the context of the conflict rather than the fundamental causes of the dispute, resulting in peace only lasting a limited time. According to (Juma, 2000), enduring peace between warring groups can only be reached by addressing the conflict's core causes. Peace can be attained, according to the study, if pastoralists engage in
profitable activities such as agriculture, which provide them with a long-term source of income, food security, and lower poverty levels. Peaceful coexistence was demonstrated in irrigated lowlands and agricultural potential highlands. Irrigation, on the other hand, remained debatable as a long-term answer to a sustainable source of livelihood, particularly in light of the projected exhaustion of low aquifer water levels as due to climate change.

**Cultural and Sporting Activities**

Pastoralists participate in sports between warring sides and educate the public about the significance of peace and cooperation as part of the peace project. Annual cultural fashion exhibits, intermarriage celebrations, religious activities, passing of rites, cultural competitions, and peace races are organized by competing communities with the support of local leaders and elders, bringing together the Karamajong, Samburu, Sabiny, Pokot, Sabaot and Turkana.

Such a charity organizes peace sports in Uganda and Kenya every year and Moroto, West Pokot, Tana River and Kapenguria. The Great Turkwel peace and beauty and the Kapenguria peace race, which incorporated a traditional beauty show and a 10 km running competition (25th September 2010), and the peace race in Moroto in Uganda are just a few of the recent notable events (27th - 28th May 2011). All members of the rival pastoral communities were welcome to participate in these peace races (Kengen, 2011).

**Disarmament Programs**

The government and international NGOs are both cooperating towards formal peace-building projects. The Kenyan government has initiated peace-building efforts on several occasions, including disarmament interventions in 2006, 2009-2010, and the 1979 establishment of game reserves in Nasolot to serve as a buffer between the warring Turkana and Pokot communities, as well as beefing up security by deploying the army to conflict-affected areas and establishing more police stations in interior regions. To counter the Pokot-Turkana raids in November 1995 and to contain post-raids situation, the government sent security personnel, the Administrative Police, the regular Kenya Police and the GSU. The Kenyan government also tried to disarm the Marakwet, Pokot and Turkana tribes (Nangulu, 2001).
Peacekeeping attempts at the macro level have also run into difficulties. According to one scholar, state-led peacekeeping efforts frequently fail because to corruption, a lack of legitimacy, a lack of resources, and, ultimately, institutional weakness. Attempts to mediate ethnic conflict issues in a government where ethnic politics are strongly established tend to increase social tensions (Mahmoud, 2017). Government action is seen as a continuation of ethnic biases, and as a result, groups respond to mediation attempts in the same way they do to livestock raids: by dividing defense along community lines.

**Mediation and Alternative Dispute Resolutions**

Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is the most popular component of peace-building programs, especially in locations where official institutions, such as courts, are poor, such as desert and semi-arid areas. Mediation programs are the most popular type of this. According to the notion, if confrontations do not escalate into violence, sentiments between groups will not worsen if ADR is used. Additionally, seeing groups with a history of violence amicably resolving conflicts may cause pastoral community members to modify their ideas of social norms, attitudes, or both. Despite the fact that there has been a lot published on the theoretical utility of these approaches (Bordone, 2015). One exception is Liberia, where communities with trained mediators experienced lower rates of violence, faster resolution of land disputes, and stronger nonviolence norms one year after the program ended (Blair, 2014). Three years after the program ended, the rate of violent disagreements remained low, and nonviolent dispute resolution norms continued, albeit degraded to some extent (Blattman, 2018).

**Communal Treaties**

Community elders from warring communities formed peace treaties at the grass-roots level. This approach involves goat slaughtering and the cleansing of the area with goat’s blood. The elders of the warring clans sharing a meal was a gesture of peaceful coexistence. This method, on the other hand, was designed to deal with the issue at hand and so was useful in certain conflict situations. According to the findings, even after a peace agreement was reached through the council of elders, confrontations erupted on occasion, depending on the severity of the communities' socio-economic distress. Additionally, despite significant efforts by government and the NGOs to enhance peaceful coexistence among pastoralists, (Kona, 2014) notes that most peace-building projects face challenges in breaking the cyclical trend of battles in pastoral societies. Despite the Kenyan
government's attempts, cattle raiding remains a big problem among the Pokot, according to Nangulu (2001). Consistent confrontations among pastoral communities have occurred over the last two decades caused by a diminishing pastoral economy as grazing and water supplies become rare as a result of climate change. Conflicts arise as a result of increased competition for scarce water and pastures. This finding backs up (Huho & Ngaira, 2012) and (Huho et al. 2009) claims that the greatest danger to the pastoral industry in northern Kenya is a lack of water and pasture owing to climate change-induced increases in drought frequency and duration.

**Methodology**
This study adopted descriptive research design for the data collection and analysis process. The research design primarily focuses on describing the underlying characteristics or properties that define a particular phenomenon that is of interest to the researcher. Besides, the descriptive design aims at identifying patterns that exist within data without exploring or making inferences to the cause-effect associations between the variables in the data (Williams, 2007). Descriptive design was deemed appropriate for this study since it enabled the researcher to develop an in-depth understanding of the research problem by interacting directly with those affected by the phenomenon under investigation. The researcher, therefore, observed and collected the perception of the participants to answer research objectives. Besides, the design created the flexibility of adopting various data collection instruments like questionnaires, interviews and focus group discussions to enhancing the study findings.

The study key themes or variables included public administration role and peace fostering among the pastoral communities in Isiolo County. Based on the previously conducted studies, the major roles that have been implemented by public administration included: setting up NGO’s and educational programs in pastoral communities, administering community-driven development projects, setting up cultural and sporting activities, disarmament programs, mediation and alternative dispute resolutions and communal treaties.

The researcher used questionnaires to collect data in relation to the role of public administration and peace building among the pastoral communities in Isiolo County. Descriptive analysis was used to analyze the role of public administration in peace fostering among the pastoral communities in Isiolo County.
The study targeted Public Administrators in the county including public administration officers, civic leaders, senior county personnel like the SCPC and OCS, and local residents since they are directly affected by the research problem. They were also identified because of their special knowledge about the study, their desire and availability to take part in the exercise of the study. The pastoralist communities in the county were also considered for the study based on the high level of insecurity resulting from criminality such as cattle rustling, ethnic violence that is often witnessed as communities fight for pastures, livestock, and water points.

The researcher adopted both probability and non-probability sampling approaches, especially the simple random and purposive sampling approaches to gather the required data due to the lifestyle of the pastoralists community who keep on moving from one point to another. The researcher used simple random sampling for the local residents especially the pastoralists and civic leaders working in Isiolo County. A simple random sampling approach was preferred since it ensures that every subject in the target population has an equal chance of selection. On the other hand, purposive sampling was used to select Public Administrators and senior security officers who work in Isiolo County. As provided by (Singh & Masuku, 2014) purposive sampling is often used to ensure that only participants who are knowledgeable about the research problem are selected to participate in a study. Therefore, this approach was applied to sample the County’s DCC’s, ACC’s, SCPC, and OCS. To ensure equal representation from all the regions of the county, stratified sampling was used to create fair participation in the study.

Using the aforementioned sampling approaches, the researcher aimed at sampling a total of 150 participants, comprising of 100 local residents, 10 Public Administrators, 35 civic leaders, and 5 senior security officers. The breakdown of the preferred sample size used in the study is given in the sampling matrix below highlighting how each segment of the participants was selected to participate in the study process.

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<th>Sampling</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
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<tr>
<td>Local residents</td>
<td>100</td>
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Public Administrators  10  7%
Senior security officers  5  3%
Civic leaders  35  23%
Total  150  100%

Data was collected using structured and closed-ended questions on questionnaires self-administered by the researcher and interviews. As provided by (Fowler Jr, 2013), survey research is often considered valuable means of data collection approaches since they are highly efficient and effective in a relatively large sample within a short time. Secondary data on peace of the pastoralist that was to be used to support the primary data was not obtained from the Isiolo County due to some difficulties which were encountered however existing literature, and other public documents on relevant theories were used. The researcher used questionnaires to collect data and was administered to the sampled local residents and civic leaders. The questionnaires were deemed appropriate for the study since they provided a great sense of anonymity due to limited face-to-face interaction with study subjects. In areas where the study was sensitive, it also increased the level of accuracy in obtaining the correct information. The questionnaires were structured with questions that stem from the formulated research sub-questions to guide the participants’ responses. The open-ended questions focused on getting insights on new ideas on the research problem, while closed questions ensured that the respondents were properly guided to the particular direction of interest. Interviews are one of the most trusted methods of collecting qualitative data since it is a much more flexible approach that allows a researcher to be able to pose questions and have a direct conversation between the interviewees. The questionnaires/interview schedules were administered to the identified respondents/interviewees through face-to-face interviews. An arrangement to collect some of the questionnaires at a later time was agreed by those who were not able to work on them at that time.

The researchers used the qualitative data analysis. Qualitative data analysis is a form of description that does not use numerical statistical data, hence only uses words while quantitative data analysis involves use of distribution tables and graphical representations of a frequency distribution, which involved pie charts and bar graphs. The discussion of the results was based on the research
objectives. Thematic analysis was preferred because the researcher was interested in perspective arranged in particular themes to maintain a logical sequence.

Validity relates to the extent to which the research instruments measure what they should in a research process. It highlights the degree to which results obtained from a research analysis represent the actual variables of the study. The research instruments in this study were measured using a content validity test. The expert judgment of content validity of the questionnaires was used (Mohajan, 2017). The university supervisors and research experts in the department of peace and conflict studies scrutinized the instruments to determine whether they adequately addressed the objectives of the study and measure what they were intended for in the study scrutinized the instruments.

On the other hand, reliability relates to the level of internal consistency of the research instruments, specifically examining whether they have variable errors. Therefore, the reliability measured the consistency of the instruments if similar results could be achieved if the study was repeated in future studies under the same circumstances (Mohajan, 2017). The reliability of the questionnaires was tested using the repeated trials and this was accompanied by the pilot study. The questionnaires, as one of the research instruments, were pre-tested and reviewed in order to understand their reliability. This was important because it guided in making corrections on errors noted in the questionnaire hence improved on the quality of data collected.

Before commencing the data collection process, the researcher also had an introduction letter from the university explaining the study’s primary purpose, which helped the participants understand their role in the process. Besides, consent forms were provided to the respondents explaining that their participation in data collection was voluntary and they could exist at any time (Bell, et al. 2018). The consent of the participants was essential in limiting the level of potential harm during the process. Furthermore, participants were assured of the confidentiality of the information they provided and that the information was only be used for research purposes. The confidentiality of the information was achieved by ensuring that there was no unauthorized access to the data unless expressly authorized by the respondents. The researcher also maintained the anonymity of the
participants by not collecting personally identifying information that can compromise their privacy.

Findings

**Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents**

With reference to gender distribution over half (65.50%) of those who participated in the study were male with women only accounting for 25.50% of the target population. Based on the distribution of the participant by their age group, most of the individuals who took part in the study are young adults of between 21-30 years accounting for 30.90% of the population. A significant section of the population 28.80% were individuals of between 31-40 years. Therefore, it is apparent that most of the individuals who were willing to participate were middle-aged youths who either are in school or involved in active work, thus making them have good understanding of the role of Public Administrators in their communities. Individuals of between 41-50 years old accounted for 24.50% while the least represented people were those of above 50 years old which can be attributed to the limited number of old individuals with basic education in the rural areas.

With reference to education level, higher proportion were college graduates, accounting for 30.90%, followed closely by those who have attained secondary education, at 28.80%, and university graduates, accounting for 28.10%. Those who had attained primary education accounted for only 10.10%, and the least represented group of individuals were those with post-graduate degrees, at 2.20%.

The demographics of the participants thus highlight that most of those respondents who were willing to take part in the study were young adults falling in the 20–40 years age bracket with either a college or University education.

**Role of Public Administrators in Fostering Peace among the Pastoralist Communities in Isiolo County**

The aim of the study in developing the above theme was to address the research question: What is the role of public administrators in fostering peace and security among the pastoralist in Isiolo County?
Table 2

Role of Public Administrators in fostering peace and security among the pastoralist communities

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<tr>
<td>(a) Public Administrators play critical roles in resolving issues that threaten peace in Isiolo County</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>9%</td>
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<td>(b) The impact of Public Administrators in fostering peace has been dwindling with minimal success in Isiolo County</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) Public Administrators have offered the best practices in mitigating against potential conflicts and promoting dialogue among contending parties Isiolo County</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
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<td>(d) The Public Administrators in the county actively involve the local residents in policy-making since they have better understanding of the causes and effects of conflicts Isiolo County</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
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With regards to the above objective on the role of Public Administrators in fostering peace among the pastoralist communities, majority of the respondents agreed that Public Administrators play critical roles in resolving issues that threaten peace giving in Isiolo County, a higher response rate of 51% while 9% strongly disagreed. Respondents described their role to be quite important in fostering peace. They termed them it as being very instrumental in the process because of their presence in every part of the county hence giving the communities an opportunity to seek for any kind of help when need arises.
During an interview, a respondent who is a local resident of Isiolo Town said:

The good thing with these Public Administrators is that they are available in all the locations and sub-locations within the county giving us an opportunity to reach out to them. The Government has ensured that there are Chiefs and Subchiefs at the village levels to give services to the communities and perform other tasks as they are mandated. Indeed, they form an important part of the government. (2 January, 22 Isiolo Town.)

Another respondent who is a local resident of Isiolo Town during the interview said:

What I know for sure is that the Public Administrators especially the Chiefs and Sub Chiefs solve issues among conflicting parties before they escalate through dialogue and promoting reconciliation. This has immensely contributed to peaceful coexistence. Without them things could have been really bad and I appeal to the Government to give them more support by providing them with additional logistics. (2 January, 22 Isiolo Town).

Other respondents had different opinions saying that despite the Public Administrators being present at Isiolo County, some of them have not performed to the expectation of the community members. When asked to elaborate further on why they feel that some Public Administrators are not up to the tasks, they sighted lack of commitment and poor leadership skills.

During the interview, one respondent who is a local resident of Isiolo Town said:

As a resident of Isiolo I feel that the Public Administrators have rather used policy of divide and rule which was inherited from colonialism. They have not been able to come up with new ideas to address issues that threaten peace among the pastoralist communities hence they need to seriously up their game. (28 December 21 Isiolo Town.)

In response to whether the impact of public administrators in fostering peace has been dwindling with minimal success in most parts of Isiolo County, 41% of the respondents strongly agreed and 2% strongly disagreed. Respondents and interviewees assert that due to other factors such as poor road networks, cattle rustling, proliferation of small arms and light weapons and scarcity of resources like pasture for animals have impacted on the realization of peace.

While conducting the interview a respondent who is a local resident of Isiolo Town lamented:

Cases of cattle rustling, ethnic violence and killings have been recurring despite the Public Administrators advocating for peaceful coexistence. These cases become rampant during drought and dry season. We have lost our loved ones and we do not feel if there has been much success in the peace building initiatives approaches by these Public Administrators. (2 January, 22 Isiolo County.)
Moreover, 43% of the participants agreed that Public Administrators have offered the best practices in mitigating against potential conflicts and promoting dialogue among contending parties, 33% strongly agreed while 6% strongly disagree. The respondents indicated that they have been able to exist peacefully due to the efforts that have been shown by the Public Administrators through peace meetings, activities like tree planting and organizing friendly matches between two warring communities.

During the interview, a respondent who is a Civic Leader in Isiolo County said:

……. I appreciate the effort made by our Public Administrators. Many of our people have started to realize the importance of co-existing peacefully and sharing the available resources instead of engaging in fighting and conflicts here and there. Some of the youths have formed football clubs to explore their talents and abandon criminal activities like cattle rustling which is also influenced by cultural beliefs. (2 January, 22 Isiolo Town.)

The findings further provide that 58% of respondents strongly agree that the Public Administrators in the county actively involve the local residents in policy-making since they have better understanding of the causes and effects of conflicts and 2% strongly disagreed on this. Although over 50% strongly agreed to this, some respondents expressed their dissatisfaction on how the Public Administrators ignore them when making policies despite the fact that they are the residents hence have a proper understanding of the unique dynamics that affects peace. They blamed the Public Administrators for not considering them in that process and stated that involving the local communities in the policy making is important.

For instance, one of the respondents during the interview who is a Civic leader said:

Isiolo is a unique county because it is a cosmopolitan county with different ethnic communities living together majority of whom are pastoralists. Involving all the communities in the policy making is paramount because of their diverse culture, beliefs and way of life which will help in understanding what they prefer when it comes to fostering peace other than just coming up with policies without considering the communities who I believe are key stakeholders in the peace process. Their voices and inputs matter a lot. This will help in understanding the needs of the communities than generalizing. What is important for one community may not be important for the other. All I can say is that Public Administrators must
accommodate the views of these communities in order for them to succeed. (2 January 2022 Isiolo Town.).

Discussion

The roles played by public administrators in Isiolo county, such as resolving security issues among the locals and promoting healing, reconciliation among rival communities, and cohesion, have gone a long way in ensuring the efficiency of their efforts in fostering peace among the pastoralist communities. Therefore, public administrators have a strong and direct influence on the effectiveness of efforts geared towards attaining lasting peace and stable security among the pastoralist communities in Kenya.

Concerning the role of public administrators in fostering peace among the pastoralist communities, majority of the respondents agreed that public administrators play critical roles in resolving issues that threaten peace giving a higher response rate of 51% while 9% strongly disagreed. This appears to be in line with a study by Blair (2014) who observed that at both the district and county levels, the government has established local security committees. These committees coordinate government officials such as intelligence and police to discuss security issues such as violence and crime in the area. Local government has a crucial role at the community level, since it provides state security, administers humanitarian aid and relief, and facilitates the implementation of government programs (Blair, 2014). The results also appear to be in the same line with results from one of the interviewees who had the following to say: the good thing with these Public Administrators is that they are available in all the locations and sub-locations within the county giving us an opportunity to reach out to them. The government has ensured that there are chiefs and sub-chiefs at the village levels to give services to the communities and perform other tasks as they are mandated. Indeed, they form an important part of the government.

Slightly more than a half (58%) of respondents strongly agree that the Public Administrators in the county actively involve the local residents in policy-making since they have better understanding of the causes and effects of conflicts. Peacekeeping attempts at the macro level have also run into difficulties. According to one scholar, state-led peacekeeping efforts frequently fail
because to corruption, a lack of legitimacy, a lack of resources, and, ultimately, institutional weakness. Attempts to mediate ethnic conflict issues in a government where ethnic politics are strongly established tend to increase social tensions (Mahmoud, 2017).

Most respondents agreed that Public Administrators have offered the best practices in mitigating against potential conflicts and promoting dialogue among contending parties. In the same line, Bordone, (2015) reports that alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is the most popular component of peace-building programs, especially in locations where official institutions, such as courts, are poor, such as desert and semi-arid areas. Mediation programs are the most popular type of this. According to the notion, if confrontations do not escalate into violence, sentiments between groups will not worsen if ADR is used).

Public administrators in the county actively involve the local residents in policy-making since they have better understanding of the causes and effects of conflicts. Shedding more light, Kona, (2014) observes that all operations with the goal of implementing or enforcing public policy are classified as public administration. This entails a methodical application of the legislation. Public administration can also be the implementation of policies, practices, rules, and regulations, and the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government are all included (Kona, 2014).

Based on the analysis, public administrators play critical role in resolving issues that threaten peace. They have achieved this through having dialogue with the warring communities, involving the local residents in policy-making since they have better understanding of the causes and effects of conflicts. Additionally, they are always available to address anything that affects the communities. Through this dialogue, the effectiveness of the security and peace efforts has led to the initiation of alternatives for sustainable livelihoods to limit the over-dependence on cattle, which has been the primary source of the conflicts. Public Administrators play critical roles in resolving issues that threaten peace giving. Based on the study findings, the government has established local security committees. These committees coordinate government officials such as intelligence and police to discuss security issues such as violence and crime in the area. Local government has a crucial role at the community level, since it provides state security, administers
humanitarian aid and relief, and facilitates the implementation of government programs. This was supported by one of the interviewees who reported that public administrators are available in all the locations and sub-locations within the county giving them opportunities to reach out to them. The Government has ensured that there are Chiefs and Sub-chiefs at the village levels to give services to the communities and perform other tasks as they are mandated. Indeed, they form an important part of the government.

**Conclusion**
The study concluded that public administration promotes communal healing, reconciliation, and enhances cohesion among the warring communities. Therefore, to enhance their effectiveness, the residents, local leaders, and the national government should support the programs and efforts of the officers by providing sufficient support. Moreover, the Public Administrators should facilitate peace committees among the pastoral communities since they have a better understanding of the situation and are well informed in their decision-making on some of the best approaches that resonate with the locals in promoting healing and cohesion. Collaboration with the communities further improves Public Administrators’ dialogue among conflicting parties. The study also concludes that initiating alternative means of livelihoods such as encouraging residents to start small-scale businesses will help limit the high dependency of the pastoralist communities’ dependency on cattle, which is the primary cause of conflict.

This study recommended that for the region and other pastoralist areas to experience lasting peace and stable security, workable strategies should be put forth by both national and local administrators, focusing on eliminating ineffective and expensive approaches that have proved ineffective in fostering peace. These strategies should be based on priority needs and efficiency to ensure that the challenges are carefully scrutinized, and communities are well integrated into decision-making processes.

Another recommendation is that the local leaders and Public Administrators initiate peace resolution approaches that involve the active participation of local residents, such as holding meetings in churches, community gatherings, and launching peace campaigns to assist in preaching peace within communities. Public Administrators should therefore organize meetings to engage the residents in the most appropriate peace resolution approaches as opposed to resorting
to violence. Additionally, the county governments of these pastoralist communities should put more emphasis on having local barazas where all stakeholders in the sub-counties fully participate in offering their views on the causes, the progress, and approaches that can be adopted in the effort to gain peace by eliminating castle raiding. These communal meetings will enhance the confidence of the locals in government efforts and responsibility.
References


Understanding Everyday Experiences of Exclusion and Discrimination: Perspectives from Rwandophone Congolese

Furaha Umutoni Alida

Abstract

The article discussed the narratives of Rwandophone Congolese civilians about their experiences of exclusion and discrimination in the Democratic Republic of Congo, particularly in the North Kivu province. While studies have attended to the general official and political claims voiced by the political wings of Rwandophone armed groups, Rwandophone civilians’ everyday experiences of exclusion and discrimination remain empirically under-researched. Drawing on 106 in-depth interviews, the study showed how Rwandophones’ everyday experiences of exclusion and discrimination are connected to certain spaces from which interviewees feel they were excluded. In addition, the Rwandophones’ narratives illustrated how the lived experiences of discrimination and exclusion feed into the identification process, which the Rwandophones firmly believe renders them second-class persons not belonging to the DRC, which in turn feeds a politicization of identity.

Key words: Exclusion, Experience, Discrimination, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwandophones
Introduction

Although the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is both multi-cultural and multi-ethnic, the belonging and the citizenship of a particular portion of the population speaking Kinyarwanda and identified as Rwandophones have been questioned in popular and public discourse for a long time, particularly after the outbreak of the war in eastern DRC twenty years ago (Kennes, 1999; Vlassenroot, 2002; Stephen, 2007). During the years of armed conflict, the politicization of Rwandophone identity has been expressed in a range of political discourses and armed mobilization, particularly the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) and later the M23 (Mouvement du 23 Mars). These Rwandophone armed groups have claimed to defend the rights of, as well as fight the exclusion and discrimination against the Rwandophone population in the DRC.

The exclusion and discrimination of Rwandophones in the DRC have been subject of much debate in both academic and policy realm (Ndeshyo, 1992; Vlassenroot, 2002; Stephen, 2007; Autesserre, 2010; Stearns, 2012; Sadiki, 2013). Yet, most studies on the matter have attended to the general official and political claims as voiced by the political wings of Rwandophone armed groups (Furaha Umutoni, 2014; Beswick, 2009; Stearns, 2012; Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen, 2013). However, the grievances articulated in such official politico-military discourse do not simply mirror the experiences of exclusion and discrimination among the people they claim to represent (Beswick, 2009; Stearns, 2012; Furaha Umutoni, 2014).

While armed groups and political movements must seek popular support by articulating grievances similar to those held and voiced by the population, clearly armed groups also receive support from other actors with various interests, and subsequently adjust their discourses to such interests (Stearns, 2012; Hoffmann et al., 2014; Stearns et al., 2015; Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen, 2013). My recent research (Furaha Umutoni, 2014) on the Rwandophone armed groups, more specifically on the M23¹, markedly illustrates that all claims put forward by the armed leaders were not embraced by all the Rwandophone population interviewed. For instance, rather than addressing

¹ M23 stands for Mouvement de 23 Mars, a Rwandophone armed group created in 2012. The name of the armed group comes from the peace deal signed on 29 March 2009 between the ‘Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple’ and the DRC government.
discrimination and exclusion of civilian Rwandophones, much focus was on the military actors and discrimination of the CNDP fighters after their integration into the Congolese National Army after a peace agreement in 2009 (see also Stearns, 2012).

Some civilian Rwandophones interviewed also expressed critique not only of motives but also of the gains that the armed struggles have provided for the civilian population. They argued that the involvement of Rwandophone armed groups and the Rwandan state had also exacerbated the resentment towards them and led to more violence, discrimination and exclusion of the population the armed group claims to fight for and represent (Furaha Umutoni, 2014, see also Stearns, 2012; Stephen, 2006; Prunier, 2009; Sadiki, 2013; Human Rights Watch, 2008; 2010).

In short, accounts of exclusion and discrimination articulated by politico-military leaders and the people they claim to represent appear to be quite divergent. For instance, and as we will see later, the issue of being excluded and discriminated against in public transport and official ceremonies constitute issues that were not highlighted by the Rwandophone politico and military leaders. Such divergence highlights the need to attend to experiences of marginalisation among civilian Rwandophones - and how they relate to the politics of identity – as this is highly relevant for efforts to search for conflict resolution mechanisms. The lived experiences of Rwandophone Congolese is an example of identity based conflict and in order to understand the dynamics of such conflict, one needs to understand identification processes of people involved in the study. Putting the main focus on the claims of political and military leaders risks not only to legitimise such actors (as the true voices of grievances), but might also enable various actors to design answers that fail to deliver sustainable and comprehensive solutions in terms of reconciliation and peace-building. In addition, claims by the military and political leaders about the discrimination of Rwandophones are often made in a very general manner, lacking in specificity, thus offering a very limited understanding of everyday experiences of exclusion and discrimination among Rwandophones.

The article seeks to fill this empirical scholarly gap by investigating Rwandophones’ everyday experiences of exclusion and discrimination in relation to various spaces and how such experiences are interlinked with processes of self-identification. It addresses the following question: in what ways and in what spaces of everyday life do Rwandophone experience that they are discriminated against and excluded and how do such experiences appear to shape their identities?
The article shows that the sentiments of exclusion and discrimination are strong among Rwandophones and that they in general feel like they are considered second-class persons who do not belong to the DRC. Yet, the article shows that such experiences are clearly linked to particular spaces of life; in particular interviewees mentioned discrimination and exclusion in relation to schools, employment opportunities, public transport and public ceremonies. It is worth to mention that interviewees did talk only about these four spaces.

The rest of the article proceeds as follows: give a brief history of the Rwandophone population in the DRC and the official claims of exclusion as expressed by Rwandophone armed groups. In the second section; present the conceptual perspective and approach of the article; followed in the third section by a presentation of the method used in the field research. In the fourth section, interviewees’ narratives of exclusion and discrimination are presented and discussed, paying particular attention to the contexts they speak of in their responses (sites such as schools, work places, public transport and public ceremonies) and how these sites reflect a sense of exclusion from the DRC. Particular attention is also paid to ways in which boundaries between Self and Other are drawn by interviewees in their narratives about experiences of discrimination and exclusion.

**History of Rwandophones and Claims of Exclusion**

*The Rwandophone Population in the DRC*

According to David Newbury, the arrival and presence of Rwandophones in the DRC could be divided into the following historical periods: the pre-colonial, colonial, and postcolonial periods (Newbury, 2005). He argues that some Rwandophones lived in what became the eastern part of the DRC before colonisation. Later on, with the border demarcation at the Berlin Conference in 1884–1885, they became part of the Belgian Congo. Furthermore, while some Kinyarwanda-speaking people, the ‘Banyarwanda’ (meaning people from Rwanda, in Kiswahili), populated the province of North Kivu, South Kivu was largely occupied by what became to be called the ‘Banyamulenge’ or ‘Tutsi Congolese’ (Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2005).

Further, under Mission d’Immigration de Banyarwanda (MIB) in 1936 and 1956, a group of Rwandophones were transported from Rwanda to the DRC (Hakiza Rukatsi, 2004; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004; Ndeshyo, 1992; Spitaels, 1953). As part of the deal between the colonial

10.4
power, the administrative authorities of Kivu, the Rwandan authorities, and the National Committee of Kivu, Rwandophones\(^2\) (Banyarwanda) were relocated to Kivu (Pabanel, 1991). While some Rwandophones moved to the Congo freely, others moved by necessity as a consequence of conflicts in Rwanda in 1959, 1973 and later on with the genocide in 1994 (Prunier, 2009; Newbury, 2005). Thus, the establishment of the Rwandophone population in the DRC is the result of both free and forced movements of people. It is believed that at the time of the DRC independence in 1960, the Rwandophone population had become almost a majority in North Kivu, and they were even more numerous in South Kivu (Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2005). Actually, statistics about the estimation of the Rwandophone population in the DRC varies from one source to another. The population of the DRC is 77 million (World Bank, 2015) and Rwandophones represent between 60% and 80% of the 6.7 million inhabitants of North Kivu. They are concentrated in the Petit Nord region composed of Masisi, Rutshuru and Walikale where some "indigenous" communities such as the Hunde in Masisi represent only 5% (Mathieu and al., 1999; Search for common ground, 2014).

Rwandophones from Congo and Rwanda share some commonalities such as language and traditions (e.g. rituals of marriage, funerals etc.) (For details see Furaha Umutoni, 2014, 2016.) Yet, the concept “Rwandophone” goes beyond the language aspect, and also contains subdivisions in which people (depending on context) also sometimes identify themselves as Hutu and Tutsi. Given the history of the conflict and the Rwandan government support to Rwandophones paramilitary group (Stearns, 2012) people identified as Tutsis often feel particularly insecure and targeted in the DRC (Stearns, 2012). Yet, despite of such differences, there is also, as we will see, a common identity (and image of) Rwandophones as one ‘ethnic group’ and the importance of other identity markers such as Hutu or Tutsi varies extensively.

Some reports and research (International Crisis group, 2001; Autesserre, 2007; Human Rights Watch, 2005; RENADHOC, 2012) about the DRC have highlighted the discrimination against the Rwandophone population in the DRC. For instance Autesserre (2007: 426-427) argues that

\(^2\) Rwandophone’ is at base a description of the language that one speaks. That is, Rwandans are Rwandophone. Yet, especially in the DRC, Rwandophone refers to a certain identity in the ethnic mosaic of the DRC.
Rwandophones were subject to massacres in Masisi in 1993 and “subject to considerable discrimination and abuse, and many Congolese groups contested their very right to live on Congolese territory”. Yet, there is little research about the focus of this paper, namely the experience of discrimination in everyday life.

The paper now attends to the official claims of exclusion as voiced by various armed groups that have claimed to fight for the Rwandophone ethnic group. Briefly highlighting the official claims from the political and military leadership will provide the picture of how civilians’ lived experience may differ from their auto-proclaimed leaders.

*Leaders’ Claims of Exclusion and Discrimination*

As mentioned above, several Rwandophone armed groups have claimed to fight for the interests of the Rwandophone population in the DRC. The first mobilization of Rwandophones in armed groups started with the beginning of the First Congo War in 1996. Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) and Alliance des Forces pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFLD), which predominantly consisted of Rwandophone fighters, played a major role in both the First and the Second Congo Wars which involved several foreign countries such as Angola, Chad, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and others (Prunier, 2009; Reyntjens, 2009).

After years of fighting against the DRC government, a peace agreement including the RCD was signed in 2002 in Sun City. Yet, parts of RCD did not believe that sufficient consideration had been taken to Rwandophones in the peace deal. New fighting erupted after the split of the RCD and the creation of the CNDP (Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple). Similar to the RCD and AFDL, the CNDP was a Rwandophone armed group organised in 2006 after years of an apparent peace. The CNDP claimed that the DRC government was not protecting the Rwandophone population. Another reason behind the creation of the CNDP was the fear that not many Rwandophones would be represented and elected in the 2006 elections (Stearns, 2012).

After intense fighting between the CNDP and the DRC government forces from 2006 to 2008, where the latter most often suffered humiliating defeats, the CNDP secured a peace deal on 23 March 2009 (Stearns, 2011, 2012). The main issues agreed upon in the 2009 peace agreement were the safe return of Rwandophone refugees (mainly residing in camps in Rwanda), the amnesty of
CNDP fighters, mechanisms for reconciliation and the inclusion of the CNDP in the Congolese National Army. However, peace from that deal did not last long and a new armed group named M23 (Mouvement du 23 Mars) was formed in 2012, claiming to fight for the implementation of the March 2009 peace agreement.

Regarding exclusion, discrimination and insecurity, the M23 initially focused their claims mainly on the situation of soldiers in the army after the integration of ex-CNDP fighters in the national army. As mentioned above, a provision in the 2009 peace agreement stipulates that the CNDP fighters would be integrated into the regular army. Yet, the CNDP fighters argued that they were discriminated against in terms of employment opportunities and could not expect justice from Congolese authorities as stressed in a statement by the political leader in 2012. Bishop L. Runiga, the former M23’s Political leader stated that: “Former CNDP and PARECO soldiers were victims of discriminatory treatment and were targets of their FARDC’s colleagues. When other FARDC received their wages, the ex CNDP and PARECO soldiers were getting only a small amount of money that does not match to the expected payment” (cited in Furaha Umutoni, 2014:80-81; for a counter-reading see Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen, 2013). After international pressure on the Rwandan government to stop the alleged support to M23, the M23 was military defeated in November 2013 through the cooperation between members of the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region and the UN Force Intervention Brigade with which the Congolese army launched a military offensive against the M23.

**Conceptual Reflections: Discrimination, Exclusion and Identity**

Having outlined the historical context in question, this section turns to theoretical issues, looking in particular at concepts of discrimination and exclusion. A common definition of discrimination is that it constitutes a system of “drawing a distinction in such way that widely accepted values and procedures are violated” (Simpson, 1985: 23). Discrimination thus takes place when an individual or an institution has been treated in such way that individual or a group of people rights have been denied. Or as Moreau Sophia (2010: 147) argues, “discrimination amounts to a personal wrong against the victim because the discriminator has interfered with the victim’s right to a certain set of deliberative freedoms”. Most research has focused on discrimination as an

In contrast to such studies, the focus here is on experiences of discrimination (rather than an objective mapping of discrimination) and how such experiences are linked to processes of identification. As such then, feelings of discrimination are conceptualized as part of processes of exclusion that shape a person’s sense of Self and Other. Here, I am of course referring to a different form of exclusion than that often referred to in theorizing about identity construction which emphasize that identity construction is always about exclusion and the construction of difference: efforts to know, secure, a sense of who ‘I’ or ‘We’ are always involves identifying and excluding what we are not (Hall, 1990; 1996; Stern, 2006; Hylland Eriksen, 1992). In short, identity is always constructed through exclusion, through the creation of boundaries that differentiate the ‘Self’ from the ‘Other’.

Yet, feelings of discrimination play a different/variable role in such processes of distinguishing between the Self and the Other. They tend to play a particularly important role, not only in contexts marked by strong inequalities, but also in armed conflicts marked by a strong sense of insecurity (Stern, 2006; Wimmer et al., 2009; Fearon et al., 2003). In such settings, people make sense of who they are in relation to others. Both everyday experiences of exclusion and feelings of insecurity often form an integral part of discrimination, and the group identified as the out-group is represented as a source of danger (Stern, 2006). Studies within conflict research focusing on the macro-level data have shown that rebellion and armed conflict are more likely in countries marked by high degrees of exclusion and discrimination (and thus ethnic diversity itself is not a cause of conflict) (see Fearon et al., 2003; Wimmer et al., 2009). Yet, rather than focusing on everyday experiences of discrimination by people not actively involved in rebellion (which is the focus here), such research mostly focuses on a more macro-level data on access to state power (Fearon, et al., 2003; Wimmer et al., 2009) or political mobilization at group level, analysing why certain ethnic minorities mobilize and rebel and others do not (see for instance Gurr, 1993).

The concept of the everyday experience also needs some reflection. Everyday experience is here understood as a site from which the re-production of knowledge/meanings is possible (Scott, 1991, 1992). Yet, like identities, experiences are here conceptualized as being constructed and mediated
through discourse. Joan W. Scott (1992: 33–34) explains further, “identity is tied to notions of experience [...]. Subjects are constituted discursively and experience is a linguistic event (it doesn’t happen outside established meanings), but neither is it confined to a fixed order of meaning”.

If knowledge is constructed, it means that the experience of discrimination is also a social construction informed by dominant discourses (for instance discourses of exclusion and discrimination articulated by politico-military elites). Yet, conceptualizing experience of discrimination as a “linguistic event” does not mean that such experiences are to be seen as “inventions”, masking something more “real”. Rather, doing so is an acknowledgement that discourse provides meaning to both events (i.e. what constitute events and practices of discrimination and exclusion) and the processes feeding into identifications and distinctions between the Self and the Other. As Meltzer, Petras and Reynolds (1977) argue, “by identifying the meanings that actors attributed to their surroundings, by [...] seeing the world from their perspective, we can understand why people do what they do” (cited in Burke et al., 2009: 33).

**Interviewing Rwandophone – Methodological Concerns**

This article is based on in-depth interviews carried out in Rwanda and the DRC between 2012 and 2014. In total, 106 in-depth individual interviews were conducted, and all interviewees identified themselves as Rwandophones from the DRC. The interviews included people living in the city of Goma as well as newly arrived Rwandophones living in refugee camps and those living outside the camps in Rwanda. As elaborated elsewhere, the original idea was to conduct all the interviews in the DRC, but due to the insecurity during fieldwork (posed by the M23 rebellion) Rwandophones that had taken refuge in Rwanda were interviewed (see Furaha Umutoni, 2014 and 2016). Individual interviews were performed in order to encourage personal reflections (Howitt, 2010) and allow interviewees to express themselves as openly as possible. Attempts were made to have interviewees from different social classes and occupations. Interviewees were men and women aged between twenty-two and seventy-six years old, with various backgrounds such as farmers, religious leaders, members of women’s groups, businesspersons, researchers, teachers, students living in an urban environment. From the interview texts, recurring narratives were identified, which were analyzed as everyday experiences of exclusion and discrimination. Despite the variety among respondents in terms of age, occupation or social classes, surprisingly most of
my respondents expressed similar experiences of exclusion and discrimination at the main sites in which it occurs.

The interviews conducted in the refugee camp in Rwanda could be seen as posing particular methodological challenges as conditions there might have limited the respondent’s willingness to express themselves freely (as Rwanda was now their host and since the country was accused in the report of the UN Group of Experts [UN Security Council 2008–2012] of backing Rwandophone armed groups). Yet, while these circumstances certainly shaped their narratives, such factors were more important in relation to other questions posed in the research (for instance identification with Rwanda and M23) and thus less likely to have affected the way they talked about their sense of exclusion in the DRC in any significant way. Moreover, the reading of the interview situations was that the researcher was largely attributed an identity of an outsider and insider (Hill Collins, 1986; Hellawell, 2006; Corbin Dwyer, 2009) given that the researcher is Rwandan, being born in and growing up in the DRC and as a consequence, the researcher and respondents speak the same languages- Kinyarwanda, Swahili and French, which appeared to create a sense of a common identity. Yet, as a researcher, it is important to be attentive to the power relations between you and the researched upon (Ackerly & True, 2010: 235, 268). Despite some commonalities between the researcher and the interviewees, the interview situations were certainly marked by the fact that most of them were refugees, living in poor condition. However, it is not an easy task to estimate the effects of such positioning and one needs to manage all possible identities that have been attributed in a way that gives the researcher ability to satisfactory performing the study (Corbin Dwyer & al., 2009).

In the interviews, open-ended questions were used to encourage Rwandophones to narrate their everyday experiences of being Rwandophone in the DRC. Since the overview picture that emerged was that Rwandophones experienced discrimination in DRC, there was a follow up on their narratives of exclusion with questions related to that.

As already mentioned, this article is based on interviews with Rwandophones living in Rwanda and in Goma, and it does not claim that the material is representative of the Rwandophone population as a whole. Although the data does not allow for generalization, it can nonetheless
reveal ways in which every day experiences of exclusion and discrimination play out in relation to contexts of exclusion and discrimination as they emerged in the narratives.

The next section examines ways in which Rwandophones interviewed account their experiences of exclusion and discrimination. These ways of talking about everyday experiences of discrimination and exclusion are organised under two sections: the first elaborates on different contexts and sites of exclusion and discrimination, while the second develops on the role of authorities in discrimination and exclusion as highlighted in the narratives.

**Narrating Experiences of Exclusion and Discrimination**

From Rwandophone Congolese’ stories, diverse contexts of exclusion and discrimination emerge. In the process of situating contexts in which exclusion took place, Rwandophone Congolese construct identity by creating boundaries that define sameness (among them) and difference (from other ethnic groups). Those boundaries are voiced through discourses of exclusion and discrimination as discussed below. As highlighted above, the intention in this article is not to provide an ‘objective’ account of exclusion and discrimination of Rwandophones in the DRC. Indeed, starting from the assumption that experiences are always constituted through discourse (Scott, 1992; Spivak, 1987; Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002), such efforts to provide objective accounts are deemed to fail (at least with the methodology employed here, i.e. interviews). The narratives of exclusion and discrimination in this article are inherently subjective, not simply mirroring factual events and actions of exclusion and discrimination as expressed by the Rwandophone population interviewed. In other words, the accounts of exclusion and discrimination are intrinsically shaped by the meanings that the people interviewed provided to events that happened to them in specific circumstances.

**Exclusion and Discrimination at Schools, Workplaces and Public Transport**

In their narratives of exclusion with regard to places, the people I interviewed drew particular attention to education, employment and public transport. They stated that their children were discriminated against in schools and that they were themselves excluded from work and public transport. In addition, their accounts report how the exclusion they experienced, for instance in school and at work, was based on their names, spoken language or physical appearance. The
following citations are some of the ways in which interviewees have located and expressed feelings of exclusion:

I can tell you that we are not included at all. Our children cannot easily get access to schools. We have to pay something more in order to get them registered and we give money to get the transcript for each semester. What we have to pay is not the school fee. It is *mukate ya watoto* [bread for kids]. Do you understand that? Other ethnic groups do not have to pay more for their children (Interviewee 27, Goma, 2013).

Requesting money and being denied access to jobs due to their names emerge as tools used in the process of excluding Rwandophones. Hence, names as one of the identity layers is being used as a means of discrimination.

We live together with Hunde, Nyanga, Tembo and Nande knowing who we are and who they are. They have jobs because they are considered and consider themselves as the real Congolese. And we [Rwandophones] are just like second-class people. You will not get a job because your name sounds like Rwandan names. So we are reduced to do farming and livestock (Interviewee 44, Kigeme, 2012).

In this narrative as many others, the reference to social class is emphasised through the notion of ‘second-class people’. In their narratives, a classification of people is made which creates a boundary (THEM and US) between who is seen as the *real Congolese* and Rwandophones (second-class people).

These kinds of narratives were articulated both by educated, and economically well- off as well as less-privileged groups. The fact of being discriminated against is considered as not allowing Rwandophones to enjoy all privileges that one can get outside discriminative practices. By creating a sense of collective sameness as ‘Rwandophones’, the interviewees show how experiences and discourses of being excluded and discriminated from getting an employment or being equally treated in schools are interpreted as a sign of them not being considered ‘real Congolese’. Hence, the Rwandophones identify themselves as different from the other ethnic groups who are not excluded, through an experience of being excluded. Furthermore, from the above narratives, one can surmise that the respondents recognised that other ethnic groups have other and more rights than they – the Rwandophones – do. Looking closer at these accounts, it appears as if the interviewees blame the other groups for not being treated equally. Through such experiences of discrimination and exclusion, identification (and meaning-making) takes place; thus allowing the
articulation of the Rwandophone identity as a coherent identity, with its particularity and
distinctiveness from other ethnic groups in the DRC. According to the Rwandophones interviewed,
being Congolese thus means to be free from discrimination and to be included and they perceive
that other Congolese are not subjected to the same practices of exclusion and discrimination.

Additionally, interviewees highlight that discrimination and exclusion are experienced on public
transport. The emphasis that the respondents place on transport, which is expected to be public in
their accounts, serves as an example of a sentiment that there is a lack of equal treatment between
Rwandophones and other ethnic groups using the so-called public transport. The state is obligated
to provide service to all its citizens in the same way without any discrimination. Yet, in their
stories, the price and the seat are determined by your physical appearance. A male respondent
explains it as follows:

Because I am Rwandophone and very tall, I have to pay the equivalent of two
seats when using public transport (Interviewee 37, Kigeme 2012).

This account shows how discrimination is located in the multiple ways in which one can
position his or self and by others. Thus, naming discrimination and exclusion is done through
a given identities.

In a similar way, a woman accounted her experience of discrimination:

In a van from Goma with goods, the driver wanted to take one more person but no seat
was left. He [the driver] said to me, you are so fat, especially your behind. If you want
to reach Masisi you have to pay what the person I cannot take would have paid
(Interviewee 71, Gihembe, 2013).

Thus, schools, workplaces and public transport occupied a central place in interviews, emerging
as particularly important sites of discrimination. In turn, these spaces are described as sites where
exclusion and discrimination are performed and that shape their sense of self (and Other).
Moreover, it is clear that exclusion and discrimination are experienced as being played out in terms
of who is considered as a citizen and who is not. While most Rwandophone Congolese have legal
rights to be citizens of the DRC, the absence of a common identity card in the country as a whole
(and the fact that most people do not have a passport as they are very expensive) makes citizenship
an easily contested issue. Currently, the main document which is used as an identity card and proof
of citizenship is the electoral card. Yet, the narratives indicate that the possession of an electoral card is often not seen as sufficient proof of citizenship.

While it is widely known that anyone (e.g. a foreigner) can buy an electoral card in the DRC, it is also widely believed that a large amount of Rwandan nationals bought the electoral cards and participated in the elections to support Kabila (in turn seen as a collaborator with the current Rwandan government). As a consequence, many of the people interviewed lamented that their cards – and thus citizenship – were always questioned. As one person explained:

When we are competing for jobs, they checked our names and appearance. Most of the time we do not go beyond the first stage where identity cards are checked. The few Rwandophones accessing the other level give money or they promise to give a cow (Interviewee 65, Gihembe, 2013).

Moreover, many people interviewed emphasised that other ethnic groups generally consider them as foreigners (Rwandans) and not welcome. Yet, in their narratives, they do not only emerge as foreigners, but as a/the source of conflict and as such also part of the perceived (Rwandan) enemy and aggressor. Two people explained it as follows:

The other groups [Tembo, Nyanga, Nande, ...] look upon us as foreigners and a source of conflicts. The others consider us as members of the Rwandophone armed group (Interviewee 63, Gihembe, 2013).

They [people from other tribes] say that Rwandophones bring conflicts. They look upon us as Rwandans. [...] most of the time they shout at us and request us to leave a meeting or a ceremony before we bring them bad luck” (Interviewee 103, Goma, 2014).

In the above account, the interviewee explains how the ways in which they experience that others perceive them influences their sense of inclusion or exclusion. The feeling among the Rwandophone Congolese interviewed is that the other ethnic groups think that the Rwandophone Congolese represent insecurity in the sense that Rwandophone armed groups have played a role in the conflicts in the DRC. Again, this in turn forms perceptions of who the Rwandophones are and who the other ethnic groups are. In this regard, boundaries are constructed in order to set differences between “us” (Rwandophones subject to exclusion and discrimination) and “them” (the non- excluded and non-discriminated).
Exclusion and Discrimination at Public Events

Listening carefully to some interviewees, we hear how they believe that authorities at the local level play a significant role in excluding and discriminating against Rwandophones, in particular (and as indicated in the citation above) in relation to public events. In the following section, attention is given to those narratives and the focus will therefore be on the authorities as actors in reproducing exclusion and discrimination. As has been stated in many interviews, getting employment in the DRC is a matter of good relationships and interactions with state representatives. Interviewees narrate that the armed conflicts changed the relationships that they previously had here and how their experiences of exclusion or inclusion are connected to the perceived role of the authorities.

In the narrative below, we see how the participation in a public event gives ways of articulating an identity of a Rwandophone Congolese Self who is excluded and discriminated in public events such as Independence Day. Public events are spaces where the acceptance of an individual as belonging to the DRC is expressed and participating in those official celebrations is considered as a civic obligation for each citizen. The official events are also an occasion for meeting between the population and authorities. Usually each year, for instance at the local level, authorities organise Labour Day and most of the people from the area attend, often schools are involved with a parade of students and speeches are held.

According to the narratives of the Rwandophones, in order to attend a public event and to enjoy it fully, one is required to hold a DRC citizenship or to be seen as an invited guest of honour. Hence, if Rwandophone Congolese are not welcome to the public events (as the respondents tell us), it means that their identity as Congolese is called into question. Thus, participation in public events emerges as an important issue in the narratives, as it is the place where belonging/citizenship is negotiated and patriotism is shown. In many of the narratives, it is emphasised that public authorities do not like their presence. As these interviewees emphasize:

I am not considered as Congolese when attending an official ceremony. I am called Rwandan. Other ethnic groups said: You Rwandan, what are you doing here? Our authorities do not value our presence (Interviewee 46, Kigeme, 2012).
Here, the first interviewee highlights the identifications that are given to Rwandophones who dare to participate in a public ceremony such as Independence Day, Labour Day, Martyrs Day of Independence. They are labelled with a foreign identity- Rwandan. Further, they explained that authorities do not prevent other groups from excluding them.

How could you expect to be in harmony with your neighbours while you are not treated equally? In the village they will not accept you if from the top [the authorities] you are not accepted as Congolese (Interviewee 30, Kigeme, 2012).

In this regard, the narrators tell us, authorities ultimately bear the responsibility of such acts. Interviewees often describe how the authorities are passive when other ethnic groups mistreat them. For example, Rwandophone Congolese narrate that the local authority will never intervene when someone from another ethnic group puts sand in their water or in their foodstuff, cuts their cow with a machete, beats them or pours dirty water on them. In situations where the feelings of discrimination and exclusion are experienced, Rwandophones Congolese cast authorities as the actors and supporters of them being excluded and discriminated. These experiences are expressed in the following quotations:

When we were in the Congo I sent my daughter to fetch water and she did. A group of people stopped her on the way back home and asked if she could give them water to drink. She gave them water, but after drinking water one of them, a man of about 25 or 30 years, said, ‘Thank you for the water but this water does not belong to Rwanda’, reported my daughter. The man took sand and put it in the remaining water. I reported the fact at a meeting and a participant laughed at me. The authority did not seem to take my problem into consideration and nothing was done until we came to the camp (Interviewee 66, Gihembe, 2012).

The lack of getting assistance in a given matter is being presented as discrimination or exclusion and makes the interviewee to voice the issue as identity-based discrimination.

According to the narratives, discrimination takes the form of being excluded from service delivery. They argue that authorities at the local level do not treat and address Rwandophone issues on the
basis of equal rights held by all Congolese citizens. In general, the authorities are supposed to deliver a range of services, such as getting a receipt as proof of payment when one is hiring a space in the market, getting a travel document, getting information when needed, solving issues related to land or any other business. The below interviewee explained:

We [Rwandophones] are not treated like them [other ethnic groups]. When we go to report an issue to authorities, they do not care; they can let us spend hours without talking to us. You know, sometimes they talk to us in Kinyarwanda to insinuate that we can only understand Kinyarwanda because we are not Congolese. [...] They act in such way in the presence of other ethnic groups (Interviewee 94, Goma 2014).

As shown here, the use of Kinyarwanda is also seen as part of exclusionary practices. Rather than being seen as a sign of inclusion and recognition it emerges as a sign of exclusion and discrimination that insinuates that they are foreigners and not Congolese. It was recurrently emphasized that local (as well as other) authorities are now in the hands of other groups, and this lack of representation was presented as a source of discrimination. As some respondents put it:

All those acts of discrimination and exclusion are there because nowadays we do not have any position and power at the local level (Interviewee 25, Kigeme, 2012).

In this narrative, not possessing a position at the local level gives ground to discrimination. It is understood as if having a position and power will prevent Rwandophones from discrimination and exclusion:

In the past we [Rwandophones] had a good position in the high hierarchy of the state. All Congolese were almost equal during Mobutu era. We had Rwandophones in the presidential office. We were not excluded. Today, all of the Congo’s problems are called Rwandophone in a way that other ethnic groups and our local authorities prefer not to include us even in a national ceremony that is celebrated at the local level such as Independence Day, Martyrs Day (Interviewee 87, Gihembe, 2013).

As discussed in the background section, governance and various position occupied by Rwandophones in the past governance is being romanticised as a great time.

I am not treated as other Congolese. I am tortured. I cannot be a customary chief or have a chiefdom. It is impossible to become even a simple chief for a locality. How

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3 For the sake of clarification, this is meant in a symbolic sense. It is a challenge to translate an interview and keep the authentic meaning. For example, several respondents said in French ‘nous sommes torturés’ and the translation in English is simply ‘we are tortured’ and yet this translation cannot capture suffering, experience of difficulty or being physically abused.
can someone be excluded from his own chiefdom while my grandfather was the Mwami? Today, we are obliged to live in the refugee camps without any means. We have had good life before the Congo wars. (Interviewee 44, Kigeme, 2012).

As illustrated in these citations, the experience and problems of today – in terms of lack of political representation at various levels – is often contrasted to earlier times, before the war when Rwandophones also held political and administrative positions. Interviewees talk much about the past when they had power (when they were *Mwami* and not excluded). Thinking about the past becomes a way to contrast with the situation now but also of remembering a time when they were considered as Congolese. Remembering a time when they supposedly were considered Congolese and equal appears to work in a comforting way, perhaps as a sign that things can again change for the better, if only conflict is ended and they, once again, also can gain access to state power. The lack of representation thus emerges as a major source of discrimination, not simply in itself, but since authorities are often blamed for discrimination and inciting other groups against them. While the location of blame differed a bit among interviewees, local authorities were often described as the main source of discrimination and exclusions:

The problem is our leaders who instigate them [other ethnic groups] to discriminate against us because we used to live in harmony with other people (Interviewee 99, Goma, 2014).

In this account, the problems were often (as in many others narratives described as driven from above and implemented by poor villagers.

Do you know how much people in the village fear to disobey Paluku? He hates us [Rwandophones] and he has given money to Hunde, Nande and others. So those tribes could fight us though we used to live in harmony. You know in the DRC when you are poor, money can change your behaviour (Interviewee 102, 2014).

Accounts that ‘we used to live in harmony with other groups’ – and thus that the problem is not really other groups, but the behaviour of the authorities

Our local leaders do not act in a responsible way. Any issue related to our presence is not handled on a regular basis. There is a culture of favouritism (Interviewee 85, 2012).

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4 *Mwami* means king in the Kinyarwanda language.

5 Paluku was the governor of the province of North Kivu at the time of fieldwork.
As reflected in these citations, local authorities are described as not simply biased towards them, but also as often inciting hatred against them.

When facing problems, our local authorities do not assist us. The solution is to flee. The local leaders don’t assist us when there is a conflict (Interviewee 87, Kigeme, 2012).

Listening to the above narratives, it is clear that the interviewees believe that the authorities do not treat Rwandophones in a just manner since those authorities do not consider issues related to them and further, those authorities do not handle their problems in the same way as they do for other ethnic groups. The way in which authorities are seen to deal with Rwandophone Congolese issues informs the articulation of their identities as an excluded group, but here mainly in relation to state authorities. Other ethnic groups do not appear as the Other in the same way as in some of the narratives above. Rather, they are described as somewhat innocent as their behaviour is incited by bad authorities.

In some narratives, Rwandophone Congolese recognise that they are also included in some public services, particularly in the police and the army. However, it was often emphasised that to maintain those positions/jobs, Rwandophones need to do something extra. As two respondents expressed it:

We [Rwandophones] have some people in the army and in the police. Those persons cannot fully assume their identities otherwise they are mistreated. You know, some Rwandophones did modify a bit their family names so it sounds different from Rwandophones’ names (Interviewee 67, Gihembe, 2013).

Our brothers are discriminated at work. They [Rwandophones] are not considered as other Congolese at the workplace. They have to negotiate and bribe in order to maintain their job (Interviewee 104, Goma, 2014).

In the above citations, the seeming inclusion is also painted with experiences of discrimination, fear and denial of one’s own identity. Similar accounts of strategies to counter discrimination by trying to hide Rwandophone markers, such as names, also recurred in other interviews. Hence, also when included in state structures, Rwandophones were described as being subject to discrimination.
Conclusion

This article has analyzed Rwandophones’ everyday experiences of exclusion and discrimination in relation to various spaces and how such experiences are interlinked with processes of identification. While a number of researchers have paid attention to the general official and political claims, as voiced by the Rwandophone armed groups, the everyday experiences of the civilian Rwandophone population have been overlooked.

In paying attention to the accounts of the civilian Rwandophone populations’ experiences, we learn how exclusion and discrimination have shaped the ways in which Rwandophone identity has been constructed and reconstructed. Listening to these narratives has allowed me to draw the following conclusions. There are a number of specific contexts where Rwandophones feel excluded and discriminated against. Many interviewees referred to school, public ceremonies, public transport and employment as spaces where exclusion happens. In this regard, for instance, Rwandophone Congolese emphasize how the lack of education or being treated equally as other Congolese in the DRC has impacted the kind of life they are able to create for their children and for themselves. The lived experiences of the people interviewed bring new perspectives that are absent from that of Rwandophone Congolese politico-military leaders. For example, the narrators highlighted the issue of how experiences from schools, public transport and public ceremonies constitute important instances of experienced discrimination, sites and aspects which have not been raised in official discourse that only highlights general claims about discrimination and exclusion.

In some accounts, people from other ethnic groups that live in their surroundings emerge as the source of discrimination. Thus, they emerge as the Other, in relation to which the identity of a discriminated-against and excluded Rwandophone collective Self is constructed. Yet often it is local authorities that are blamed. While the lack of Rwandophone representation in various state functions is emphasised as a sign of discrimination, authorities themselves are often blamed for discrimination and for inciting hatred against them. A common narrative is that ‘we used to live in harmony with other groups’, but that the behaviour of the authorities has changed this. Hence, in such accounts, authorities emerge as the main Other, rather than members of other ethnic groups who are described as somewhat innocent and whose discriminatory behaviour has been incited by authorities. Such accounts, as well as the recurrent stories and remembrance of times when
Rwandophones were recognised as Congolese citizens and also represented in various state functions, seem to serve both as a confirmation of their belonging to the DRC, as well as a sign of hope that they could again be included.

To conclude, the narratives in these interviews add new knowledge about the Rwandophones’ everyday experience of exclusion and discrimination, which are silenced in the official discourse. In turn, it highlights how the claims of political and military actors tend to be articulated in a more general manner, neglecting the more specific and detailed knowledge of the people experiencing exclusion and discrimination in their everyday life. The analysis of Rwandophones’ narratives helps us better understand how the Rwandophones identify themselves in relation to other ethnic groups and how they think others consider them in the conflict dynamics of eastern DRC. Furthermore, it shows how experiences of discrimination shape Rwandophone identity in a marked manner by creating boundaries between “us” (Rwandophones subject to exclusion and discrimination) and “them” (non-excluded and non-discriminated Congolese). Thus, exploring Rwandophones’ narratives of experiences about discrimination and exclusion can shed further light on conflict dynamics and provide insight for policy-makers and other stakeholders involved in reconciliation and peace-building in the DRC. The experiences of local people, including their experiences of exclusion and discrimination, are necessary to take into account when attempting to build a peaceful future in the region.
References


Community Policing during Pandemics: A Study of Lari Sub-County in Kenya during COVID-19 Outbreak

Mumo C. Musyoka and Innocent Ndahiriwe

Abstract

In understanding community policing in situations of pandemics, this article examined police and community actions, perceptions, and narratives surrounding community policing during the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 in Kenya. Normative sponsorship theory guided this study to explain the convergence of interests, to satisfy the needs of the people and critically explicate social and political activity by people to improve their social conditions. The use of qualitative research design guided this study and primary data collected from a representative population through the snowball sampling. The government administrative offices provided the secondary data. The narrative and descriptive analysis method analyzed the data. The findings indicate that the determining factor of police performance in terms of community policing depends on wide-ranging public opinions from various actors. The police should respect the will of the community and instead build on this will while catering to their policing needs. In terms of contribution to knowledge, normal situations have always defined community policing, this study brings in the abnormal situation of community policing. The article provides empirical evidence of the reality of people’s perceptions, which define how positively or negatively, it influences the applicability of community policing in situations of pandemics, not only now but also in the future.

Keywords: Community actions, Community policing, Normative sponsorship theory, Convergence of interests, Covid-19
Introduction

Police establishments worldwide systematically continue to focus on instituting or reinstituting confidence in their police personnel and building a correlation of trust between communities and the police. Even before its known connotation described as “meaning many things to many people" (Denny & Jenkins, 2013: 2), the concept of community policing existed practically through voluntary services of keeping watch over neighborhoods and detecting problems by selected individuals (Peak K., 2013). Historically, great examples emerged in the 1970s and early 1980s in North America and Britain largely aimed at restoring police-minorities ties and relations with the community (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990). This followed the expansion of community policing initiatives across the globe and the identification of the same as both a philosophy and concrete operational strategy (Diphoorn, T., & Stapele, N., 2021). Since sir Robert Peel’s principles of policing (Pearl, 2015 p.2), community policing has continued to be key in expanding the partnership to all other agencies (both government and private) and civil society with an overall goal to improve public safety and the quality of life for all persons.

As underscored by Kelman (2008), security challenges pose one of the biggest threats in African countries striving to achieve their development goals hence augmenting the need of embracing community policing (CP) amongst other new policing strategies. In the Kenyan context, community policing has been advanced largely as a tool of police transformation geared to a police institution centered on serving people’s needs. The community policing approach in the Kenya Police Service is enshrined in her strategic mission, which states; ‘to provide professional police service through community partnership and upholding the rule of law for safe and secure society’ (National Police Service Strategic plan 2018/2022). It recognizes the independence and shared responsibility of the police and the community in ensuring a safe and secure environment for all Kenyan citizens. Its objective is to establish an active and equal partnership between the police and the communities through which crimes are determined and implemented in the same manner (National Policing Service Community Policing Information Booklet, 2017).

Despite community policing being key in determining police public relationships, its applicability in the aspect of pandemics, has not been given enough emphasis. This is done in order in order to define the required need of policing centered on serving people’s needs and creating or maintaining
the intended relationships (Beek, et al. 2017), rather, it has been based on assumptions applicable normally as other times. This paper added to this debate through the determination of the power of preferences, perceptions, and opinions in shaping good relationships and bringing the right solutions in policing pandemics as founded in normative sponsorship theory. The theory indicates that people who have a convergence of interests may cooperate with one another in order to satisfy their preferred needs (Sower, et al., 1957).

Section one is the background of the paper, which summarizes, integrates, and critically evaluates the empirical knowledge in community policing and pandemics. Section two covers the general overview of community policing and the related impact from covid-19 pandemic while bringing an understanding of the theoretical contribution The other sections that follow elucidate the methodology applied in conducting the study, the findings thereof, and the conclusions drawn from the study.

Defining Community Policing
Arguably, it has not been easy to arrive at an agreed definition of community policing in the social sciences field despite its latest continuous application in policing. (Friedman 2013, p. 292), acknowledges that community policing remains an unclear concept, lightly used to denote a collection of things. (Cheurprakobkit, 2002), also recognizes the confusion over the meaning of community policing as one of the most significant issues that hinder its successful implementation. Due to the difference in meanings attached to the term, research on the African continent tends to refer to community policing as different initiatives that are state-driven, and others community-driven (Kyed, 2018). Community policing implies various things in different contexts, not only due to variances in the understanding of the concept and designing of the initiatives, but correspondingly from the diverse societal, cultural, and political settings.

Several authors agree that at the very core of the community, policing are complementary fundamental component dynamics that explain its existence (Davis, Henderson, and Merrick 2003; Segrave and Ratcliffe 2004, Murray 2005 and Skogan 2006 cited in Casey, 2010). These dynamics include decentralization of police authority, to provide local flexibility in policing operations. Continuous commitment to a problem-solving approach by both the police and the community that
seeks to find homegrown solutions to security and safety threats. Collaborations by the police with all stakeholders working together to change the ideal of the police officers from the hardened paramilitary approach in policing, to communicators and appreciators of diverse backgrounds, who are able to develop rapport with the community. Empowering the public to help solve their own crime and disorder problems through a range of crime prevention programs available to them, is supposed to be the order.

More to understanding community policing brings about the importance of taking cognizance of the landscape of ‘communities’ themselves and the way the impression has significantly departed, from a fairly localized and geographically confined concept to a globalized village due to the advancement of technology. Such has forced the conception of the idea as much more complex, which are hard to contain (Brogden & Nijhar 2005). The modernization effect and patterns of globalization have changed the depiction of communities as traditionally known—that is, as embodied in notions of geographic cohesion - to beyond physical boundaries and their influence on each other as such too.

Despite the various different understandings of the concept, which have led to diverse approaches in implementation, the available definitions share common terms and concepts such as mutual understanding and cooperation alongside the relationship between the police and the communities (Shaka, 2021). As a result, community policing is generally, defined as a range of styles of policing with intelligence orientation, problem orientation, and community orientation (Skogan 2003). This paper premised upon the above three related concepts in the understanding of the concept and was constrained as such in carrying out the study within Lari Sub-County, Kenya.

The three related concepts of community policing emanate from the core principles, which comprise four interconnected elements: partnership, prevention, problem solving, and power-sharing (Giwu, 2018). The element of partnership insinuates that police is part of the community they serve and the community is equally inseparable from the police who serve them. The police do not possess the whole expertise in the process of managing and controlling crime rather. Instead, it should be as equal partners alongside others, especially in the aspect of crime prevention (Whitelaw & Parent, 2010). Prevention is the evident aspect of police work. It produces
confidence and trust along with the safety and security of communities. The third element of community policing is problem solving, which may be termed as its cornerstone through which the police and community cooperate in identifying problems, prioritizing, and strategizing on the appropriate and timely solutions. Lastly, in the power-sharing element, police institutions recognize that they are only custodians of public resources. The police as an organization, the staff therein, and the community are each positioned strategically to benefit from each other’s vantage position for the common good, something that is still challenging police institutions and still standing as an impediment to the successful implementation of community policing.

According to (Ford J., and Kelvin 2007) & (Weisburd and Braga 2019), there is much that has been documented about the overall philosophy of community policing with challenging issues surrounding the philosophy like conducting superficial analysis by police officers and rushing to implement responses. There has also been a notable issue of ignorance of assessment of the casually analyzed implemented responses. As a matter of concern then, questions continue to linger about the implementation and practicality of community policing approaches in different areas of the world with problem analysis as a major part of the concept that needs improvement (Scott, 2001). Additionally, due to the abrupt nature of pandemics like the Covid-19 pandemic of 2020, minimal efforts have been focused on understanding the approaches of community policing desirable to build capabilities for change and also the viewpoints that surround the concept during uncertain times like the one represented by pandemics. In their article, (Diphoorn & Stapele 2021) argue that during the Covid-19 pandemic, community policing was advanced through state-driven strategies hence failing to enhance confidence, trust, and engagement among the police and citizens and therefore becoming impossible for it to act as a means for the much-needed solutions. They cite the reason behind their argument as the interrelated issues of representation, ownership, and diversity of opinions on the part of the community.

In Kenya, two state-initiated Community policing initiatives for improving police-public relations have been developed; the National Police Service (NPS) Community Policing Policy and the ‘Nyumba Kumi’ model led by the President’s Office in 2020. However, moving from policy to practice has proven hard to be realized and specifically during the covid-19 pandemic of 2020. In
Kenya, CP is an approach to policing that recognizes voluntary participation of the local community in the maintenance of peace. It acknowledges that the police needs to be responsive to the communities and their needs, its key element being joint problem identification and problem-solving, while respecting the different responsibilities the police and the public have in the field of crime prevention and maintaining order (National Police Service Community Policing Booklet, 2017). CP in Kenya remains contextually progressive with Lari Sub-County standing out as a benchmark for her milestones in community policing initiatives.

**COVID-19 and its Negative Impact on Community Policing in Kenya**

This study pointed out at least three specific impacts, either directly or indirectly, on community policing which are related to police responses during the spread of COVID-19 in Lari Sub-County. Firstly, police officers’ personal health concerns as they were faced with potential risks of possible infections from the pandemic when deploying to their duties of the enforcement of the established health protocols. As argued by (Waseem 2020), this could have led to other related fears as psychological stress, trauma, and anxiety. Pathologically arguing, COVID-19 was an infectious disease that quickly spread amongst people in close contact, either through exposure to droplets produced by coughing, sneezing, or talking or touching surfaces contaminated by the droplets (WHO 2020b). With limited resources especially in developing countries like Kenya, nothing changed much to march the covid-19 safety regulations in terms of police transportation, mode of arrest, police station administration, and handling of police records among other duties posing jeopardy. This left not only police officers who were under pressure to perform exposed, to the menace of infection but also the civilians being handled.

Secondly, rigid police organizational structure and culture with a history of inflexibility to adapt to change in a contemporary world. The police institution needs to recognize the flexibility and adaptability needed in fixing up with ‘new’ roles of the police service in uncertain times as posed by the infectious transmission crisis of the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, even with previous lessons of the 2003 SARS in the affected countries, the decisive role of policing to collaborate with public health to deal with a flu pandemic still lacks established standard criteria and thus readiness in dealing with such a crisis (Waseem, 2020).
Thirdly, the mindset that police responses have to be determined by the prevailing circumstances with their operational plans being subject to change as appropriate and updated as frequently as possible to balance government policies and community needs is paramount. The Covid-19 pandemic brought the discovery that primary duties of crime prevention can sometimes become less urgent priorities than building new techniques and skills to relate well and become more closely knitted to the public in order to successfully meet safety concerns. Policing approaches needed to change in adaptation to the new norm of people staying indoors with the need to curb increased reporting of domestic violence, child abuse as well as computer-related crimes.

Theoretical Framework

Trojanowicz et al., argue that initiatives from whichever end, can only be supported, or sponsored when it is normative to all parties involved (Trojanowicz, 1972, cited in Nalla, et al., 2018). This is an indication that people who have a convergence of interest may resort to a tendency of cooperation with one another in order to satisfy their needs (Sower, et al., 1957). This assumption would be applicable in relation to the premise on which community policing rests. Individuals have different preferences and would always want to defend themselves and better so commonly arousing the continuous need for collective action. Nevertheless, concerned individuals can only work together as long as their goals and preferences are within the normal limits of established standards. This gives an explanation as to why preferences that are more compatible, perceptions, beliefs, and values from individuals who represent communities or groups are key in sponsoring change and cooperating in bringing solutions to problems. Therefore, it is important for the police and the members of the community to work together to define common goals, effectively mobilize community resources, and sponsor change in order to reduce crime and promote community health, especially in times of uncertainty.

This paper contributes to the given debate by agreeing to the fact that the determining factor of performance by police services is the consideration of the wide-ranging public view and opinions from clients who evaluate police actions. Specifically, the reliance by the police on the will of the community during pandemics remains key to achieving a cohesive society. This is the main goal in
policing a state. Equally, the reality of people’s perceptions seen as driving actions, which in turn define relationships is evident during uncertainties.

Methodology
A qualitative research design approach developed a comprehensive understanding of the problem. Emphasis was put on arguments and inductive reasoning, rather than quantification in data collection and analysis. The approach rejected the norms of the natural scientific model in preference for prominence on the ways in which individuals interpreted their social world and embodied their view of social reality as a constantly shifting emergent property of one’s creation (Bryman, 2001 p20). Qualitative research design approaches were particularly valuable in understanding the perceptions that surrounded the philosophy of community policing during the Covid-19 pandemic. Additionally, the study also employed descriptive statistics to help interpret demographic trends of data from the field through smart art graphs where applicable.

Analysis of existing literature from documents such as books, journal reports, and articles was done. This was to complement the primary data collected and enhance the qualitative approach. This brought on board a wealth of experience in community policing in Lari Sub-County since 2015. The information gathered from the different sources richly informed the study findings. The primary tools used to collect qualitative data were questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. Categories, as the business community, the employed and those on casual work, community policing committee members, and the leaders of the committees provided the necessary information. Targeted interviews were conducted and especially from the concerned police commanders, community leaders, and National Government Administration Officers (NGAO) to complement and triangulate the study.

The data that guided the study were gathered from a representative population through the snowball sampling method. 101 questionnaire respondents and semi-structured interviews from 20 respondents provided primary data while secondary data was amassed from records available and accessible at the government administrative offices in Lari Sub-County. The narrative analysis method was instrumental in analyzing the available data qualitatively; demographic trends of the population interpreted through simple descriptive statistics. The researcher identified two leaders,
one representing the National Government Administrative Officers (NGAO) and another one representing the community who led the researcher to other respondents to interview and give the questionnaires to fill.

Findings
The study, made use of the Normative sponsorship theory which believes that people who have a convergence of interest with one another may cooperate in order to satisfy their needs but the extent of cooperation is determined by how the goals they what to achieve are within the normal limits of established standards. It is thus not easy for incompatible perceptions, beliefs, and values witnessed between police and the community during the Covid-19 pandemic in Kenya to sponsor any meaningful or desired change. There was a big gap in the incompatibility of perceptions as indicated by this study. What was perceived to be negative and positive actions by both the police and community was (69% vs. 31% for Police response to Community, and 64% vs. 36% for Community retaliation to Police response respectively) cooperation with each other will remain elusive and satisfaction of each other’s needs a fiction. This may mean that a negative response by the Police would be met by negative reprisals from the Community.

Information from interview respondents largely indicated that each entity stands in the right position and defends its actions while perceiving the other’s actions as wrong. This perception of what is considered negative or positive conduct by each entity with the negative/bad conduct from both sides of the community and the police picking a higher percentage in relation to the actions mentioned against each other. From the views of the respondents and interview participants’ a lack of common understanding of what entails good policing between the Police and the Community and especially during uncertain times takes tall of the perceived or real negative actions exhibited by either party in retaliation. This calls for a paradigm shift in the relationship between the police and the community to reflect each other’s needs in arriving at responses to challenges like the one of the Covid-19 pandemic of 2020.

In support of this study and linked to normative sponsorship, theory is the critical theory, which is oppositional and involved in the struggle for social change and unification of theory and practice. The criticism in its deduction elucidates oppression, exploitation, and the struggle for a better society. The theory endorses enlightenment, empowerment, and emancipation of people through
empirical knowledge, which is extensive in this era of human security and human rights and freedoms. The balance between when one’s rights are supposed to be limited vis-à-vis the full enjoyment of the same rights, and freedoms with the government being at the center, with the obligation to ensure this is achieved remains a tall task. It is with this enlightenment, empowerment, and emancipation of the community in a vibrant democratic country like Kenya that both the police and the community found themselves in a struggle during the Covid-19 pandemic of 2020. Arguably, the perceptions, beliefs, and values of the respondents are founded on knowledge about the rights and freedoms they are supposed to enjoy. Basically, from the opinions of the respondents, the government had an obligation to make sure they meet their diverse needs but instead it looked like they were being opposed in their efforts to meet the daily needs. One respondent said; *opposing the police was a way of communicating with the government. We were voicing out*...Finally, the deductions grouped into three themes as follows:


Due to the Covid-19 pandemic safety protocols, there were innovations in the way to carry out different daily activities and routines with many of the events going virtual and many individuals working from home. However, for the police officers, it was just an added task to their normal duties. As routinely expected, they had to put their lives on the line to serve and protect the members of the community from the pandemic. From the respondent’s experience, there were several actions characterized by different activities from either the community or the police, which defined community policing during the Covid-19 of 2020 in Kenya. Many of the routine past community policing actions did not continue or lessened in frequency from the effect of the health/government protocols. The main reason for the effect was due to the lack of gatherings during the period of COVID, which affected the vibrant community policing committees meeting quarterly to evaluate and monitor the progress of the police/citizen relationship in Lari Sub-County and discuss and plan the community support activities with the police. Equally, the restriction of movement and introduction of curfew hours was an impediment to community policing activities. Nevertheless, some of the actions by either party continued to be observed, especially those, which involved empathetic services. This was witnessed in many other places in the country during the said period.
Considering the state of affairs brought about by the pandemic to police work, community policing was even more important because police officers had more of their hours interacting with the members of the public as opposed to on the job devoted just to dealing with crime. However, the turn of events brought about by the COVID-19 infectious nature and accompanying preventive measures forced them to get into the community and engage with them regularly though abnormally. On one side, there was a real engagement between the two entities, whereas, on the other side, the routinely scheduled community policing activities where the police and the community would regularly and amicably interact seemed not to be occurring. This turn of events came with different perceptions, which instead severed the good relationship between the police and the community gradually building prior to the Covid-19 pandemic. The perceptions which were either positive or negative resulted in the actions towards each group and thus defined the kind of existing relationship at the time as described by the charts below;

![Fig. 1.1 Positive Vs Negative Perceptions of Actions by Police to the Community during Covid-19 Pandemic of 2020](image)

Source: Primary data from respondents and participants in the field, December 2021

From the respondents’ views, both positive and negative aspects of behavior by the police toward the community and the community toward the police were mentioned. The activities done by police during the Covid-19 pandemic of 2020 in Kenya and perceived hence referred to as positive/good were encouraged by the community members as key determinants of good police/citizen relationships and described as the bedrock of all the other elements of community policing. At the same time, the respondents also mentioned what they described as negative/bad conduct of police towards the community, which severed the relationship between the two entities. The activities done by police during the Covid-19 pandemic of 2020 and perceived as negative led to bad police/citizen relationships. The community leaders interviewed described these negative acts as spoilers of good police/citizen relationships, which the community in Lari Sub County had tried their best to uphold through Mutual Corporation with the police since the year 2015. They described these negative actions as affecting all other elements associated with community policing initiatives. A community committee interviewee said;

It is only when this pandemic came that we started to see our police officers change in their way of handling the citizens, I do not know if it is out of the pressure of work or what?

Source: Primary data from respondents and participants in the field, December 2021
Otherwise, we have been enjoying good working relationships with them since we started the community engagement forums.

In describing the conduct of the community towards the police, the respondents equally mentioned both the positive and negative actions by the community as they did for the police. The activities done by the community during the Covid-19 pandemic of 2020 and perceived hence referred to as either positive/good or the police hence severing the good police/citizen relationships as well denoted negative/bad as key determinants of the extent of use of force and brutality. Surprisingly, the retaliation level from the public towards the police depended on the degree of what was perceived to be a negative approach or action. Correspondingly, under this analysis, almost all the respondents pronounced good police/citizen relationships, which are highly determined by positive perceptions and actions, as the basis of all the other elements of building and maintaining good relationships and ensuring success in community policing.

3. Alternative Ways in Preventing COVID-19 Pandemic while Promoting Community Policing

From the views of questionnaire respondents and interviewee participants, the police could have prevented the Covid-19 pandemic of 2020 spread through other different ways and means. These according to them, would have helped, if not for anything else, to maintain or improve the relationship between the police and the citizens other than worsening it. They gave several proposals chief among them letting the citizens have all information on policing matters and being given time to synthesize and consent to it. For example, they should have been made to understand the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic of 2020 in the citizens of Kenya, and what it meant to them and the consequences of failure to abide to the given protocols. The supporters mentioned ways like public awareness creation, sensitizing the public, giving civic education, educating the public, installing posters that advocate for the need for protection from the virus by obeying the covid-19 protocols. There was also need to educate offenders held in police custody, and use of more civilized preventive measures like use of the house-to-house awareness campaign. Liaising with local administrators to conduct awareness campaigns as the main methods of passing the required Covid-19 pandemic of 2020 information in Kenya, was extremely instrumental.

The other proposals surrounded the issue of communication in relation to ways and channels of communication, provision of required services, and leaders setting good examples and leading from the front. The proposals on good communication included talking politely when addressing
the members of the public, in peaceably and in a friendly way advocating for the observance of covid-19 protocols without undue force, reaching unto masses through all available channels of communication – TV, Radios, and Daily newspapers and application of diplomacy

It can be argued that, when the spread of COVID-19 became a global pandemic and was declared so, there were also several concerns of ‘policing by consent’ specifically in the spirit of “a good Samaritan”. In Lari Sub-County, for example, cases of police officers going out of their way to help the public by offering transport, distributing masks, and giving out food among other philanthropic acts were witnessed. In particular, as the COVID-19 crisis lingered, the best approach would be for the police to use their role and responsibility in support of the interests of the community’s welfare and survival and apply the best practices and approaches in policing for people to be as safe as possible.

In a free society where community policing is practiced as in the case of Lari Sub County, citizens should have open access to police organizations and provide input into police policies and decisions. As per the respondents, if this occurred then they would have given their input on the matter, which could have avoided the conflict that ensued. Key among the reasons that led to the conflict, misunderstanding, and mistrust was the lack of common understanding and agreement on what works for the benefit of each party. This led to pushing for survival and freedom from each other.

Arguably, the ultimate determinant of police service performance is general public opinion. Irrespective of how good the police appear in figures, it fails in democratic terms if the community to receive services is not satisfied. The perceptions to actions witnessed by the community of the police’s inability to provide efficient services should be addressed by whoever is concerned through informed and radical change intervention involving consultations and cooperation. Community perception cannot be easily reversed by means of one-sided normal organizational change methods or good public relations exercises. As seen from the findings, it is the people’s perceptions about witnessed actions that define community policing and so neither the police nor the community should assume their actions are right and hope to define the desired community policing from their own point of view.
In examining competing organizational narratives, which are highly applicable to the analysis of this study, Brown (2012) gives a clear sense of organizations as political arenas in which groups and individuals contest the legitimacy of each other’s interpretations of events. In the case of Lari Sub – County the representations of each group’s (the police and the community) narrative are described as foundations for established motives for embarking on their actions while attributing responsibility and blame for what can be defined as poor police/community relations to others.

In terms of the contrasting narratives of what went wrong, the police narrative was to do with the failure of the community to coordinate in abiding by the given protocols and the community emphasized the tendency of the police to force the implementation of protocols that were unfavorable and not well understood neither communicated. It thus remains part of the police leadership challenge to ensure workable strategies to address these perceptions, especially during uncertain times like the Covid-19 pandemic of 2020 in Kenya.

**Conclusion**
Based on the review and analysis, the study offers conclusions relevant to community policing in the rouse of the pandemic outbreak. The findings of this review have immediate implications for policing during the COVID-19 pandemic in Kenya but also cover other pandemics and future related natural health disasters, providing valuable recommendations even after the COVID – 19 pandemic of 2020 in Kenya uncertainty is long gone.

To arrive at a positive impact on the application of community policing during pandemics, and in order to maintain good police/community relations, community policing during pandemics should not be driven through new state-driven policies. This would totally fail to enhance trust due to a lack of engagement between the police and citizens which follows a buy-in by both entities especially so if the given policies are abrupt, abnormal, and at the same time unfriendly. The article thus appreciates the reliance of the police on the will of the community through their input on how community policing should be done during pandemics.

Arguably, policing activities are complex and police officers inevitably exercise wide discretion when making decisions, which may be legal, bureaucratic, and personalized criteria. From the very actions perceived as positive, personal service whether from the police or community was branded
as a key determinant of good police/community relations. The police are part of the community and their mindset and that of their customers of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ is an identity that is socially constructed and thus can be deconstructed. This article recommends a deliberate deconstruction process by police institutions as assisted by governments through awareness and education, which as Nelson Mandela put it; remains the most powerful weapon to change the world.

In order to achieve a common understanding of policing and community needs, the Kenyan population requires a cultural transformation and mindset change in order to build a spirit of individual responsibility of obedience to the law on their side and the responsibility of ensuring rule of law and equality in enforcement on the part of Police. This is the only remedy to impediments to the rule of law and the whole justice system in Kenya. The article thus proposes a robust program geared to cultural transformation and mindset change in policing beginning from the top leadership.

Lastly, in community policing, the will of the community should be considered when deciding which laws to enforce under different circumstances, and police officers need to tolerate and even encourage this kind of differential. Without this kind of balance, some police methods including unexplained aggressive tactics like roadblocks highly applied during the covid-19 pandemic of 2020 as well as more preventive-oriented programs may at times coincide with community norms and values. Striking a healthy and satisfactory balance between these two competing interests remains the central concern of policing especially during challenging moments. This is the only balance that would address the complaint raised through the voices of the people that; police officers do not seem to care for the community but are more interested in obeying directives from their bosses than providing quality service, which indeed may call for idiosyncratic principles.

Expectedly from the findings, not every encounter between the police and the community during the pandemic period was amicable and friendly, nevertheless, police officers who dealt with citizens in a friendly open, and personal manner seem to have generated trust and confidence than officers who operated in a bureaucratic manner. This article proposes that Police Institutions emphasize and train on the use of discretion by police officers in all policing situations depending on the prevailing circumstances other than only obeying and following given directives while
weighing options and the impacts they may come up with whether administratively supported or not (Scott and Kirby 2012).
References


Decentralized Governance and Conflict Mitigation in Post-Genocide Rwanda

Innocent Ndahiriwe

Abstract

Decentralized governance is one that brings the government and governance to the grassroots, through increasing opportunities for citizens for popular participation. This article tries to understand the conflict mitigation potential of the local governments, arguing that a local governance approach mitigates conflicts as long as there is positive state-society relations, which is built on the interaction and the interdependence between state and society. In terms of methodology, the study is qualitative, as well as exploratory and empirical. Through conducting interviews and attending mediation sessions, the results of the narratives indicated that the contribution of the citizens to the governance process was still modest; citizens and other actors were less motivated due to insufficient resources and poor infrastructure. The study analyses the citizens and other local-level actors in relation to the mediation committees (MCs) in Rwanda. The MCs are state institutions, and they represent the state at the local level. The authority of the MCs emanates from article 141 of the constitution of the Republic of Rwanda.

Keywords: Conflict mitigation, Decentralised governance, Local governance, Mediation committees, Mediation.
Introduction

It is important to mention from the outset that the end of the Cold War came with a wave of “decentralization” that swept through the continents of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and it was not demand-driven. However, “the contribution of decentralization policies to economic development, participation, good governance and democratization have been the topic of an increasing body of research over the last decade” (Crook, Manor, et al 1998). The above scholars argue that decentralized governance addresses the “power to develop and implement policy, the extension of democratic processes to lower levels of government, and measures to ensure that democracy is sustainable “(Camille Cates Barnette et al, 1997 pp.2). The benefits that come with democracy at local-level-level, is aptly illustrated in Galtung’s argument that “the more democratic a country is, the more shared the decision making; the less belligerent the country becomes” (Galtung, 1996:54). According to him

If a democracy works well within a country it will in principle, produce relatively content population that on the average and over time, gets much of its wishes satisfied, within the limits of the feasible (Galtung 1996:4)

Which means democracy is “a form of decision making in an interacting system to settle conflicting interests without violence and in accordance with established rules and accepted procedures in a society (Kaboyashi, et al 2008:1).

Further more, Decentralization has been identified by different scholars as “changes which occur within political systems” (Manor, 1999:4), others have seen it as “a state strategy to restructure the center-periphery, relations. In this case, it is defined as “the transfer of tasks and public authority, from the national level to any public agency at the sub-national level” (Braathen and Hellevick, 2008 pp.3). The assumption is that through this, the citizens participate in the decision-making process and make policies that favor them.

Therefore, in the process even conflicts among the population could be solved at this level, since all groups in society will be involved in the planning and finding solutions to the problems inherent in their communities. In relation to the above, Rupesinghe identifies, five phases of the conflict
process, namely “conflict formation, conflict escalation, conflict endurance, conflict improvement and conflict transformation” (Rupesinghe, et al 1992: 6). Hence, the above leads to the conclusion that as long as the authorities at local level have the means, and resources, they should be able to solve conflicts at the latent stage, at the conflict formation stage, before the conflicts escalate. Simply because they are nearer to the problem, and they understand the magnitude of the problem.

**Theoretical Underpinnings on Decentralized Governance and Local Conflict Mitigation**

Decentralization has several dimensions but the political dimension is more critical as “it provides a process at the local-level through which diverse interests can be heard, resource allocations made, based on public discussions” (Barnette et al, 1997: 3). It is important to emphasise that decentralized governance can also mean “meaningful” authority that has been devolved to local units of governance and are accessible and accountable to the local citizenry, who enjoy full political rights and liberty (Johnson, 2001: 523). But, it can also be a state apparatus that is more exposed and therefore, more responsive to local needs and aspirations (Crook R, and Sverison A.S, 2001). Which in the end produces systems of governance that are more effective (Blair, H 2000). Decentralized governance also assumes that there is maximum involvement of the citizens in the decision making process. While local governance is,

a rule governed process through which residents of a defined area participate in their own governance in limited but locally important matters. They are the key decision makers in determining what their priority concerns are, and how they will respond to them, what and how resources will be raised to deal with the concerns and whether the key decision makers are learning from the responses (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004: 4).

However, the major question is, does transferring responsibilities to the local governments mean that local governance is established and sustained? Yet some local governments have been bedeviled by local-level conflicts, elite capture and poorly designed local government institutions, with corrupt and ineffective local civil servants (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004: 4). A number of reasons have been given for the above scenario. The main reason being that Local public affairs remain the preserve of the local civil servants, there is lack of sufficient resources for improved service delivery, and the central authority has failed to relinquish power. Ultimately, citizens fail to participate in the governance of their localities leading to negative state -society relations,hence
resistance from the citizens, creating conflicts between citizens and the state, as citizens withdraw from their obligations, which is similar to John Dewey’s assertion that

The state exists as direct results of organic contacts as off springs are conceived in the womb, or by direct conscious intent as a machine is invented (…). When we seek for the origin of states in such sources as these, a realistic regard for facts compels us to conclude in the end that we find nothing but singular persons, you, they, me (Dewey, 1954: 37).

The above indicates that it is citizen participation into the affairs of the state that states are constructed. Manor defines participation as “citizens’ active engagement with public institutions” (Manor, 1998: 7). Scholars have argued that, “participation plays an educative role by enhancing civic consciousness and political maturity, as the citizens gain experience in holding those in office accountable” (Golooba, 2004: 290). The above is in consonance with Manor’s point that “when reforms inspire disadvantaged groups to engage in public affairs, their confidence, skills, connections, organisational strength, and thus their capacity to influence their own destinies grow” (Manor, 2004: 27). But there is also another argument that participation could also be seen in terms of the limitation of state power by society, and as a way for developing a sense of efficacy and political skills (Diamond, et.al 1994: 9). In the process participation makes “a contribution to building a practical and responsible citizenry” (Hayward, 1976: 611). The importance and advantage that citizens gain through this process of public reasoning is illustrated by Sen that

The ideal of public reasoning…with two particular social practices that deserve specific attention: the tolerance of different points of view (along with the acceptability of agreeing to disagree) and the encouragement of public discussion (along with endorsing the value of learning from others). Both tolerance and openness of public discussion are often seen as specific--and perhaps--unique features of western tradition (Sen, 2003: 5)

Nevertheless, it is important to note that though we are talking of public reasoning, in developing countries like Rwanda, it is still in their infancy. As Eyben and Ladbury argue,

Even when the state creates opportunities for dialogue and debate and is capable of responding, some people, particularly those living in poverty or subject to discrimination and exclusion, are too alienated or oppressed to enter the debate. Or when they do try, they find themselves silenced through not being able to speak “the right” language – or they may be ignored or threatened because more powerful groups believe they have no right to a voice (Eyben, R. and Ladbury, S. 2006).

Finally, the idea of public discussions in relation to the principal of participation gets its origin from “Plato’s view of democracy and it involves fundamentals like holding assemblies, and equal
representation” (Kakumba, 2010: 173). In this case, the intension is “to reduce the frontiers of the state while extending public choice” (Kakumba, 2010:173). Participation is supposed to “offer citizens more choice, stimulate competition, and make public service more responsive to citizens’ interests” (Kakumba 2010: 173). The above resonates with Arnstein definition that

Citizen participation is…citizen power. It is the redistribution of power…enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future. It is the strategy by which the have-nots join in determining how information is shared goals and policies are set…programs are operated….. In short,, it is the means by which they can induce significant social reform, which enables them share in the benefits of the affluent society (Arnstein, 1969: 216).

Another drawback of mandatory participation is that some citizens may attend for the sake of attending just because it is a directive. In this case, participation serves patronage interests. Hence, it is equally important to ask whether the leaders convened the meetings regularly as required by legislation, and whether the citizens were able to express their concerns and interests (cf. Golooba, 2004: 290). All this should lead to the fact that participation should enhance people’s freedom of choice and action, and ultimately enable the citizens to have more control over the resources and decisions that affect their lives (Narayan, 2002: 14). The next is the methodology used to understand the conflict mitigation potential of the local governments. What is the conflict mitigation potential of the local governments.

The Conflict Mitigation Potential of the Local Governments

The question whether a local governance approach could mitigate conflicts is linked to colonial history, which was characterised by a long history of centralised rule, especially in Africa. In the 1960s the former British colonies adopted a system of local government with elected councils. These had responsibilities for the delivery of services such as education, health, roads, water supply, and agricultural extension (Crawford and Hartmann, 2008: 7) After independence, some countries either found themselves under military regimes, dictatorship, or single party regimes. The councils were not recognised, and as a result were rendered useless. Therefore, “the local governments existed but they did not have significant powers and resources. Their legitimacy with the local populations was low” (Crawford and Hartmann, 2008: 7). Crawford and Hartmann concludes that Local governments did continue to exist in many places, but with little power and resources, and thus local authorities lost both their role in the political and development process
and also their legitimacy with local populations (Crawford and Hartmann, 2008: 7). Local
governments responding to citizens’ needs means that the citizen’s develop trust in the local
governments and secondly, the citizens participate in the making of decisions that concern them.
Romeo argues that,

local governments are critical in post conflict reconstruction due to better access to
information on local conditions, and needs. They also have a greater ability to interact with
local communities and traditional authorities, a mandate that is useful for economic
development, enhancement in service delivery, and increased potential to realise allocative
and operational efficiency in the use of scarce public resources (Romeo: 2002).

Local governments can identify conflicts when they are still at latent level, because they are nearer
to the problems within the communities, and they can create checks and balances that can check
the escalation of conflict.

However, it is also possible that the situation may be worse at the local government level because
of lack of capacity on the part of the local government officials to mobilise communities to
participate in the decision making process. Others, may even take advantage of the ignorance of
the masses to neglect and deny them information. Especially, if they want to protect their corrupt
tendencies. Though, the above problem could be handled by involving middle range actors as
argued by lederach that:

Middle-range actors within the population are uniquely located to have the greatest
potential for constructing the necessary infrastructure... They have the capacity to impact
processes both at the top and grassroots levels. If mobilised strategically for peace building,
middle-range leaders could lay the foundation for long-term, sustainable conflict
transformation. It is at this level, that innovative and intensive strategies—“middle-
out”approach—must be encouraged and supported (Lederach, 1997:151).

In this case the local government leaders would mobilise these middle level actors and create
sustainable conflict transformation.

Finally, in relation to the capacity of the local governments to mitigate conflicts, there is an
argument that “for a civil war to occur, intergroup antagonism and grievances must exist, leaders
must emerge to coordinate and manage recruitment, resources and supplies must be available to
support the movement over time” (Walter, 2004:375). Which brings in the point that for genuine
decentralisation to take place, there should be larger local revenue collection (Hyden:2007:221).
Indeed, as mentioned earlier the biggest problem is lack of capacity at local government level.
Increased capacity of local governments would enable the local governments handle poverty related conflicts, and the grievances that come due to inequality and failure to access basic services. The next section contextualises the conflict mitigation potential of the local governments, bringing in the case of decentralisation and local conflict mitigation in post conflict Rwanda from 2000-2015 as an illustration of the above theoretical discussions.

**Decentralization and Local Conflict Mitigation in Post-Genocide Rwanda (2000-2015)**

In this section, we contextualize local conflict mitigation to Rwanda. The history of decentralization in Rwanda gets its origin back in 1962-1973 and from 1973-1994 in what has was referred to as the first and second Republics (Gaynor, 2013:23). During that period, the Rwandan society had communes, sectors, cells, and villages, which they called “Nyumba kumi,” meaning ten households. The leader of a commune was a Bourgmestre and appointed by the President of the Republic (Gaynor, 2013:23). In 1991, the constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, Article 11, provided prefectures, with juridical powers meaning that they were legal entities with a legal personality (Article 11:1). These worked as structures at local level but with connections at central level.

Comparing the decentralization before 1994 and the decentralization after the genocide, the difference lies in the fact that the contemporary history of decentralization in Rwanda traces its origin from the Arusha Peace Accord (cf. Kauzya, 2007:84), and it emphasized the aspect of power sharing. Scher argues that though the current decentralization policy in Rwanda came from above, the actual planning of the current decentralization policy is rooted in the 1997 and 1998 meetings by the leadership in Rwanda as one of the ways of consulting the citizens about the nature of the government that they needed (Scher, 2010:3). Another difference is that the decentralization policy before 1994 was rooted in Article 11 of the 1991 constitution, while the authority of the current decentralization policy emanates from the 2003 Constitution of Rwanda and revised in 2015.

Eventually, the current decentralization policy was enacted, and the main objective of decentralization was to “ensure political, economic, social, managerial, administrative and technical empowerment of the local population…through participating in the planning and management of the development process” (MINALOC, 2008:4). The Rwanda government
“thought of decentralizing governance and letting people have a strong say in determining their socio-politico-economic destiny, hence, the proposal for decentralization in Rwanda came from above” (Kauzia, 2007:83).

Accordingly, the decentralization policy was supposed to ultimately enable the citizens to develop trust in the state, acquire greater voice in the governance processes, increase transparency and create local-level stability (Scher, 2010:3). Henceforth in Rwanda, the policy of decentralization was meant to enable the citizens to participate in the governance of the country through ensuring that all the citizens of Rwanda participate in the affairs of the state, including mitigating local-level conflicts\(^1\). This resonates with Uvin’s point that the “Violence in Rwanda is a structural process characterized by long standing dynamics of exclusion, marginalization, inequality, frustration, and racism” (Uvin, 1998:7). Uvin aptly puts it in this way that,

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\text{...a society characterized by structural violence produces profound popular anger, frustration, cynicism, ignorance, and desire for scapegoating. This creates a fertile soil for elites to mobilize these sentiments against minority social groups...the broader economic and political threats to the elite made some of the elite choose that option to defend their power and privileges. In Rwanda, in the 1990s, that option was all the easier to implement...because racist prejudice had been a structural feature of society for as long as a century (Uvin, 1998: 8).}
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In relation to the above argument, one of the advantages that come with decentralization is that the policy is supposed to provide local-level empowerment of citizens, fragments, and distribute authority. Ultimately, this is supposed to reduce the frustration mentioned above, since power is distributed and shared. In the case of Rwanda, the biggest problem was that:

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\text{Ordinary citizens had no effective way to exert influence over local leaders or check their behavior. Decentralization was a way of addressing the needs of citizens more directly, while also making local leaders more accountable by giving ordinary citizens a greater role in policy formulation and evaluation (Scher, 2010: 3)}
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Nevertheless, it is important to observe that, the current decentralization policy in Rwanda has been criticized of being over centralized, and has limited accountability to the citizens (DFID, 2012).
Methodology

This is a qualitative, explorative and an empirical study, which acknowledges that different stories can be told from a similar set of data. The study gathers data with an open mind, aiming at getting information and experiences for interpretation. The information and experiences are got from the narratives that come from the mediation sessions. This is done through, analysing the narratives. As Elliot argues, narratives are chronological, they are meaningful, and they are social. They convey something about the world and/or people’s experiences of it. Theoretically, the study engages with literature on decentralised governance, citizen participation, local governance, local democracy, and local conflict mitigation. The study analyses the citizens and other local-level actors in relation to the mediation committees in Rwanda (MCs). The MCs derive their authority from article 141 of the constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, as amended in 2015. This implies that they represent the interests of the state at local level.

In this article citizen participation is understood in two ways a) Citizen active engagement with public institutions (Manor, 1998: 7), in this case the Mediation committees, and b) in terms of how citizens exercise influence and control over decisions that affect them (Devas and Grant, 2003: 309). The following questions interpret the concept of participation according to Arnstein’s ladder of participation (Arnsten 1969). Are the citizens obliged to participate in the mediation committees MCs? Is there a risk that patronage interests manipulate the meetings? Do the MCs serve elite interests? Are the meetings simply a showcase? (Manipulation), are the meetings organized regularly and on time? Did the citizens as litigants attend regularly and in big numbers in order to provide required information about the respective disputes? If they did attend, what concerns and interests were expressed, and which issues came up frequently in the course of the meetings? Are all citizens involved, specifically the poor, women, and other disadvantaged groups? (Inclusiveness) What benefits do the citizens enjoy by participation in these meetings both at individual and community level?

Generally, the study makes use of four basic techniques of data collection: namely, direct observation during the MC meetings, group and individual interviews, narrative analysis and documentation analysis. Triangulation of data is based on using the above four techniques to
ensure that there is fair assessment of the evidence provided by the respondents. Therefore, what is the conflict mitigation potential of the local governments? In the next section, we look at the MCs as a platform for citizen participation.

**The Mediation Committees as a Platform for Citizen Participation in Decentralized Governance**

According to the Rwanda government, the logic behind the establishment of the MCs was to reduce the big number of land and other disputes that were common immediately after the genocide in Rwanda. The state found it prudent to involve the citizens in the mitigation of disputes since the state did not have the capacity to mitigate the conflicts, as most of the qualified citizens either had been killed or had gone out of the country. In addition, the state may not have had the capacity to understand the nature of the conflicts, since the disputes existed back to the past political violence in late 1950s. The table below shows where the MCs operate. The MCs operate at sector level, the cell level and the Village level. This shows the existence of the MCs within the structure of local government and a state institution at local level.

**Table 2: The current decentralized administrative structure at the local-level in Rwanda showing the operational structure of the MCs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>416 Sectors</th>
<th>Administration of basic services (Plan, implement and monitor service delivery). Manage community development. Collect taxes (50% of the taxes to be submitted to the districts</th>
<th>There is an elected council and the technical staff. The sector is an administrative unit. The MCs operate at sector level to hear appeal cases that come from the cell.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cell</td>
<td>2148 Cells</td>
<td>Community mobilization</td>
<td>Council (all adult population), and there is an executive committee and an executive secretary who carry out the administrative functions of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12.10
| The Village | 14842 Villages | Mobilization of citizens within the village. | The village council is comprised of all residents who are above eighteen years. The authority of the villages falls under a committee of five people elected by the village council. The Village elects the MC members. Some of the MC members from the Village council, are elected to Cell council and some of the members of the cell council move to the sector council. |

Source, Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC, 2006:27)

As mentioned above from Table 2, the MCs are part of the local government structure in Rwanda, and they operate both at cell and sector level. They carry out public functions and their functions are in line with the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, Article 6, which states “Public powers are decentralized at local administrative entities in accordance with the provision of the law.”ii The sector, the cell, and the village level carry out the decentralized functions, and the MCs belong to all those levels.

It is important to emphasize that the MCs mediate all sorts of conflicts, including conflicts of socio-economic nature. Ultimately, through mitigating conflicts within their communities, they acquire skills of mediation and other leadership skills. The principal objective of these committees is to mediate everyday conflicts at the local community level. In addition, they are involved in the establishment of infrastructure for sustainable peace in Rwanda. In the next section, I empirically present citizen participation in local conflict mitigation as decentralised governance, specifically trying to answer the question, *how do the citizens participate in the conflict mitigation process?*
Citizen Participation in Local Conflict Mitigation as Decentralized Governance in Rwanda

As previously mentioned, decentralised governance assumes that there is maximum participation of the citizens in the decision making process, and the citizens participate in the analysis of the problems that concern them, through problem identification, solution identification and implementation. But the question is how is it done? In trying to answer the question, how do citizens participate in the conflict mitigation process, the sub-question mentioned in the previous section will be used as a framework for analysis. The questions mentioned above will be used as the framework of analysis.

It is important to point out that the MCs participated as state agents, citizens participated as litigants, as witnesses, as the public and they also participated both formally and informally through providing information. On the participation of all citizens, it was discovered that some women were not participating because they felt the men were the head of the family and disputes to do with land had to involve the men more than the women, because land is an inherited property of the man. On the benefits that the citizens got from participating in these committees, the study discovered that the MCs are educated, and the citizens had internalized some laws. In one of the narratives, one member of the MC mentioned that

> We know what to do, we have been trained and the laws have been translated for us in Kinyarwanda (the local language), and above all we were given many books, which we use in our work (Int.62)

This was because of the education they acquired from the MCs. Specifically, laws to do with inheritance and specifically land; women had also learnt that they legally had the right to occupy 30% of all positions in any committee involved in making decisions of national interest.

Hence, in these meetings, citizens provided necessary information that the mediators used to make decisions. Particularly, the elders were very instrumental in helping the MCs to make appropriate decisions. The elders provided information through the provision of local history and knowledge, which was vital for the MCs to make appropriate decisions. Most of the contentious issues, which concerned, for example land, would trace its history to fifty years ago, and it was the elders who were over seventy years, and had knowledge in relation to the history surrounding those disputes who provided the necessary information. Their participation enabled the MCs to understand the
exact ownership of the land under contention. In relation to the issues that came up in the process of citizens participating in the MCs, the findings indicated that the citizens were complaining of providing voluntary work, they complained of lacking facilities, resources and the necessary infrastructure that would enable them to do their work.

The above-mentioned point was a big factor as far as the motivation of the MC members was concerned. Due to very low motivation, some of the MC members were coming late, and the attendance of some of the MC members was irregular. This was frustrating on the part of the citizens, who would come and wait for a long time before the MC Sessions started. The situation was accentuated by the fact that some of the citizens would walk for over twenty kilometres (20 kilometres). This frustration had a negative impact on the mediation process. This is supported by the often-mentioned weakness that decentralisation of authority is often done without providing adequate resources; ultimately, this leads to the frustration of the citizens.iii The above point is supported by the narrative that

The biggest challenge is lack of facilities, to use in their work. You find they have no furniture even pens to use in their work. Another problem is that many of them are not educated and cannot interpret the materials we give them, and some of the issues are complicated, it requires somebody with some level of education, which many of them seem not to have, and they lack time to do what they should be doing. (Int.15g)

In terms of inclusiveness and access to services, one narrative from two of the actors mentioned that:

These committees cater for the interests of all citizens whether poor or rich, leaders or not leaders disabled or not disabled. It all depends on the evidence provided and what the witnesses say about the case. (Int.34). The MCs know what to do, because the decision made by these committees is in most cases given credence by the sector MCs, whenever there are appeal cases. Secondly, those who lose at cell level also tend to lose at sector level, and there are even cases where those who appeal in the courts of law after spending so much time and money end up losing (Int.64).

As revealed in Table 3 below, the dominant disputes were disputes of socio-economic nature and this was common in the urban areas. This was because many citizens were involved in informal commercial businesses, and due to the nature of their businesses. They borrowed money from
informal financial institutions or borrowed from friends as a way of funding their businesses. In the end, they were failing to pay as agreed, and their cases would end up in the MCs. The table below shows a summary of disputes in terms of percentages, as they appeared in the different MCs from 2017-2019.

**Table 3: Summary of disputes in terms of percentages as they appeared in the different MCs 2017-2019**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Sector 1 in %</th>
<th>Sector 2 in %</th>
<th>Sector 3 in %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Destruction of property</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Land</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Failure to pay debts</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Disputes over inherited property</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Domestic violence</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Failure to honour agreements</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Destruction of crops</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Theft</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Child neglect</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Deserting/Abandoning his/her family</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Others</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Compilation of data from the fieldwork in Musanze, Karongi, and Huye Districts.*

However, there were other common cases where citizens were engaged in paid employment like working in Hotels, shops and carrying out domestic work in homes. At times some of these employees were not paid their monthly salaries and they would end up taking these employers to the MCs. These employees were normally disadvantaged citizens like young girls who did not even have money to pay in the normal courts of law, since the normal courts requested for money before any case could be had. This showed the nature of inclusiveness, as an aspect of citizen participation. Hence, the findings indicate that the majority of these citizens, who have had their problems solved by the MCs, have trust in the MCs and they regard the MCs as legitimate state institutions. It is important to mention that those who lose cases tend to discredit this institution,
which means that the trust in the institution of the MCs depends a lot on the *positionality* of the actors.

However, the elite category of citizens, namely the lawyers did not appreciate the work of the MCs and referred to the institution of the MCs as an abuse of the justice system in Rwanda. Nevertheless, some citizens argue that the reason why the lawyers do not like the MCs is that the lawyers were getting a lot of money, which they no longer get since MCs currently do some of their work.

**Conclusion**

The MCs are state institutions operating at local government level and their authority emanates from Article 141 of the Rwandan Constitution as revised in 2015. They work as a platform where citizens participate in the local governance process. Participation in public meetings, through providing oral testimony in the process of mitigating conflicts, all that is participation. Citizens participate in these meetings through providing necessary information that the mediators use to make decisions, and it was found in the study that the participation was inclusive of women, men and all categories of citizens. The elders are also very instrumental in helping the MCs to make appropriate decisions; reflected through the provision of local history and knowledge. Their participation enabled the MCs to understand the exact ownership of land under contention, leading to mitigation of land conflicts and other conflicts at local level. The above, answers the question how the citizens participated in the conflict mitigation process, as decentralised governance. The study also indicated how each of the actors participated in the conflict mitigation process. However, the participation of citizens in the mitigation process was still modest due to lack of motivation, poor infrastructure, and other resources, as it was not possible for the state to provide the resources.
Endnotes

i Here mitigation means the reduction in intensity and frequency of conflicts.

ii See Table 2 and the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda Article 6 on decentralization.

iii This problem has partly been addressed as the MC members have been given bicycles and the government pays for them Medical Insurance.
References


A Search for Political Integration in East Africa Community (EAC)

Kasaija Phillip Apuuli

Abstract

For nearly the first seventy years of the 20th century, the East African states of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda undertook several integration initiatives that aimed at bringing them closer together economically and politically. Unfortunately, the integration experiment came to a halt in mid-1970s when the East African Community (EAC) collapsed amidst acrimony between the three states. In the early 1990s, the three states (the bloc now includes Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and South Sudan) agreed to resume the integration process. In the Treaty of EAC (1999) the three states agreed to ultimately establish a political federation. According to the proposed timetable made in 2004, a political federation should have become operational in the year 2013. However, the timetable fell through due to lack of agreement among the partner states. The article argues that political integration in the EAC has failed for a number of reasons, including the weak nature of the partner states, the leaders only paying of lip service to regional integration, and the political differences that continue to bedevil the region, among others. The general conclusion of the paper is that the search for political integration in the EAC will continue for a while longer.

Key words: EAC, EAC treaty, Integration, Partner states, Political federation
Introduction

The African Union’s African Integration Report for the year 2021 titled: “Putting free movement of persons at the center of continental integration” found the East African Community (EAC) sub-regional bloc, as the most integrated in Africa with an average score of 0.75 out of 1 (AU, 2022: 66). The report, however, also highlighted the challenge of the inadequate capacity of the Partner States to respond individually and collectively to peace and security challenges (ibid: 69). The EAC is one of the eight African Union (AU) officially recognized regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa.¹

Article 5(2) of the EAC Treaty (1999) (as amended) states that the Partner states will undertake to establish among themselves a Customs Union, Common Market, Monetary Union and ultimately a Political Federation. A Customs Union was established in 2005; Common Market in 2010; and the protocol establishing the Monetary Union was concluded in 2013. Whilst negotiations on the political federation pillar have been ongoing since 2004, they are yet to result in tangible results. It should be noted that the EAC is possibly the only regional economic community in the world, which establishes the end-state of its integration process, which is, political federation.

This article examines the political federation pillar of EAC integration, and argues that there has been little movement in its establishment. The reasons range from the weak nature of the partner states who have sought to enhance their sovereignties (especially economic) through the regional political integration project; to partner states leaders only paying lip-service to regional integration; and political differences that have of recent bedeviled the region among others. As a result, the general conclusion of the article is that the search for political integration in the EAC will continue for a while longer.

¹ The officially AU recognized RECs are: Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); East African Community (EAC); Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); and Southern African Development Community (SADC). However there are other regional formations including: Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC); Economic Community of the Great Lakes Region (CEPGL); Indian Ocean Commission (IOC); Mano River Union (MRU); South African Customs Union (SACU); and West African Monetary and Economic Union (UEMOA). For details on the membership, mandate and functions of the officially recognized and non-recognized regional arrangements see AU, Audit of the African Union, Addis Ababa, 2007.
Methodologically, this article is a result of information gathered through a review of primary and secondary documents. The author has also used his extensive inside knowledge (also known as participant observation) of the EAC integration process gathered through years of researching on the subject of regional integration in Eastern Africa, and acting as a consultant for the government of Uganda\(^2\) and a number of organizations on various EAC integration projects.

**Conceptual Context**

Integration, in the sense of transfer of authority and legitimacy to a new supra-national set of institutions, is one response to the condition of interdependence. Interdependence is a condition in which actors in the international system are sensitive and vulnerable to the acts of other entities, whether these be governments or transnational actors such as multinational corporations or terrorist groups (Taylor, 1978: 254). Most theories of integration derived from the 19\(^{th}\) Century when there was a growth of functional international organizations.

According to Baregu (2007), integration arrangements are driven by definite imperatives, which derive from perceptions of integration as a matter of choice or necessity. Thus, Baregu identifies at least four types of rationales or imperatives that lie behind the formation and sustenance of regional integration schemes. These are: *affection*, *gain*, *threat*, and *power*. By imperatives is meant the kinds of factors or impulses that create the impetus and give rise to the drive and yearning for integration among the members.

The *affection* imperative refers to a situation where countries come into an integration arrangement because they have a lot in common and feel some bonds of affection. For example, is argued that the East African countries are connected by a common language, common colonial heritage and cross border affinities which makes their integration inevitable. The *gain* imperative arises out of the rational choice theory, which contends that individuals and states tend to behave in a manner that maximizes their gains while minimizing their losses. Thus states enter into regional

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\(^2\) In 2016, the author was contracted by Uganda’s Ministry of East African Community Affairs to conduct a desk research study on the proposed political confederation for the EAC. As part of the methodology, he interviewed several respondents including the former Minister of State for East African Community Affairs, Shem Bageine whose views are quoted in this article.
arrangements for economic welfare gains from trade within the bloc or from without. The *threat* imperative arises from two situations. First, integration occurs when two or more countries find themselves in a mutually threatening relationship and thus reach some compromise leading to peaceful co-existence. This explains the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) by France and Germany in 1951. Secondly, when there exists a perception of a common external threat, countries may come together to enhance their capacity to defend themselves. Lastly, the *power* imperative refers to a situation where a regional hegemon forces the neighborhood into an integration arrangement. For example, the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (COMECON) bringing together Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union was established in 1949 and held together by the Soviet Union.

For one school of theorists, the federalists, the goal of integration is to build a supra-national authority in which the importance of the nation-state either is overridden or altogether eliminated (Senghor, 1990). This seems to be the conceptual aim of the end state of the EAC integration. However, within the same federalism theory, there are those who argue that the end point of integration is the building of an international community which is increasingly tied together by virtue of functional interactions, which does not necessarily entail the end of the nation-state (ibid). Both approaches, as can be observed, stress a predominance of either economic or political variables. In the case of economic variables, the economy and technology are viewed as generating demands and pressures on existing political institutions and decision makers (ibid). These demands in turn are supposed to compel them to adopt more creative policies and bargaining skills which rapidly lead to an integrated community.

On the other hand, where emphasis is placed on political variables, successful integration is seen to depend primarily on the will and determination of political elites to seek positive outcomes (ibid). In this regard, whereas federalists are preoccupied with degrees of centralization and transfer of authority away from the nation state to some supranational structure, the functionalists argue for incremental structural integration based on a convergence of interests over-time (ibid).

Behind functionalist thought is the belief that progress in international economic and social cooperation is a prerequisite for the elimination of political conflicts and war. The approach posits a reduction in intergovernmental conflicts as cooperation expands to cover different spheres of activities, eventually reducing individual dependence on the state. The coordination of man’s
individual welfare needs will gradually direct his loyalties from the nation state and towards functional international organizations (ibid).

The neo-functionalist approach contends that the first step to integration is the achievement of regional functional integration, which would lead to increased regional exchanges (Hurrell, 1995: 348). The high and rising levels of interdependence would set in motion an on-going process of cooperation that would lead eventually to political integration. As Hamad (2016) observes, ‘once initial integration processes have been agreed to, full-fledged political federation (supra-national organization status) will come about by default’. Supra-national institutions are seen by the neo-functionalists as the most effective means of solving common problems, beginning with technical and non-controversial issues, ‘but spilling’ over into the realm of high politics and leading to a redefinition of the group identity around the regional unit. In summary, for the neo-functionalists, integration is a result of supra-national and transnational coalitions (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001: 523).

Standard trade theorists argue that integration among two or more countries will improve welfare of the member countries provided the arrangements lead to trade creation, minimal trade diversion and/or trade creation that exceeds trade diversion (Maluvi, 2014: 3). Thus according to Belassa, there are five ideal types of regional integration arranged in a hierarchy (Ojo et al, 1990: 145). At the lowest is the free trade area in which tariffs and quotas are eliminated among the members. The next level is the customs union in which tariffs and quotas are eliminated in addition to discriminatory tariffs being eliminated among the members. The third level involves the establishment of the common market entailing the elimination of obstacles to the free flow of factors of production i.e. free movement of people, goods and services. The fourth level is the establishment of an economic union entailing a single currency and harmonization of economic policies of the members. The last and highest level is the political union involving unified structures and political institutions (Apuuli, 2005: 108).

From the available evidence, the EAC integration seems to be following Belassa’s approach. As already observed above, the EAC Treaty states that EAC integration will follow a continuum starting with a custom’s union and ultimately ending with a political federation. Whilst the customs union and common market initiatives have been established, the establishment of the
economic union and political federation have rather faced serious challenges partly due the fact that they fundamentally impact the sovereignties of the partner states.

**Summarized Timeline of EAC Integration**

Since 1895, in the case of Kenya, Uganda and Zanzibar, and since 1919 in the case of Tanganyika territory, politicians and scholars have been toying with the idea of East African integration (or to be more specific federation) (Abir, 1969: 514). At this time, the East African region, colonized under British control, was comprised of Tanganyika (i.e. mainland Tanzania), Kenya, Uganda, and Zanzibar (an island off the coast of Tanganyika). The building of the Uganda Railway kicked off the integration initiative. The British colonial interest in East Africa (conceived as a region from a territorial perspective) aimed at accomplishing three major objectives: 1) securing control of the Nile headwaters as a conduit for protection of British position in Egypt and the Suez Canal, 2) monitoring of pre-World War I era German imperial plans in the region, and 3) opening up the Kenyan hinterland via rail transport to introduce lucrative large-scale farming (Katembo, 2008: 108). In 1899, Sir Harry Johnston was instructed to consider the merits of some form of union or amalgamation of the East Africa (Kenya) and Uganda protectorates… (Hamilton, 1963: 407). However, the 1900s were to be the golden age of East African integration.

Between 1900 and 1960, the East African Common Market was established in 1900 characterized by a customs arrangement between Uganda and Kenya (then British East Africa) on the one hand, and Tanganyika (then German East Africa) on the other. Measurers to integrate and interlink the three East African countries were undertaken including the introduction of the common currency (the East African Shilling), the Joint Income Tax Board and Economic Council. In the same period over 40 different East African institutions were in research, social services, education/training, and defense among others were established or strengthened (Apuuli, 2006: 172). Also, several commissions were appointed to explore the possibilities of establishing an East African Federation (ibid).

The 1960s saw the establishment of the East African Common Services Organization (EASCO) which centralized the administration of East Africa’s customs, excise, and revenue authorities; currency, land, sea and air transport; telecommunications; and education (Nyirabu, 2005: 24).
EASCO was meant to be a transitional arrangement to be succeeded by an East African Federation whenever Kenya and Uganda attained independence (Ojo et al, 1990: 157). Nevertheless, the federation failed to materialize in spite of Mwalimu Nyerere offering to delay Tanganyika’s independence for that purpose (ibid). On 1 December 1967, the East African Community (EAC) was established by the Treaty of EAC (1967). The Treaty was anchored on three pillars: harmonization of economic policy; common institutions and a common market (Nyirabu, 2005: 30).

The EAC, which was one of the ‘most successful models of integration on the globe’ (Khadiagala, 2016: 175) collapsed in 1977 for various reasons including: the economic war waged by Idi Amin resulting into a divergence of currencies; the worsening relations between Uganda and Tanzania due to the latter’s giving political asylum to Milton Obote; the worsening relations between Uganda and Kenya following Israel raid on Entebbe in 1976; the disparity between the three currencies of partner states; and the divergences in the economic policies of the partner states (Ojo et al, 1990: 159-171; Tulya-Muhika, 1995; Katembo, 2008: 110; Mugomba, 1978: 261-272). The collapsed EAC was liquidated in 1984 under the ‘Mediation Agreement for the Division of Assets and Liabilities of the former Community’, but the same agreement recommended that the options for possible future cooperation should be left open (Baregu, 2010: 42).

Between 1991 and 1999, the states of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania reached several agreements on reviving the EAC, and in 1999 the Treaty on EAC Cooperation was adopted. Later in the year 2000, the Treaty was ratified and thus the new EAC started operating. Burundi and Rwanda were admitted as members in 2007, South Sudan in 2016, and the DRC in 2022.

**Political Federation**

There are two remarkable things that can be noted from the EAC Treaty (1999) (as amended) namely: first, that the EAC is the only REC possibly in the world that states the end product of its integration i.e. political federation. Secondly, the Treaty does not give a timeline within which the end product has to be achieved. Nevertheless, the debate on the political federation of the EA region has been on since colonial times. According to Kituyi (2012: 12), ‘the debate on establishing an East African Federation combining Uganda and Kenya [started] in 1899’. In the 1920s, the British government set up the Hilton Young Commission to study the possibility of establishing
an EA Federation. The Commission failed in its task mainly because of the opposition of the Kabaka of Buganda and of the Africans in Kenya and Tanganyika. In their view, to bring Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika into some form of a closer union was simply to create a means of locking racial groups in a struggle for power which might well lead to the type of internal self-government granted to Southern Rhodesia, where the white settlers had taken over practically all governmental power (Cervenka, 1968: 150).

The federation debate intensified at the beginning of the 1960s as regional countries prepared for independence. In late 1950s when it became clear that Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika would shortly become independent, the idea of a federation of East Africa under an African government became a popularly accepted objective and one of the main goals of the Pan-African Movement of Eastern, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMESCA). Under PAFMESCA, Julius Nyerere in June 1960 made a dramatic declaration on East African Federation while attending an African Heads of State meeting in Addis Ababa Ethiopia when he said, ‘We must confront the Colonial Office with a demand not for the freedom of Tanganyika and then for Kenya and then for Uganda and then Zanzibar, but with a demand for the freedom of East Africa as one political unit’ (ibid: 150). While Kenya enthusiastically backed him, Ugandan leaders looked with less favor on the proposal (ibid) at that time. Uganda’s reluctance on the issue was due to a number of reasons including, first, sovereignty. The government of Uganda complained of ‘the high degree of centralization, which its partners wanted to build into the federation’ (Apuuli, 2004: 26). It should be noted that earlier on, Prime Minister Milton Obote had complained that the EA High Commission (established in 1948) ‘cut into the sovereignty of Uganda’ (Nye Jr, 1963: 479). Secondly, there was a perception in Uganda that the integration project was not benefiting all the countries equally. According to Nye (ibid: 482), ‘several leading members of the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) claimed that [Uganda was] not benefiting sufficiently’. They cited the example of the over-industrialization of Kenya at the expense of the other two partner states. Lastly, the Kingdom of Buganda had in early 1963 expressed its opposition to the federation (ibid: 489).

Ley (EALA, n.d: 32), attributed the failure of the EA federation at that time to conceptual problems. According to him, ‘what Tanganyika wanted, what the Kenyans were willing and able to agree, and what most people in those countries understood, was not federal government but unification’. For the Tanganyikans and Kenyans, regional unity involved the concept of a tightly
constructed federation. In fact, Tanganyikans were willing to endure the adverse short-term implications of the existing common market arrangements because they assumed that a close political federation would reallocate development opportunities to the poorer areas (ibid). In the end, the three EA partner states gained their independence separately.

The debate on the EAC federation started as part of the discussions on re-establishing the integration arrangement in the 1990s with President Museveni leading the chorus of leaders calling for its establishment. In a 48-page paper titled Towards a closer cooperation in Africa (1998)³ that he presented in July 1998, Museveni argued that the region should deepen its integration into a political federation (Mukasa, 1998; Vision Reporter, 2006). It should be recalled while the EAC Treaty provided for the establishment of the political federation, it did not elaborate on how it was to be achieved (Kamanyi, 2007: 127). In 2004, President Museveni pushed his counterparts to accept the idea to 'Fast Track' the proposed steps of EA integration (Walsh, 2015: 88). This resulted in the establishment of the Committee on Fast Tracking East African Federation chaired by Kenya’s Attorney General Amos Wako, which was tasked with ‘examining ways and means to expedite and compress the process of integration, so that the ultimate goal of a Political Federation is achieved through a fast track mechanism’.⁴ The main finding of the committee was that the EA integration should be expedited (EAC, 2004) and it recommended that the political federation be achieved in the year 2013, with the election of a single president for East Africa. In order to have more inclusive consultations in the fast-tracking debate, the partner states decided to establish national committees to consult their populations on the issue. Between the years 2007 and 2009, the national committees of the partner states reported their findings on the issue of fast tracking the EA political federation.⁵

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³ The author has a hard copy of this paper.
Generally, all the populations in the five member countries were receptive to the idea of establishing a political federation with the following findings: Burundi 71%; Kenya-83%; Rwanda-96%; Tanzania-97% and Uganda-87%. On fast tracking the political federation, however, the findings were as follows: Burundi 63%; Kenya-66%; Rwanda- 91%; Tanzania-24% and Uganda-75%. The fast tracking idea received the lowest support in Tanzania. According to Baregu (2010: 55), Tanzania’s stance on the political federation idea was ‘enigmatic’. Nevertheless, the national consultations revealed a number of fears, concerns and challenges on establishing a political federation. These included in the areas of governance, land and constitutional arrangements among others. From this time onwards, the momentum on the idea of political federation slowed down. As a way of keeping the issue alive, the partner states between 2009 and 2012 appointed groups of experts and consultants to study it further (EAC, 2011). But overall, the enthusiasm that had been exhibited at the start of the fast-tracking federation debate was dampened.

**Why Has the Federation Failed to Materialize?**

The establishment of a political federation as envisaged in the EAC Treaty (1999) (as amended) has so far not materialized for several reasons. This following section offers some observations as to why.

* a) *Weak nature of the partner states*

One major factor identified as inhibiting successful governance in sub-Saharan Africa (of which the EAC partner states are part) is that the state is considered weak (Atiku-Abubakar and Shaw-Taylor, 2003: 169). Weak states are defined as having a prevalence of structural inequality, the components of which are economic differentiation, cultural (or social) inequality and political inequality. To maintain regime longevity and relative stability, leaders in weak states use ethnic and religious affiliations in the form of client relationships to maintain political power (Isaacs-Martin, 2017: 135). Thus, the state ‘becomes the means by which elites enrich themselves and service their interest, rather than the state existing for the public good and economic development’ (ibid). Chazan et al (1999:66) described the characteristics of 'relative weakness of governments'
as follows: scarcity of resources, politicized patterns of social differentiation, over-expanded state structures, insufficient state legitimacy, inadequate state power, and the lack of adaptation of alien institutions to local condition. The majority of the states of the EAC bloc are in the ‘weak category’. Just a few examples will suffice. First, the state of Uganda nearly collapsed from mid-1960s through to mid-1980s as a result of authoritarian and dictatorial governments of Milton Obote and Idi Amin. Corruption became endemic in the public service on account of very poor salaries and conditions of service, and the lack of effective accountability and oversight mechanisms (Robinson, 2004). Corrupt practices enabled state elites to appropriate state resources for personal self-aggrandizement (Tangri and Mwenda, 2008). When President Yoweri Museveni came to power in 1986, the corruption situation did not change much, although while he was still struggling to capture power, he had promised to eliminate corruption ‘once and for all’ (Mulera, 2020). The 2021 Corruption Perception Index ranks Uganda at 27 index points out of a maximum of 29 (Take-profit.org, n.d).

Secondly, since getting independent in 2011 from the Sudan, the Republic of South Sudan has suffered bouts of civil wars that are yet to come to an end. The 2022 Fragile Index ranks the country at number three after Yemen and Somalia (Statista, 2022). Generally, the protracted conflict and increased outbreaks of sub-national intercommunal violence have left 2 million South Sudanese internally displaced across all 78 counties (UNHCR, 2022: 11), with the refugee numbers from the country projected to hit 2.33 million by the end of the year 2022 (ibid: 12). Currently, the country is facing its highest levels of food insecurity with over 8.3 million people needing assistance, including some 7 million facing severe food insecurity (ibid: 11). Corruption permeates all sectors of the economy in South Sudan and all levels of the state apparatus, and manifests itself through various forms, including grand corruption and clientelistic networks along tribal lines (Anti-Corruption Resource Center, n.d). The 2021 Corruption Perception index ranks South Sudan at the very bottom of the countries surveyed (Take-Profit.org, n.d).

With this situational outlook, the regional states have used regional integration to boost their official status and sovereignty. Sovereignty is defined as the supreme decision-making and decision-enforcing authority possessed by the state and no other social institution (Plano and Olton, 1988). At the national level, sovereignty denotes the freedom of a collective entity to
act independently (De-Benoist, 1999). However, the structural conditions existing in the EAC mean that the partner states’ ability to make and enforce laws, the power to define and defend territorial borders, as well as the capacity to shape and direct economic performance is generally circumscribed. In general, whilst the Partner States enjoy international recognition, they to some extent lack substantial and credible sovereignty by the established criteria. In the end, the weakness of the Partner States’ sovereignty means that they tend to place heavy emphasis on formal and absolute sovereignty (borders especially) to enhance their power. The reality, however, is that institutional and formal sovereignty is simply a justification for their continued survival as states, which paradoxically diminishes the achievement of regional integration especially the political one.

b) Paying lip service to regional integration

The supra-national nature of the EAC makes its activities to be largely state-driven and elite-led (Okoth, 2020). The highest decision making organ of the institution is the Summit comprising the Heads of State and Government of Partner States. The ordinary and extra-ordinary meetings of the Summit provides a platform for the leaders to make statements in support of regional integration. In this context, the leaders are perceived as promoters of the goals and values of regionalism, whereas not! Two examples relating to the implementation of Customs Union and Common Market will suffice.

First, statutorily, the EAC integration process starts as an economic and progresses to political arrangement. Following this trajectory, a Customs Union (CU) was established in 2005. Conceptually, a CU involves two or more countries agreeing to free all trade internally (elimination of quotas and tariffs) while maintaining common external tariffs on all imports from non-members (Buthelezi, 2006: 2). The EA region was expected to achieve full implementation of the CU in 2010 (Asiimwe, 2018a), however, from the available evidence, its full implementation whilst being postponed three times previously has now been put on hold indefinitely (ibid). The failure to achieve full implementation of the CU has been attributed to the failure by Partner States to ‘harmonize … joint collection of taxes’ (ibid). For example, it has been reported that while Kenya and Uganda have imposed a 35% external tariff on imported steel products, Tanzania has not
(ibid). This means that cheaper steel products are entering the Tanzania market, which can easily sip into the other partner states countries thus making the full implementation of the CU difficult.

Secondly, the EA Common Market (CM) was established and became operational in 2010. Conceptually, in a CM there is free internal trade, a common tariff for external trade plus free movement of labour, capital, goods and services among the member countries (Buthelezi, 2006: 3). The problematic surrounding the implementation of the CM, is for example highlighted by the issues of the free movement of labour and goods. The CM Protocol allows workers from any partner state to accept employment, including social security benefit, within any other EAC country without being discriminated against on the basis of their nationality. However, ‘some partner states have put in place stringent measures-and fees- that make it difficult for the free movement of both skilled and unskilled labour’ (Asiimwe, 2018b). The case of Sylvia Mulinge epitomizes the region’s failure to implement the CM (ibid; Alushula, 2018). Mobile telecoms company Safaricom, appointed Mulinge as Managing Director of Vodacom Tanzania with effect from 1 September 2018. In order for her to take up the appointment, she was required to obtain a Class B residence work permit in Tanzania. However, after more than five months of waiting, the Tanzania authorities failed to grant her the work permit, which is issued to foreign expatriates with rare profession to obtain in the country to work for the companies in the country. Tanzania claimed that ‘she had not fulfilled all the requirements’ (Asiimwe, 2018b). This case, one of the many, demonstrates that the partner states are still far apart on the right of free movement of labor.

The two examples cited above, demonstrate the failure of the partner states to walk the talk of regional integration. But this failure should not be surprising as it has become the norm for African leaders to not mean what they say and say what they do not mean!

\[c\) Friction among the partner states\]

In 2011, a group of experts that had been established to study the fears, concerns and challenges of political federation inter alia recommended that the EAC should negotiate a Treaty for the establishment a Political Federation (EAC, 2011). According to Walsh (2015: 89), ‘it was

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6 Article 10.
Tanzania which was the weariest of the proposals’. But the immediate result of Tanzania balking at the proposals was the emergence of what came to be called the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ (CoW)-an alliance of Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda. The CoW countries proceeded to moot and conclude numerous integration projects such as the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) and oil pipeline among others without involving Burundi and Tanzania (ibid). In 2014, the CoW started issuing a single tourist visa making them a single tourist destination (BD, 2014), and also concluded a defense and security pact (Ssonko, 2014). The countries in the CoW supported by the EAC Secretariat justified their actions under the principle of variable geometry in the Treaty which provide for flexibility in the integration process.7

The perceived establishment of a putative CoW was exacerbated by the schisms that cropped up among the partner states. In 2012, a new rebel movement called M23 emerged in Eastern DRC. In November of that year, it occupied the provincial capital of Goma in North Kivu province much to the embarrassment of the UN peacekeeping forces deployed there. In March 2013, the UN decided to deploy within its peacekeeping mission a robust force called the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) to deal with the M23 rebels (UN Security Council, 2013). Tanzania’s decision to be part of the FIB did not go down well with Rwanda.8 Suffice to note that the UN had accused Rwanda of supporting the M23 rebels (Charbonneau and Nichols, 2018). At the same time, President Kikwete appealed to Rwanda to negotiate with the rebel group *Forces democratique de liberation du Rwanda* (FDLR) (Walsh, 2015: 93) operating out of DRC, which the Rwanda government accuses of being responsible for carrying out the 1994 genocide of the Tutsis. As a result of Kikwete’s suggestion, Kagame reacted by publicly threatening to punch him (Habiyaremye, 2013) and described Kikwete’s call as ‘utter nonsense’ (The East African, 2013). It is reported that after Museveni’s intervention, Kagame backed off. In the aftermath of the public spat between Kagame and Kikwete, the latter ordered Tanzania’s army-Tanzania Peoples Defence Forces (TPDF) to expel 20,000 foreigners including Rwandans he claimed were living in his country illegally (Byaruhanga, 2013; Ssekika, 2013). Relations between Rwanda and Tanzania somewhat improved after President Magufuli succeeded Kikwete in 2015 with the former making

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7 Article 1. The principle allows for progression in cooperation among a sub-group of members in a larger integration scheme in a variety of areas and at different speeds.

8 The other contributors to the force are Malawi and South Africa.
his first official trip abroad to Rwanda (The Citizen Reporter, 2016). More recently, the two
countries signed a bilateral agreement to strengthen cooperation in the areas of border control and
crime prevention among others (Beautiful Rwanda, 2021).

The semblance of normalization of relations between the Partner States should not be taken to
mean that all is well in the region. The issues that caused the instability in the relations, in the first
place, have not been fundamentally resolved. For example, the rebel group-FRDL- continues to
pause a threat to the security of Rwanda. The SGR project has all but stalled in Uganda as hitherto,
the country has found it difficult to find a source of finance for the project (Angurini, 2020). It
should be noted that the construction of the SGR is supposed to be a cooperative effort between
the Partner States.

Conclusion
The EAC Treaty establishes the trajectory of EAC integration with the ultimate goal of
establishing a political federation. It is only the EAC among the integration arrangements in
the world that clearly establishes its ultimate goal. Since 2004 when a decision was taken to
fast-track the political federation of the EAC, a lot of effort has been expended by the partner
states on the project. However, the issue is yet to be successfully concluded. We have argued
that the achievement of the political federation has hitherto run into headwinds because of
inter alia the weak nature of the partner states; the leaders paying lip service to issues of
integration; and the continuing frictions among the partner states. On the latter point, the
current spat between the DRC and Rwanda over the M23 insurgency is very instructive. The
two states have been engaged in a war of words, which sometimes has threatened to escalate
into open violence. The DRC accuses Rwanda of supporting the M23 rebel group while the
latter counter accuses the former of supporting the FDLR. In this situation, the regional
integration political debate has been put on the back foot. In the end, the words of the former
Minister of State for East African Community Affairs of Uganda, Shem Bageine are very
poignant. In his opinion, the main challenge facing the formalization of the EA federation is
‘friction … among the Partner States’ (Interview, 2016). We cannot agree with him more. It
is thus our conclusion that the search for the EAC political integration will take a while longer
as friction among the EAC states is not about to disappear.
References


13.19


Is Mutuality Wanting? Urban Governance and City Transformation in Dakar and Nairobi

‘Femi Balogun

Abstract

This article explored how urban governance and city transformation are occurring in Dakar and Nairobi. It examined what city transformation means for urban dwellers, by utilizing process-based leadership framework to determine the extent of mutuality between the vision of urban governance and the aspirations of ordinary citizens in these two cities. In this regard, the article questioned the factors that shaped the vision of urban governance approaches and interrogated its value in relation to promoting inclusivity and sustainability. Relying on secondary data, the article critically assessed a range of flagship projects in these two cities and compared access to clean water, and transportation to determine the value of urban governance approaches in both cities. The article argued that mutuality is at the core of city making that emphasizes inclusivity and sustainability, and that city transformation is in doubt if the hopes and aspirations of ordinary city dwellers are still wanting.

Keywords: City dwellers, Basic services, Flagships, Leadership, Mutuality, Urban governance
Introduction

Cities worldwide are experiencing a historic transition that continues to pose significant leadership challenges in the provision of security, basic infrastructure, and public services. In a world that is on the threshold of an urban revolution, urbanization is redefining what constitutes living long and living well for city dwellers. Across Africa, Asia, and Latin America (the hotspots of rapid demographic growth), insecurity, exclusion and vulnerability are having far-reaching consequences for peace, security, and development (Moser 2009, Koonings & Kruijt, 2009; Kilcullen, 2012). While addressing these concerns remains an overwhelming priority for both the state and citizens, the challenges are wicked in urban spaces, where formal or effective governance is still developing. In many African cities today, an uncivil logic exists where swathes of destitute (slums) exist side by side with islands of wealth and opulence.

From the slums of Tolbiac and Kawangware to the wealthy areas of Plateau and Lavington in Dakar and Nairobi respectively, city governments are faced with dire problems on how to allocate and regulate limited resources in ways that are inclusive and equitable. By year 2000, the introduction of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the events of September 11 2001, terror attacks in the United States drew the attention of global policy actors to the emergence of small cities, which had become a dominant feature of Africa’s development trend. While MDG 7 (target 11) sought to improve the livelihoods of slum dwellers, the 9/11 terror attacks brought to the fore an increased appreciation of the perils of failed states. These two events shaped the way in which the literature and policy interacted with urban development, particularly in relation to the resource and administrative capacity gaps that existed in African cities. Following these events, a flurry of studies emerged with analysis of the infrastructure deficit and how city administrators in Africa were expressing the desire to portray their cities as world class. Urban governments in Africa found themselves on the horns of a dilemma as they attempted to navigate these issues. But there were already emerging questions about the prospect of centering the wellbeing of the poor and vulnerable within urban governance agendas.

By the 2010s, new studies began to emerge indicating that African cities were experiencing city transformation, resulting in a change in perception both at home and abroad. Much of this was said to have been shaped by exceptional economic growth in many parts of the continent, despite the global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. Lagos, Africa’s fastest growing city, which was hitherto labeled as one of the worst cities in the world (Gandy, 2006), with more than one hundred slum settlements by 2006 (Ilesanmi, 2015, p. 244), was suddenly being described as ‘Africa’s big apple’ in popular literature and media circles. Lagos has an internally generated revenue increasing from 14 billion Naira monthly in 1999 to 219 billion Naira by 2014 (Asaolu, Dopemu, & Monday, 2015, p. 91). This renewed image and confidence was further sustained by flagship projects such as bus rapid transit, rail transport networks, new roads, and bridges to connect communities, affordable housing schemes, ultramodern markets, oceanfront leisure parks and the construction of new cities such as the Eko Atlantic city in Lagos. The Diamniadio Lake city in Dakar and the city of Kilamba in Luanda became a common feature across many cities across the continent. However, as high-
profile flagship initiatives were being fast-tracked to attract investors, there were concerns that this was happening at the expense of the wellbeing of poor and vulnerable urban dwellers.

The Ebola disease outbreak of 2014 and the transition from MDGs to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) began to raise critical questions about the extent of inclusion and sustainability associated with urban governance and city transformation occurring in Africa. This in part occasioned the introduction of the New Urban Agenda (See Caprotti et al, 2015) which advocated for the creation of safe cities by promoting inclusive policies and practices aimed at reducing poverty, vulnerability and leaving no one behind. Available data at the time indicated that of the 31 most vulnerable countries in the world, the population in 23 of them were projected to increase significantly in the short term (Gupte, 2016, p. 1). Interestingly so, more than half of these countries were in Africa.

While much of the literature tends to be normative, by either being explicitly enthusiastic or cynical about the reality and prospects of African cities, this study contributes to the debate by presenting a balanced perspective by moving beyond the face value of the discourse and engaging a more reflective attitude and admitting that our understanding of the workings in and of African cities is limited. In this regard, this study asks what a focus on ordinary citizens as the referent point of urban governance and city transformation means. The article explores perspectives on how urban governance and city transformation is occurring in Dakar and Nairobi by interrogating what city transformation means for urban dwellers. This is done by utilizing a process-based leadership framework to determine the extent of mutuality between the vision of urban governance and the aspirations of ordinary citizens in the two cities. Relying on secondary data, the article critically assesses a range of flagship projects in these two cities and compares access to clean water, and transportation to ascertain the value of urban governance approaches in both cities.

Establishing Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks

Urban Governance

With the continued global attention about urbanization and its implications for peace, security and development, urban governance has become an appealing concept within policy and academic spaces. Just like many other concepts in the social sciences, the concept of urban governance has different meanings and implied connotations. There is hardly any consistent way in which to define the concept. Is it related to city administrator’s organizational structure; the responsibility and management of urban infrastructure; or the obligation of actors such as civil society as well as other local and traditional actors? (Razaghi & Finger, 2012). Is it a model or systematic approach that provides alternative ways of thinking about processes of governance, politics, responsibility, and democracy; or an explanatory term that enables an understanding of how urban institutions work in relation to financing projects, distributing public goods and related responsibilities? (Raco,
Since there is little consensus on the concept of urban governance, this study explores a few definitions and attempts to tease out common themes and emerging issues relevant for this study.

Avis (2016), suggests that “urban governance refers to how government (local, regional and national) and stakeholders decide how to plan, finance and manage urban areas.” Avis asserts that urban governance involves continuous engagement, negotiation, and contestation over the distribution of resources and power. In a similar but detailed definition, Raco (2020) posits that urban governance refers to the processes through which government is organized and delivered in towns and cities as well as the relationships between state agencies and civil society, a term that is used to include citizens, communities, private-sector actors, and voluntary organizations.¹

Both definitions tend to agree that urban governance is essentially partisan, one that is shaped by several engagements and interactions with political structures as well as the capacity of government to distribute public goods and make decisions in the interest of its citizens. Raco (2020) further indicates that urban governance provides an analytical framework for posing important questions relating to who makes the decisions about policy implementation in urban areas; how these decisions are made; who controls agendas and how; what policymaking processes exist; which institutions/interests have the power and resources to shape policy agendas; as well as what control local citizens have over the way their cities are governed.

Furthermore, the definitions suggest that urban governance involves a chain of economic and social interactions, institutions, and relationships with labor markets, households, basic infrastructure, land, markets and businesses, public services, and public safety— all of which combine to determine what happens in the city. Therefore, urban governance processes are crucial in influencing the built environment and social character of urban regions; they determine the capacity and value of public amenities and efficiency of delivery; the allocation of expenditures and resources among stakeholders; as well as citizens’ rights to access city administrators and participate in processes that shape the urban vision and strategies, and demand accountability (Avis, 2016).

The concept of urban governance tends to assume that power is dispersed between a plurality of interests and stakeholders. It also assumes that city administrators serve as neutral players trying to negotiate between and amongst the conflicting demands of various interests to make fair judgments for the good of all. Yet, other scholars have argued that the dynamics of urban governance is not necessarily typical of plurality. Rather, a small group of actors including elite groups, political cliques, social organizations, private sector actors, and technical-bureaucratic agents frequently controls urban governance. Avis (2026) for instance, argues that while city administrators constitute the largest and most visible urban governance actor, local administrations have little control over a large portion of what ordinary citizens can access within the city. He

¹ A term that is used to include citizens, communities, private-sector actors, and voluntary organizations.
suggests that they are mostly shaped by market and private businesses, national government agencies as well as the advocacy and activism of civil society.

This may, in part, help to explain the sharp contrast between the swathes of destitute existing side by side with islands of wealth and opulence. It perhaps also explains the limited ability of ordinary citizens to participate in urban life and access social, economic, and political opportunities, especially in relation to decision making within the city. This therefore raises important questions about what urban governance and city transformation means for ordinary citizens. African cities continue to lag on key indicators despite explicit commitments to the New Urban Agenda, which advocates for the creation of safe cities by promoting inclusive policies to reduce poverty, vulnerability, and leaving no one behind. Democratic consolidation has not replaced attempts to achieve this through democratization.

Despite sound articulation, current policy and normative frameworks at the national and regional levels are yet to realize the aspiration of safe and sustainable cities. The several economic and development policies formulated by state governments and the African Union's Agenda 2063 are cases in point. Even though the last decade has seen increased investments in urban infrastructure, poverty and vulnerability, African cities are rapidly deepening, making the challenge to explore alternative ideas for achieving inclusive and sustainable cities an important one. In this regard, this article suggests that the leadership approach to urban governance may offer a more effective alternative and argues that mutuality is at the core of city making that emphasizes inclusivity and sustainability.

**Leadership as a Framework**

Defining leadership is difficult. There are as many definitions of leadership as there are people who have attempted to describe it, both in popular and scholarly literature. Even though leadership seems to be a phenomenon that is frequently witnessed, it is probably not fully understood. Popular ideas on leadership tend to be simplistic and limited in scope, which makes them effective at influencing opinions and choices. Nevertheless, the study focuses on Keith Grint's (2005) four typologies of leadership to unify the various meanings of the term.

Keith (2005) argues that it is pointless seeking a single definition for leadership while also highlighting the need of comprehending the many perspectives on the idea and making sense of the arguments. He was able to narrow the criteria by posing four thought-provoking questions that make up his four-fold leadership typologies after realizing the limitations of a universal understanding. First, he discusses leadership as a position- are leaders defined by the environments in which they operate? Second, is leadership a personal trait - is it who leaders are that makes the leaders? Third, leadership as result – is it the outcomes that leaders achieve that define them as leaders? Fourth, leadership as a process – is it how leaders get things done that makes them leaders?

*Leadership as a Position*: The definitions of leadership based on position and person are essentially what are used to frame common concepts of leadership in autobiographical or
biographical reports. According to the position perspective, leadership is defined as the actions made by a person who has the power to lead due to their formal or informal position of authority. They demonstrate what is frequently referred to as leadership in charge, or individuals who lead from positions of power over towns, states, or groups of people. The position-based perspective may be more applicable in organizational and business settings, but its application in social contexts where problems are intractable is limited. For instance, if a citizen-led approach is considered a more effective way of dealing with the urban challenge in Africa, how does the position someone occupies explain compliance, especially in a context where there is no conversation between the leaders and the followers on the terms of their social contract?

Leadership as a Person: A person with certain qualities or traits is typically thought of as having leadership attributes. Such people are often regarded as a messiah or a hero having answers to all problems. However, while such leaders might be successful in one circumstance, they might not be the right kind in another. Therefore, a limited view of leadership as a personality is flawed. The conventional characteristics approach, which defines leadership from the character and personality of leaders, is in line with the person-based perspective. Although these viewpoints offer some insight into the leadership concept, they undermine the importance of followership in their analysis. Regardless of a person's charm or position, if solutions to difficult problems do not align with followers' wishes and aspirations, such remedies can end up making the situation worse. This may help to explain why certain leaders resort to coercion to enforce compliance.

Leadership as Results: Focus is placed on the outcomes of leadership from a result-based leadership approach. In essence, achieving outcomes is the goal of leadership, and without them, leadership may lack the required support it needs to sustain itself. If inclusive and sustainable cities is the purpose of urban governance, emphasis on outcomes will perhaps include, but not limited to, equitable opportunity for citizens to realize their full potential in a peaceful society, access to administrative services, and basic social infrastructure. If these achievements are attained, who should these results be attributed to? Successful urban strategies can only be realized through inclusion and collaboration of different actors, including ordinary citizens as well as civil society, government agencies and other private actors. It cannot be achieved or implemented by one individual. Consequently, attributing successful outcomes to a leader may be problematic. Ironically, when a leader fails, there is a propensity for the people to blame someone else while the leader absolves himself of responsibility. But if that is the case, what does it say about who has more authority- the leader or the followers?

Furthermore, if the results achieved can be attributed to the effectiveness of specific leaders, what does the process through which these results are achieved say about the practice of leadership? The cooperation of citizens is imperative for any meaningful urban strategy to be successful and sustainable. As several incidents in Kenya and South Africa have shown, it is feasible for relocation or displacement to be accomplished using pressure, dishonesty, or exclusionary measures, which could invariably result in violence. The urban situation becomes even more challenging as more harm is being done to society in the scenario where urban violence is a result.
of urban regeneration, which is considered as a huge setback to urban planning processes. And it is because of this that process-based leadership is receiving a lot of attention as a potentially more useful perspective from which to create inclusive and sustainable urban strategies.

**Leadership as a Process:** The emphasis here is more on the leadership process, which draws attention to how the many components interact in a given situation, rather than the traits of a leader. The situational approach used by the process-based leadership analysis portrays leadership as primarily a sociological phenomenon. It explains the dynamics between the leader and the followers, the situational setting, the leadership process, and the outcomes of leadership. According to this perspective, leadership is viewed as a dynamic, interactive influence process between leaders and followers that is motivated by the desire to accomplish shared objectives in a social setting. By emphasizing the need for common people's goals to be incorporated into larger concepts that shape society, this definition of leadership essentially highlights the necessity for dialogue between leaders and followers. As a result, leadership is the starting point for efficient and sustainable urban governance when viewed from a process-based perspective.

The interaction between the situation and the needs it creates for people as well as the leader is defined as the leadership process. This aids in defining who the leader is, group effectiveness, future needs of the group, and potential successor. More importantly, mutuality between the ideas of leaders and the aspirations of followers emphasizes the process-based notion of leadership. In this context, mutuality refers to a shared sense of purpose, which serves as the cornerstone of effective leadership. When the ideas that shape society are cumulative of the aspirations of followers, then one can say that there is a sense of common purpose. This gives leadership legitimacy in a way that encourages followers to cede control to leaders, who in turn defines and interprets reality for them. Burns (1978) explains this further by referring to the term ‘moral leadership’ which holds that the relationship between the leader and led is not only of power but also of common needs, desires, and ethos.

Burns (1978) argues that the separation of the leadership and followership literature has been a significant weakness in the study of leadership and urged for the conceptual fusion of the two categories of literature. Followers are engaged members of society who are aware of alternative leaders and can make decisions. As a result, leaders are accountable for the promises they make, and when they carry out the improvements they pledged, they step into the leadership role. This is a lot akin to the thought of Murphy (1941) who opines that leadership comes into being when leaders can articulate ideas that have the tendency to provide solutions to needs that are dimly sensed. Since power and conflict dynamics must be understood to effectively lead, effectiveness of leaders must be assessed by actual societal change, as opposed to news coverage, as well as by how well needs and expectations are met. The process-based leadership paradigm is primarily used by this article for its analysis since it is thought to be more comprehensive for dealing with issues that groups in society encounter, especially in Africa, where the state is mostly estranged from the society.
The Nexus between Leadership and Urban Governance

This section begins by defining the distinction between leadership and management as the basis for establishing the relationship between leadership and urban governance. Grint (2005) draws attention to the difference between the two concepts by distinguishing their areas of problem-solving activity. According to him, the division between wicked and tame problems is the foundation of management and leadership. On the one hand, wicked problems are described as complex issues that cannot be separated from society which may require an inventive response to unusual or insurmountable problems. On the other hand, tame problems are problems that can be solved with the help of standard operating procedures. They are problems that have already been encountered and have ready-made solutions. So, the question is, does Africa's urbanization and the ensuing urban challenge constitute a wicked or tame problem?

Defining an urban strategy as a tame problem would suggest that the provision of basic amenities and social infrastructure, planning and legislation are very simple tasks. However, in a society where rapid urbanization is occurring, characterized by economic decline, lack of trust and limited economic resources, a tame definition to an urban governance approach might be a narrow interpretation which downplays the social policy and economic dynamics involved. It may be impossible to tackle the broader economic and social issues that have become an inherent part of the urban challenge. If urban governance is about infrastructural deficits, limited acumen for city planning, regulatory blockages, vested interests, and an increasing population, how can African cities absorb all of these with just half the resources? How can this be done while at the same time improving overall quality of life? What this means is that political decisions will have to be made on who gets what, when and how. This suggests that the context of urban governance in Africa dwells within the realms of wicked problems. Therefore, if leadership is about solving wicked problems, a leadership approach to urban governance might be useful.

The challenges that urban governance focuses on are not simply that of dilapidating infrastructure; they are acutely complex social difficulties involving different government departments, institutions, societal groups, and political structures. Thus, approaching these issues from a narrow institutional framework is less likely to succeed. Urbanization is not a problem that can be removed from society as it has no readymade solution; it is also not a problem that one leader can solve alone. Hence, any attempt at curbing the impact of urbanization requires a leadership approach; where leadership is defined as a dynamic and interactive influence process, between leaders and followers, bound by the need to achieve mutual goals within a social context (Grint, 2005).

A leadership approach emphasizes the imperatives of collective action in tackling wicked problems. In essence, if a people-centered approach to urban governance is more effective, process leadership may perhaps provide a useful alternative. Wicked problems like that of the urban crisis in Africa are somewhat defined by the absence of a solution on the part of leaders. City administrators may therefore benefit from an approach that engages the collective to properly understand the context of the problem and co-create solutions. African cities for instance, are
burgeoning with a youthful population that is *tech-savvy*. Yet, the agency of these young people remains latent. While they are in the driving seat of tech innovations already occurring on the continent, they are also at the front of crime and insecurity. When city administrators can harness the ideas and aspirations of citizens in ways that feed into the broader vision of society, while also allowing them become leaders as they give their talents and skills in the management of public and welfare services, city administrators are more inclined to legitimize their actions based on a persuasive account of the situation. The notion of legitimacy here is associated with normative compliance, which means that citizens cannot be coerced into addressing wicked problems, because the nature of the problem requires citizen’s willingness to help (Grint, 2005).

**Urban Governance and City Transformation in Africa**

African cities have become the focal point of urbanization (Songwe, 2018) and this has occasioned growing interest in urban governance and city transformation as global change accelerates. Increasing at an unparalleled rate, urbanization is redefining what it means to live long and live well for many city dwellers. From 3,300 cities in 1990 to 7,600 in 2022 (OECD/UN ECA/AFDB, 2022), Africa’s population of 1.1 billion will double by 2050, with over 80% of the increase occurring in its cities (Muggah & Hill 2018). Studies estimate that this population growth will endure till the end of the century, with 13 of the world’s 20 largest cities located in Africa (Koonings & Kruijt, eds. 2009; Kilcullen, 2012; Gupte, 2016; Bearak, Moriarty & Ledur, 2021). While cities such as Lagos, Kinshasa and Cairo dominated the literature on African cities due to their size, there has been growing attention to smaller cities, which already account for 62% of Africa’s urban population (Smith, 2018).

By the new millennium, the introduction of the MDGs and the September 11, 2001 terror attacks in the United States perhaps, drew global policy attention to the emergence of small cities, which had become a dominant feature of Africa’s development trend. On the one hand, with projections that the continent will be home to over a hundred cities with more than a million people by 2025 (Hove, Ngwerume, & Muchemwa, 2013; Smith, 2018; Muggah & Hill 2018) development partners, researchers and practitioners had already begun to express concerns about this trend. Target 11 (improving the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by the year 2020) of MDG - 7 called attention to a set of constraints to the broader social, economic, and political development of slum dwellers especially in cities where urbanization was transforming environments in ways that had become more diverse in formation, geometrically complex, and ecologically fragmented. Much of the concern was that urbanization is occurring in cities with critical infrastructural gaps, where local institutions had limited capacities and where effective governance was nearly absent (United Nations, 2009; Koonings & Kruijt, eds. 2009; Gupte, 2016). Similarly, the history of urbanization in the developed world was supplemented with industrial development, and as a result was closely associated with rapid and sustained economic growth. Unfortunately, rapid urbanization in Africa is taking place in an economic context of inconsequential industrial development (Ilesanmi, 2010; Hove, Ngwerume, & Muchemwa, 2013).
On the other hand, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks, there was an increased appreciation of the perils of failed states within global policy circles. During the Cold War, failed states did not often present themselves as a threat to global peace and security. The events of 9/11 indicated that failed states provide a haven for terrorists to hide, train and plan. Hence, governments too weak to provide basic services and security to their citizens are too weak to resist the parasites of terrorism. This turned the old Cold War paradigm on its head that the strongest threats may come from the strongest states. Rather, the strongest threats may originate from the states with weak governance structures (Schieffer, 2003).

Consequently, rapid urbanization and limited capacity for urban governance have continued to complicate inequality, increased health risks, widespread poverty, inadequate capital investments in public goods, the lack of pro-poor social programs and increasing informality. The expansion of ‘slums’ by the early 2000s, perhaps, became the most tangible symbol of many African cities (Smit, 2018). Lagos for instance, had over 100 slum settlements by 2006 (Ilesanmi, 2010), which were mostly branded by the dearth of basic social infrastructure and essential services, leaving citizens (mostly women, children, and youths) subjected to degrading living conditions that endangers their security and well-being. While market forces and global trends continue to inspire urban dwellers to seek ways of refining urban life, structural adjustment policies, inept governance, conflict as well as weak institutions combined to further impoverish many African cities.

By the 2010s, new literature began to emerge indicating that Africa’s urban development narrative was shifting from that of urban squalor to city transformation. Much of these studies suggested that African cities were being marked by remarkable changes that were already beginning to change the perception of African cities locally and globally. According to Edgar Pieterse, the question of infrastructural readiness of key urban nodes and the pressure on urban governments to attract international capital was at the core of the city transformation in African cities. He further noted that city transformation was largely attributed to remarkable economic growth occurring in parts of the continent at the time despite the global financial crisis of 2008-9 (Pieterse, 2017). Other studies (OECD/UN ECA/AfDB, 2022) posited that more than before cities are playing a larger role in national development schemes and offering solutions to existing urban challenges. This is being sustained by an expanding middle class and a younger generation of consumers with new hopes and aspirations of a city that is safe, connected, and sustainable. This further precipitated the emergence of private sector-led initiatives attempting to support government efforts in providing basic services in what became popularly referred to as public-private partnerships (PPP).

The literature on Africa’s city transformation highlights these new partnerships as well as innovative approaches to financing and implementation as crucial to accelerating the implementation of flagship projects. Although, the manifestation of city transformation differs based on context and practice, African cities where transformation was occurring became marked by improvements in cities economic performance with prospects for growth; expanding public

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2 See PASGR’s research on Urban Governance and City Turn-Around - Lagos, Luanda, Johannesburg, Addis Ababa
investment agenda focusing on economic infrastructure; fast tracked projects over and above the routine operations of the city to prioritize high profile flagship initiatives that sends a strong signal to the investor community; a policy and institutional commitment to effective urban governance and management through policy documents that articulate the transformation agenda; and an express desire for international recognition and reputation building to be called a world class city (Pieterse, 2017).

For many city governments who hitherto had struggled with limited budgets and limited access to financing, projecting their cities as a premium destination for foreign investment, linked with a holistic planning agenda for city reform has become a common tactic. Flagship projects such as bus rapid transit, rail transport networks, new roads, and bridges to connect communities, affordable housing schemes, ultramodern markets, oceanfront leisure parks and the construction of new cities such as the Eko Atlantic city in Lagos, the Diamniadio Lake city in Dakar and the city of Kilamba in Luanda became a common feature across many cities across the continent.

Unfortunately, the buzz around the city transformation in Africa was short-lived as the trend came under question at a critical period when global policy actors were discussing the transition from MDGs to SDGs, which also coincided with the Ebola outbreak of 2014. Scholars began to raise critical questions about the extent of inclusion and sustainability associated with city transformation and urban governance approaches. Just like the events of 9/11, the Ebola outbreak re-echoed the realization that the greatest threats to global peace may also originate from the states with weak governance structures and this time with a focus also on small cities. Recent literature has already begun to question how economic performance is being measured in African cities and emphasizing that economic indicators must be defined more broadly to include the qualitative dimensions of growth (Muggah & Hill, 2018; Wall, Maseland, Rochell, & Spaliviero, 2018; OECD/UN ECA/AfDB, 2022). From the 2010s, African cities continued to enjoy an increase in internal revenue generation, yet questions around equitable distribution of social dividends and inclusive growth remains. For instance, tax revenues in Lagos increased significantly from 600 million Naira monthly in 1999 to 23 billion Naira by 2014 (Akinsanmi, 2015), but the increase in tax revenues is yet to meet up with citizens' expectations from the government.

Similarly, more recent studies have begun stressing the prevalence of massive inequalities in African cities evidenced by the reality of slums existing side by side with islands of wealth and opulence, and how city, and national governments are confronting tough questions about how new urban investments are being distributed. Estimates suggest that meeting Africa’s urban infrastructure gap is a tall order as it requires between $130-170 billion every year (Ballard, 2018). With the continent’s Infrastructure shortfall at $68-$108 billion every year (Muggah & Hill, 2018), attracting investments in the provision of healthcare, education, public utilities, and security have become critical. At the same time, the paucity of city planning, inefficient land use, regulatory hurdles, and vested interests all seem to be part of the challenge. The implication is widespread
sprawling and rising informality that contribute to making many African cities today extremely expensive to live in. Data from the World Bank suggests that African cities are 29% more expensive with residents paying 100% more for transportation, 55% more for housing, and 35% more for food, which contributes to the deepening of exclusion and poverty. Despite increases in tax revenues, city governments have access to limited resources and require political discretion and financial autonomy to meet up with public demands. For instance, in 2015 the central government in Senegal prevented city administrators in Dakar from offering municipal bonds to investors leading to a loss of $40 million in capital (Muggah & Hill, 2018).

Much of the literature on urban governance in Africa have anchored their analysis on either a policy dimension or political economy approach which complicates the opportunity for a dispassionate and grounded perspective of the evolving trajectory in African cities. Much of the literature tends to be normative, by either being explicitly enthusiastic or cynical about the reality and prospects of African cities. This study attempts to fill this gap by presenting a balanced perspective by moving beyond the face value of the discourse and engaging a more reflective attitude and admitting that our understanding of the workings in and of African cities is limited. Indeed, African cities are changing in a complex way, and coming to terms with this complexity requires our thinking to move beyond simplistic predictions of doom about the African experience and its future.

Therefore, the study attempts to move the conversation in a way that amplifies the lived experiences of ordinary citizens and presents an analysis of what city transformation means at the level of the individual. There is a tendency that the definition of city transformation is expressed by desire for international recognition and reputation building to be called a world class city. More so, the dominant proposal within the literature from a policy dimension or political economy approach has been that African cities should consider financing their infrastructural deficit through foreign direct investment (FDI). The tendency here is the challenge it presents to city administrators to prioritize the hopes and aspirations of ordinary citizens. African regional and continental institutions have embraced the New Urban Agenda (Caprotti et al., 2017) which advocates for the creation of safe cities by promoting inclusive policies and practices that aim to secure and not securitize urban spaces (Gupte, 2016). This suggests that reducing poverty, vulnerability and leaving no one behind will mean shifting attention to poor urban settlements (Kilcullen, 2012; Jütersonke & Krause, 2013). But in a context where public policy instruments are prioritized to advance economic positioning as a world class city, and where high-profile flagship initiatives are fast-tracked to attract investors, what is the prospect that the wellbeing of the poor and vulnerable will be central to considerations of urban governance and city transformation?

In this regard, this study asks what a focus on ordinary citizens as the referent point of urban governance and city transformation means. In other words, what vision shapes the city transformation agenda? Whose ideas shape this vision? Through what process was this agenda articulated and legitimized? To what extent does this agenda center the hopes and aspirations of
ordinary citizens? In answering these questions, this article utilizes a process-based leadership framework to determine the extent of mutuality between the vision of urban governance and the aspirations of ordinary citizens in these two cities. It also questions the factors that shape the vision of urban governance approaches and interrogates its value in relation to promoting inclusivity and sustainability.

Urbanization and the Leadership Challenge in Dakar and Nairobi

Dakar and Nairobi are two major capital cities in Africa. The former being the capital of Senegal and the latter, the capital of Kenya. Both cities are largely models of the African colonial city and this has shaped their construction and administration even after independence (Varshney, 2013; Zayas, Hall & Redding, 2021). Like many other African cities, urbanization in Dakar and Nairobi was triggered by the development of these centers as the central transport interchange for the colonial administration. For instance, French colonialists founded Dakar in 1857 as a transport hub to serve the interests of slave merchants and business owners in Dakar and Goree,4 and built a train line to expand the trade route from Dakar to Mali by the 1920s. This led to the influx of people from rural communes and the concentration of commercial opportunities into the city. Dakar eventually became the main port for cash crop export by the 1930s (Zayas, Hall & Redding, 2021). Similarly, the colonial British government's establishment of Nairobi city in 1899 was centered on the growth of a railway network that drew a larger population. This was partly because of the area's favorable climate and abundant water supply owing to its swampland (Burdett, 2020).

Preliminary efforts at urban governance indicate that the colonial administration intended to keep these two cities racially divided (Anacker, 2010; Twinokwesiga 2020). Although racial discrimination was never legally codified in Dakar, colonial urban laws in Nairobi socially excluded the native African people. Consequently, the informality that still exists in Dakar, Nairobi and many African cities today has its roots in colonial exclusion. While the need for labor occasioned the creation of new urban settlement in Nairobi (Twinokwesiga 2020), colonial rulers used the bubonic plague of 1914 as an excuse to drive many native African citizens out of areas, which housed the administrative and financial districts and establish suburbs like Medina in Dakar and Kibera in Nairobi (Betts, 1971; Anacker, 2010). Medina eventually set the benchmark for what would lead to huge unplanned suburbs, unrestrained constructions, and quagmires when it was eventually merged into growing Dakar. Similarly, in Nairobi, the areas of the African community that were underrepresented in the municipal council (such as Eastleigh, Pangani, Pumwani, and Kibera), had the most noticeable absence of sanitary infrastructure and services, such as drainage and conservancy. The breakouts and reappearance of the plague that followed the pandemic at the end of the nineteenth century disproportionately affected these neighborhoods, which were already lacking in access to public services such as potable water and electricity (Bin-Kasim, 2020).

Medina, Kibera and other impoverished areas were frequently demolished to make way for new construction as exclusion and discrimination persisted even after independence in the 1960s. This

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4 A nearby island that functioned as one of the first staging grounds for the slave trade.
is, in part, at the core of slum growth in Dakar and Nairobi, as the colonial strategy to dominate through its urban policies has continued to shape urban governance processes in these cities, which have become characterized by class-based distinctions (Betts, 1971; Anacker, 2010; Twinokwesiga 2020). Restrictive controls on their movement inside the colonies were implemented out of concern that a persistent African presence would weaken the color line, lead to political unrest, and spread infectious diseases. For instance, the *kipande* system mandated that Africans wear a certificate around their necks in a small metal case as identity, proof of employment, and of their rightful presence in Nairobi. As a result, the system gave the police and district officers the authority to intimidate, accuse, and expel Africans who had broken their contract or were residing in Nairobi without authorization or unlawfully (Bin-Kasim, 2020).

Following the plagues, the colonial governments in Dakar and Nairobi set out broad strategies on urban reconstruction (Betts, 1971; Anacker, 2010; Twinokwesiga 2020). Unfortunately, this led to a persistent focus on the urban challenge as a matter of public order and less about the funding issues (occasioned by the economic decline of the post-World War 2 period) and, more importantly, the issue of exclusion. Consequently, slum removal measures that fueled growing animosity were a hallmark of urban development attempts. In the face of economic decline and growing resentment, the colonial administrator’s frustration increased as they continued to dwell on pervasive sentiments that put the blame of urban decay on the urban dwellers. This underscores the extent to which urban development efforts lacked mutuality. It was no surprise that protests and strikes became a common feature in the 1950s. These incidents sparked the *Mau Mau* emergency in Nairobi in what became known as a "tragic narrative" that saw British forces massacre around 20,000 native Africans.

In the run up to independence, many parts of Dakar and Nairobi were already facing an escalating and complex thread of crisis that continued to undermine the legitimacy of the colonial government. Like many other African cities, Dakar and Nairobi began to witness an increase in social, political, and economic activities and this continued to attract migrants. Beyond economic aspirations, city migrations marked an expression of liberation from political and socio-economic oppression. But while public finance remained a challenge, the growing need for public reform got lost within the nationalist’s move for independence in the late 1950s. Consequently, these cities found themselves trapped within a broader set of regional economic and political dynamics that will give further impetus to urban growth and accelerate urban decay even after independence in the 1960’s.

Being the capital cities after independence, Dakar and Nairobi inherited the governance structures and infrastructure that were already in place, as well as the difficulties. Following the loosening of the colonial authority that restricted Africans to the city centers, independence already prepared the way for the influx of African population into the city. For instance, Nairobi’s population climbed at an extremely high rate of 12.2% between 1962 and 1969, reaching 506,000 (Twinokwesiga, 2020), and Dakar's population increased from 132,000 in 1945 to 375,000 in 1960 (Olvera, Plat, & Pochet, 2016). All of this made the already difficult urban problems even more

After Senegal gained independence, the new government developed a masterplan that sought to prioritize housing and a broad plan for city rehabilitation that led to the establishment of new streets and neighborhoods in Dakar. To appeal to the middle class, the new housing models replicated the western architectural descriptions of affordable housing (Cissé, 2022). Expectedly, Nairobi experienced a similar situation. The 1973 Nairobi Metropolitan Growth Strategy existed to promote the interests of local bourgeoisie and multinational corporations (Owuor & Mbatia, 2008). In essence, the interests of the urban majority were disregarded and segregation along economic and social lines was further strengthened, thereby relegating the aspirations of the urban majority. This further perpetuated the colonial legacies of exclusion, urban decay and slum development in Dakar and Nairobi into the 1980’s and 1990’s.

Furthermore, the 1982 Masterplan in Dakar and the 1984-1988 Nairobi City Commission Development Plan that followed did very little to transform the sectoral issues in these cities. These plans projected harmonious development needs of all sectors including housing, health and environment, sewerage, social services, transport and public works, manpower development and financial management (Owuor & Mbatia, 2008; Cissé, 2022). However, implementation delays occasioned by inertia, corruption and capacity issues left much to be desired of these agendas, as the spatial configuration evolved with new realities and challenges. More so, global trends and economic policies such as the introduction of structural adjustment and the economic and debt crisis that followed led to a pause in economic reforms and contributed to a decline in living standards (Mabogunje, 1990; Smith (2022). The debt crisis left many African countries like Senegal and Kenya in stagnation and reversed the gains in living standards made in the 1960s and 1970s. Other non-debt forms of capital flows also decreased leading to a weak investment climate, the lack of available trade credit, and a reduction in foreign direct investment (Riddell, 1997; Briggs & Yeboah, 2001).

The gradual incorporation of African economies into the global economic system also intensified the impact of globalization on urban development in Dakar and Nairobi. Akin to other African cities, globalization paved way for market liberalization, advancement in information technology and improved transportation. Private investors began to take advantage of low labor costs, tax rates, and informality in economic operations in a bid to maximize financial returns (Mitullah, 2004). These strong links made the cities susceptible to the effects of global recession and economic reforms under the structural adjustment programs in the past two decades. As living expenses increased, so did urban poverty, unemployment, and informality. Structural adjustment
deepened the spread of poverty and decreased levels in the provision of public services and basic amenities, as the city governments removed themselves from the responsibility of providing public services, leaving behind weak institutions (List, 2014).

While capital cities were to solidify liberation from political and socio-economic oppression, globalization led to the weakening of national and local public institutions and their sense of responsibility to ordinary citizens. Privatization of public services enabled external private institutions to wield economic power. The drive for profit in public sphere meant that private investments were only secured in profitable services while ill performing services were abandoned to the detriment of citizens’ welfare (UN-Habitat, 2003). Urban residents were left to grapple with the high costs of living as well as limited access to or absence of basic amenities and services. Consequently, constricting much of the population to slums. For instance, the number of informal settlements within the Nairobi divisional boundaries is said to have risen from 50 in 1971 to 134 by 1995 with the population in these settlements increasing from 167,000 to 1.8 million inhabitants (UN-Habitat, 2003; Kundu, 2016).

By the late 1990s and 2000, the challenges of urbanization vividly expressed in the socio-economic landscape began to take a toll on political leadership. The political structure of Senegal and Kenya were not exempted from the ills of centralization, as they were over-reliant on central government and weak local administration. It was becoming clearer that urban city economic growth could no longer keep up with population growth as well as the increasing demand for public infrastructure (Owuor, & Mbatia, 2008). Additionally, Dakar and Nairobi, like many other African cities, had come to be associated with crime and unrest, turning the urban landscape into what Kruijt & Koonings (2009) describe as a theatre of low intensity warfare. The apparent failure of the state to upscale urban life resulted in a legitimacy crisis that expresses a leadership challenge. This was largely because city governments remained essentially detached from the daily realities of local populations—a lack of mutuality. This was such that the extent of urban squalor was so precarious that by the new millennium, improving the livelihood of slum dwellers became a prominent feature in the MDGs (target 11 of MDG – 7), while the events of 9/11 drew global policy attention to the emergence of small cities, which had become a dominant feature of Africa’s development trajectory.

By year 2000, the Dakar Urban Masterplan 2025 (PDU Dakar 2025) was developed by the Senegalese government in response to these difficulties, but it was not adopted until 2009. Its goals included the establishment of seven new growth centers and rebalancing the regional space with other metropolitan centers. The plan also promised the implementation of flagship project such as the expansion of the Blaise Diagne Airport, the Dakar-Diamniadio Motorway Extension, the VDN Extension, the development of the Diamniadio Urban Center, the development of the Special Economic Zone (SEZ), and the building of the new Sendou Port. Yet, these plans were not sufficiently based on local reality, particularly given the rising risk of disasters like flooding. The paucity of technical and material resources, lack of participation by local governments and communities, and absence of ownership by local actors, particularly those who will be involved in
execution, all contributed to the failure of the plan. The corresponding backlash from the ineffectiveness of the PDU Dakar 2025 led to the formulation of a new Masterplan for Urban Development of Dakar and its surrounding horizons by 2035 (PDU Dakar, 2035) which was developed in 2014 and approved in 2016 (Cissé, m2022).

Nairobi on the other hand had developed without a coordinating framework in form of a masterplan until 2014 (Twinokwesiga, 2020). Several local area plans were deployed to support with organizing flagships as the city continued to expand. For instance, the Kenya Local Government Reform Program (KLGRP) introduced a strategy and legal structure designed to devolve and empower local governments. Similarly, the Local Authorities Transfer Fund (LATF) was established in 1999/2000 through an Act of Parliament to empower local authorities with the means to provide citizens with essential services. The purpose of the LATF was to provide local governments with the tools required to enhance and expand service delivery, pay off municipal debts, and enhance local revenue mobilization, accountability, and financial management. Additionally, the Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan (LASDAP), a participatory planning and budgeting method for identifying local priority requirements in the local authorities, was adopted by the government in 2001 as part of the same reform framework (Owuor & Mbatia, 2008).

Despite the numerous regulations, plans, and strategies in place, Nairobi's urban services could not keep up with the demand as the city's population increased. To get services like sanitation, water supply, garbage collection, and security in their neighborhoods, city residents developed coping mechanisms by resorting to self-help and community-based initiatives. Consequently, participation and partnerships of various kinds emerged, giving rise to new types of urban administration (Owuor & Mbatia, 2008). The Nairobi City Council started promoting public-private partnerships for managing cities and offering citizens urban services. Unfortunately, due to corruption and inertia, many of these initiatives could not be scaled up or replicated (Twinokwesiga, 2020). Nevertheless, just like Dakar, Nairobi eventually came up with the 2014-2030 Nairobi integrated Urban Development Masterplan (2014-2030 NIUPLAN) which also received formal consent in 2018 (Wasonga, 2020).

**Mutuality and the Vision for an Urban Agenda**

Dakar and Nairobi set out to create new urban Masterplans by 2014 as a foundation for revising existing masterplans and implementing an integrated and participatory approach to city development while receiving technical assistance from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (Twinokwesiga, 2020; Cissé; 2022). While masterplans provide a framework for articulating and measuring practical outcomes of urban development, the tendency is that they define urban governance as a tame problem, which implies that the provision of basic amenities and social infrastructure and planning legislation are simple and straightforward processes. However, in a society where rapid urbanization is occurring, characterized by economic decline,
lack of trust and limited economic resources, a tame definition to an urban governance approach might be a narrow interpretation which undermines the social policy and economic dynamics involved. This is true not only because there is a lack of data but also because measuring urban realities is complicated by people's lived realities, as well as their hopes and aspirations.

Fundamentally, what is lacking occasionally is the role of ordinary citizens in cities that will be impacted by the manifestations that will occur from integrating localized versions of the global goals and agendas. Data, measurement, global urban agendas, and urban policy have dominated much of the discussions, relegating the ideas, hopes, and aspirations of ordinary citizens to the sidelines. Therefore, it follows that the ideas that shape the urban vision in cities are not representative of the aspirations of ordinary citizens. Thus, regardless of how articulate masterplans may seem, they frequently lack legitimacy because of the absence of a mutually shared vision between the ideas outlined in masterplans and the aspirations of urban citizens.

In this regard, examining the gamut of urban governance and city transformation in Dakar and Nairobi requires interrogating the extent of mutuality between the PDU 2035, the 2014-2030 NIUPLAN and the aspirations of ordinary citizens in these two cities by asking the following questions: Whose ideas shaped these policy documents? Through what process were they formalized? To what extent does it articulate the hopes and aspirations of ordinary citizens? What was their role in the implementation of flagship projects? And how effective have these Masterplans been in improving basic services to citizens?

The PDU Dakar 2035 and the 2014-2030 NIUPLAN were developed with assistance from the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA). In order to create a document based on an integrated strategy and participatory process through public empowerment and consultations, the process of generating these plans aimed to examine prior masterplans and reports (Cap, 2020; Cissé, 2022). The vision of the PDU Dakar 2035 for instance, sought to transform Dakar into a “City of Hospitality”, which had a welcoming ambience, comfortable dwelling conditions, simple communication, which was innovative, inclusive, sustainable, competitive, and supportive of creativity. It emphasized improving the city’s spatial development strategies, sectoral improvement plans, and a strategic appraisal of the environmental conditions, the Daga-Kholpa PUD, the pre-viability of flagship projects and the administration of urban planning. To avoid previous inefficiencies like non-compliance with land use plans, non-implementation of projects, exclusion of important stakeholders, and the provision of legal tools to support implementation, the PDU Dakar 2035 framework sought to strengthen local ownership of the Masterplan, improve the supporting tools for implementation, and strengthen its recognition by state bodies and local governments (Cissé, 2022).

Similarly, the 2014-2030 NIUPLAN sought to address several planning problems facing Nairobi city. These include inadequate urban infrastructure, urban sprawl, uncontrolled urban development, informal settlements, and overconcentration of development in the central business district (Kitur, 2019). Therefore, the redevelopment of the CBD and sub-centers, expansion of road
networks and public transportation, enhancement of urban management, and environmental improvement through storm water and sewerage, solid waste, and air pollution control, were its top priorities for urban development. It also highlights important initiatives like the Eastlands urban renewal program, the Dandora sub-center renovation, and the Railway City Development (Cap, 2020).

Despite these grand aspirations, an analysis of these plans indicates several challenges from its conception to implementation. Primarily, the vision which shapes its priorities were typically expressed through a top-down approach. This, in part, was because the plans were products of assisted donor funding as the question of infrastructural readiness and the pressure to attract international capital was at the core of urban transformation. This is notably the case for Dakar and Nairobi whose city governments were struggling with limited budgets and limited access to financing, despite the desire to project their cities as a premium destination for foreign investment. Emerging evidence suggests that while some stakeholders in the town planning departments of Dakar confirmed their participation in the preparation of the PDU 2035, the quality of this participation was fraught with challenges (Cissé, 2022). In the case of Nairobi, the 2014-2030 NIUPLAN marked the beginning of meaningful interactions between city officials and residents (and even children), because citizen participation in urban governance and planning was relatively new in Kenya's urban sphere (Kitur, 2019; Cap, 2020). Yet, city bylaws and urban regulations continue to take a very selective and repressive stance against low-income and disadvantaged citizens, which Otieno (2020) describes as urban invisibles.5

At the local level of participation, the process is said to have been hampered by the attitude of some stakeholders when invited to forums. In Nairobi, the experience has been that some stakeholders wanted to be paid to participate (Kitur, 2019), while in the case of Dakar the shortcoming with the participation of local governments was partly due to the lack of technical resources dedicated to town planning. Consequently, there was very little interest from local governments, which reflects the low level of mobilization in the process of stakeholder engagement. Local stakeholders such as craftsmen, traders and even youth organizations were said to have little knowledge and appreciation of the urban plans and thought of it as a reserved domain which indicates that its elaboration is not inclusive and does not articulate their hopes and aspirations - a deeper reflection of which already constitutes the lack of mutuality.

Flagship Projects, Basic Services and Citizens Aspiration

After a 5-year review of the New Urban Agenda, the UNDP reported that cities have increasingly become epicenters of crises, insecurity, and violence, fueling displacement and forced-migration (Xu, Tuts, 2021). Housing remains largely unaffordable both in the developing and developed world. With about 1.6 billion people lacking adequate shelter, one billion people are only able to

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5 These includes Demographic Invisibles, Digital Invisibles, Mobility Invisibles and Media Invisibles.
find shelter in informal settlements and slum dwellings that have little or no access to basic services. The review further suggests that these forms of exclusion disproportionately affect youth, older persons, and migrants especially women precipitating the feminization of urban poverty as female-headed households in informal settlements and slum dwellings continues to rise. Furthermore, as cities are responsible for some 70% of carbon dioxide emissions the implication for climate change, food security, sustainability and inclusion are far reaching (Xu, Tuts, 2021).

**The Diamniadio Urban Center - Dakar**

The development of the Diamniadio urban center, is a replica of the construction of new cities that has become a common feature in African cities such as the Eko Atlantic city in Lagos and the city of Kilamba in Luanda. Diamniadio, which is being developed on a site with around 2,000 hectares of land about 30 kilometers from the Dakar central business district, is an attempt to separate governmental structures from commercial and industrial operations. The new town is situated in a significant groundwater resource area that is home to 3 lakes and 4 dams, highlighting the significance of the site's agricultural vocation, which could have been consolidated by an agroecology zone especially for the people of Déni Malick Guèye (a village located in the local authority of Diamniadio) who have for a long time derived most of their livelihoods from horticulture, particularly the production of okra and sorrel (Cissé, 2022). With the Diamniadio Urban Center being built on the proposed home extensions and the farming lands, this industry, which is primarily exploited by women, is now in danger of extinction. Residents have from the on-set complained of a lack of communication with government officials and the insufficient compensation for informal ownership of lands taken over for the new city, even though 80% of the 700-hectare area had already been allocated to operators (Sala, 2018; Cissé, 2022).

For individuals in favor of the project, it will provide a significant opportunity to create income and jobs as well as the solution to many of Dakar's development challenges. For the government, the new city will help to relieve congestion in the nation's capital and promote economic growth. Diamniadio, which has a $2 billion price tag, is being financed through a public-private partnership, allowing private business owners to compete for lucrative projects while lending money to the government. There are worries that China's pledge to invest 60 billion CFA (approximately $105 million) in the second industrial phase of Diamniadio may lead to a debt-trap and jeopardize the nation's precarious finances for years to come. According to data from the World Bank, Senegal's external debt was 62% of its GDP at the end of 2017, while its public debt was close to 61%. The nation's first toll road's rate of 2500 CFA (about $4.50) is regarded as exorbitant, and the recently inaugurated fast railway that connects Dakar to Diamniadio, which cost more than $900 million to rehabilitate, was overshadowed by demonstrations due to problems with compensation (Sala, 2018).

More structural issues have already persisted without being fixed. Water shortages have continued to fester, even as students regularly take to the streets to protest delays in their monthly scholarship stipends. Professors at universities are allegedly owed their pay for many months. Many worry
that the Diamniadio metropolitan area would lead to the emergence of an affluent enclave that will be out of reach for most Senegalese. As urban poverty increases, commentators claim that the so-called affordable housing will be too expensive for ordinary citizens and that the goal of creating a city for the middle class—which only makes up 3% of the population—contradicts their aspirations. In essence, for the average Senegalese worker with a monthly wage of $144, affording a home in the Diamniadio metropolitan hub with futuristic skyscrapers remains a distant prospect (Sala, 2018).

**The Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) - Nairobi**

Kenya began building a new high-speed standard gauge railway (SGR) in 2014 for the transportation of people and goods. This SGR currently connects Nairobi, the nation's capital, with Mombasa, a coastal city in Kenya. The Kenyan SGR is a component of a larger regional rail network that will link South Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, and Rwanda. Each of these countries is expected to develop the part of the railway line falling within its borders. Kenya has since taken the lead since it operationalized the SGR before any other country in the area. This new passenger and freight railway, which cost US$3.8 billion and funded in part by a bilateral loan from the Exim Bank of China is arguably the largest infrastructure undertaking in Kenya's history since independence. The Standard Gauge Railway, along with other significant initiatives like the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (Lapsset) Corridor, is essential to Kenya's current national development strategy, "Vision 2030." The program presents these large-scale initiatives as essential to luring the type of private sector interest required to support economic growth, boost exports, and reduce poverty (Lesutis, 2021; Dahir, 2022)

According to Chinese authorities, the building of the Standard Gauge Railway has improved Kenya's economy by 1.5% and provided 46,000 jobs for locals (Lesutis, 2021). While the railway project makes positive social and political claims about urban transformation, it has been shaped by evictions and the loss of land and livelihoods. Large landowners who got considerable financial compensation from the land acquisition, many of whom were able to reinvest, are expected to reap most of the benefits. Due to this, smallholders and informal settlers who lack legal land titles have been forcibly removed without receiving any compensation (Lesutis, 2021). As expected, the railway has come under fire from litigation, criminal investigations into allegations of corruption, and animosity from environmentalists (Nyumba et al., 2021) and trucking industry workers who have been forced to find new jobs. The second phase of the railway, which connects the Port of Mombasa to the nation's interior, has abruptly come to an end in Naivasha, a town 120 kilometers northwest of Nairobi, due to a reversal in funding from China’s Exim bank in 2019 (Dahir, 2022).

Accordingly, the railway project is understood to be the highpoint of the borrowing and looting spree that has plagued Kenya, as large-scale infrastructure projects appear to be financially unviable, primarily benefiting the wealthy. The tendency has also been that such flagship projects divert investments away from the provision of basic services such as clean water, public transportation, healthcare, and other necessities that are essential to the city. Yet, as of the first quarter of 2022, the country's debt profile had almost quadrupled, reaching $73.5 billion.
Fundamentally, the colonial legacy of inequality has persisted, leaving less than 0.1% (8,300 persons) of the population owning more than the bottom 99.9% (more than 44 million people), making social movements and citizen protests a common feature in Nairobi (Lesutis, 2021; Dahir, 2022).

**Access to Water**

Based on data from Afrobarometer, more than half of the continent’s population lacks access to clean water. According to these data generated from over 48,000 face-to-face interviews conducted in 34 African countries between 2019 and 2021, the region's water situation is deepening (Armah-Attoh, 2022). According to the data, one in seven people do not have any access to sanitation facilities. The results show that in 18 countries, especially in Senegal, more individuals reported having trouble accessing water. In Senegal, this number jumped from 51% in 2011–2013 to 66% in 2019–2021, while in Kenya water scarcity increased from 45% to 50% within the same period (Walker & Logan, 2016; Armah-Attoh, 2022).

Faye (2021) suggests that this would continue to increase with growing urbanization and resource pollution, indicating that water scarcity in major cities like Dakar and Nairobi is a wicked problem. This is on top of already-existing problems with ineffective water management, degrading continuous water sources, outdated and crumbling water infrastructure, as well as corruption. In addition, the water crisis in Senegal and Kenya has been made worse by factors including climate change (repeated, severe droughts and floods), contaminated drinking water, and a lack of investment in water resources. The structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) that resulted in the privatization and commercialization of water have also been linked by some academics to the water issue. Water privatization, corruption, and water cartels have all contributed to persistent water deficits, especially in Nairobi slum areas where local governments have continued to show apathy (Gachihi, 2022).

**Access to Transportation**

Despite considerable developments in the road infrastructure, Dakar and Nairobi still have a lot of room for improvement in their public transportation systems. Dakar and Nairobi have one of the highest percentages of people who use walking as their primary mode of transportation. According to available data, walking makes up 70% of all means of transportation in Dakar (Cissé, 2022), while a 2013 poll revealed that more than 40% of trips are taken on foot in Nairobi (Kamau and Manga, 2020). While motorized transportation accounts for 30% of trips in Dakar, with public transportation accounting for 80% of those, available data indicate that pedestrians are primarily faced with inconveniences resulting from crowded pavements (63%), a lack of street lighting (63%), poorly constructed pavements (58%), flooding (58%), the presence of litter (56%), and risk of accidents (51%) (Cissé, 2022).
About 40% of Nairobi inhabitants use public transportation, which is often referred to as paratransit, much of it being unregulated and privately owned. These paratransit systems are frequently left out of city and town planning, including the most recent designs for Nairobi’s Bus Rapid Transit (BRT). In discussions on BRT, high-capacity vehicles are frequently proposed as a replacement for paratransit on important city routes (Kamau and Manga, 2020). Although the public transportation sector has recorded some progress in recent years, there are still several obstacles standing in the way of Nairobi's achievement of a socially just public transportation system. Some of the issues, are related to the absence of level-boarding facilities and seats for passengers with special needs, insecurity at bus stations and drop-off locations, a lack of visible demarcation at pedestrian crossings and intersection points within busy roads, and indiscipline among public transportation staff, especially in the way conductors and drivers interact with women. Much of what is often missing in urban transport analysis is how cities remain unfriendly to women at various levels, which enhances their exposure to sexual and physical assault. This menace is particularly evident in public transportation networks, which are regulated by patriarchal power structures (Kamau and Manga, 2020).

**Key Findings**

*Inequality in Dakar and Nairobi is rooted in Colonial Legacies*

The nature of the inequality that exists in Dakar and Nairobi was established by colonial regimes. This system of exclusion has perpetuated itself through neoliberal urban policies and worsened due to growing urbanization, corruption, and inertia on the part of city administrators. Colonial administrators had used the bubonic plague of 1914 as an excuse to exclude native African from the administrative and financial districts and establish suburbs like Medina in Dakar and Kibera in Nairobi. This eventually set the benchmark for what would lead to huge unplanned settlements characterized by unfettered structures and the near absence of basic services. Many of these settlements have continued to be underrepresented in urban governance conversations with the noticeable absence of sanitary infrastructure and services, such as drainage and conservancy. Settlements such as Medina and Kibera have remained impoverished and have continued to experience incessant demolishing to make way for new construction as exclusion and discrimination persisted even after independence.

After independence, inheriting the governance structures and infrastructure that were already in place, as well as the difficulties; the gradual incorporation of African economies into global economic system; and structural adjustment precipitated the deepening of urban poverty and worsened the provision of public services and basic amenities. The city governments removed themselves from the responsibility of providing public services, leaving behind weak institutions. The result of this is the alarming spatial and social inequalities that have endured since colonialism, leading to a never-ending class and cultural conflicts that raises critical leadership questions about the mutuality in these cities.
The Process of Articulating the Masterplans was hardly Inclusive

The development of city masterplans in Dakar and Nairobi tended to define urban governance as a tame problem. The problem with this narrow definition is that it downplays the social policy and economic dynamics involved. Consequently, the role of ordinary citizens as well as their hopes, aspirations and contribution to city transformation was either considered an afterthought or was undermined. It therefore follows that the ideas that shape the urban vision in cities are not representative of the aspirations of ordinary citizens. Thus, regardless of how articulate these Masterplans seemed, they frequently lack legitimacy because of the absence of a mutually shared vision between the ideas outlined in Masterplans and the aspirations of urban citizens. Despite the grand strategies articulated in the Masterplans, the ideas that shaped its priorities were typically expressed through a top-down approach. This, in part, was because the plans were products of assisted donor funding as the question of infrastructural readiness and the pressure to attract international capital. Moreso, city governments in Dakar and Nairobi continue to struggle with limited budgets and limited access to financing, despite the desire to project their cities as a premium destination for foreign investment.

Elite Cliques and Cartels dominate City Making in Dakar and Nairobi

It is problematic to presume that inviting local stakeholders and citizens to meetings in the manner of a participatory approach will distribute power among a variety of interests. In practical terms, the lessons from Dakar and Nairobi indicates that rather than being open, transparent, and responsible, urban governance approaches have been frequently controlled by a small group of actors including elite groups, political cliques, social organizations, private sector actors and technical–bureaucratic agents. While the manifestation of this situation differs in both cities, in terms of context and practice, they have become marked by developments and urban situations that are unequal. Despite reports of expanding public investment agenda focusing on economic infrastructure, the underpinning reality is the prioritization of high-profile flagship initiatives over and above the routine operations of the city in the attempt to attract investors. Thus, questioning the Masterplans as being representative of citizens aspirations. Rather, they symbolize policy and institutional commitments that articulate a transformation agenda which expresses the desire for international recognition and reputation building to be called a world class city (Pieterse, 2017).

As the evidence suggests, the creation of the Diamniadio urban center and the construction of the standard gauge railway (SGR) clearly illustrate a lack of mutuality between the citizens aspirations and the vision that guides urban planning. These flagships are happening at the expense of the wellbeing of poor and vulnerable urban dwellers who are forced to live side by side with flagship projects that have swallowed up their livelihood. The implementation of these flagship projects lacks local ownership and raises important questions about the sustainability of the projects and
the city at large. This is because the redevelopment project appears to disintegrate social fabric in ways that suggest that urban transformation in these cities potentially erode collective aspirations and shifts cities to lifeless pursuits of individual survival.

**Achieving Equity in the Provision of Basic Services in Dakar and Nairobi Remains a Distant Prospect**

To further emphasize the lack of mutuality between citizens’ aspirations and the vision guiding city transformation, an analysis of access to basic service profile in Dakar and Nairobi brings to the fore significant urban governance gaps. The findings from this study indicate inefficiency across water and transport indicators which suggests that access to these public services is wanting. The evidence also suggests that this situation would be further complicated with growing urbanization, corruption, and the hijacking of service provision by cartels particularly in slum areas where local governments have continued to show apathy.

As have been established, large scale flagship projects such as bus rapid transit, rail transport networks, new roads, and bridges to connect communities, affordable housing schemes, ultramodern markets, oceanfront leisure parks and the construction of new cities continue to be a favored tool for economic growth and city transformation by city governments. Urban governance therefore has been underlined by a narrow self or group interest approach to leadership for more than two decades. Rarely were there mutually held goals between city leaders and the populations that they govern. The argument has largely been that these projects play a catalytic role in urban transformation often by creating high profile and high-end retail, residential, entertainment and tourist spaces in what were once derelict or underused urban spaces. They are often tied into aggressive city re-branding or marketing campaigns which seek to launch a new urban vision.

**The Pathways**

From the foregoing, the development of city masterplans and the support for flagship projects by city governments and developers appear to be in stark contrast with the aspiration of citizens. While city governments claim that city agendas, masterplans and flagships will contribute to overall economic growth, the forms in which urban governance is applied diverts scarce resources from basic services that are fundamental to living long and living well in cities. Hence, rather than mitigating socioeconomic polarization, urban governance continues to reproduce, contribute to, and perpetuate colonial spatial divisions within these cities, despite critical assessments from academic and policy circles.

Consequently, a new understanding of leadership may provide a useful entry point for developing shared core principles and systems that can strengthen urban governance approaches in these cities and elsewhere. In this regard, this suggests the need for cross-correction through a leadership approach to undo the colonial legacies of inequality that continue to threaten the sustainability in
these cities. Even if there was a shared understanding that leadership is essential to city development, the likelihood of success is greatly influenced by the type of leadership approach deployed. The perspective from which leadership is applied is particularly crucial if it is to make a positive change in the setting in which concerns of inequality and urban squalor will be addressed. This is the basis upon which a process-based approach to leadership becomes vital (Olonisakin, 2015). Process-based leadership, much like urban governance, is relational and held together by mutuality. Process-based leadership is characterized by the sense of common purpose that connects those whose goals for a just and sustainable city are intertwined. Urban contexts in Africa display significant leadership dynamics when examined from a leadership perspective, which operate as both a driving and sustaining force for urban transformation. This may include:

1. **Harness and articulate the aspirations of ordinary citizens within the vision that guides city transformation:** In this regard, strengthening the leadership capacity of local government departments and legal frameworks to support citizens’ rights to the city will play a significantly larger role in this process. On the one hand, it will ensure that citizens’ hope and aspirations are carefully harnessed, processed and articulated in ways that help citizens feel that they belong to the city and that the city belongs to them. This may also involve mapping, identifying, and reaching out to marginalized groups and removing obstacles that undermine social inclusion.

2. **Utilize capacities and resources of citizens to galvanize local ownership:** Urban planning processes should intentionally seek to utilize local capacities and expertise to articulate realistic plans that reflect the aspirations of ordinary citizens and not just the ideas of the elite. Urban governance should enable community participation in implementation of flagship projects to ensure local ownership and legitimacy. Engaging participatory tools such as surveys, workshops, focus group discussions, social media, public forums, and radio might be useful for reaching out, identification, engagement, and implementation.

3. **Expand masterplans and investment strategies to also prioritize basic services and citizens livelihoods:** Masterplans and investment strategies should be expanded to incorporate and prioritize citizens’ livelihoods and this must be included as a key performance indicator. This will help to strengthen trust and confidence in urban institutions. Therefore, city leaders and planners need to be aware of approaches that place people at the center of city making and ensure that this is facilitated by legal frameworks. Such approaches will ensure that city transformation agendas embrace inclusivity and the diverse interests of the citizenry as well as those considered to be ‘invisible’ i.e., those excluded from the city not just physically, but in spaces of participation and planning (Otieno, 2020).

4. **Build trust through monitoring and evaluation mechanisms:** While it is important to establish monitoring and evaluation (M and E) mechanisms in the implementation of Masterplans, the process must be deliberate enough to accompany citizens and key stakeholders in appreciating progress made and challenges encountered. Amongst other things, establishing M&E mechanisms that are participatory creates opportunities for building trust and legitimacy. In situations where budgets and expenditure need to be
reviewed or in situations where adjustments are made to initial plans, accompanying citizens and stakeholders can prove to be effective. More importantly, in situations where challenges are encountered in the process of implementation, such ‘M and E’ mechanisms provide the opportunity to further harness the ideas and expertise of citizens and stakeholders, which will further strengthen the ownership of city agendas and flagship projects.

Conclusion
Utilizing process-based leadership framework, this article explored how urban governance and city transformation is occurring in Dakar and Nairobi and traces the origins of the inequality that exists in Dakar and Nairobi to the colonial legacies of exclusion. The article evaluated the urban vision articulated in 2014 and narrows in on the PDU Dakar 2035 and the 2014-2030 NIUPLAN to establish how urban governance approaches have continued to contribute to and perpetuate spatial division within these cities.

In determining the value of urban governance approaches in both cities, the article identified two flagship projects (the Diamniadio urban center in Dakar and the Nairobi’s high-speed standard gauge railway) and access to clean water and transportation in these cities to demonstrate the lack of mutuality between the citizens aspirations and the vision that guides urban planning. The article found that the process of articulating the masterplans was hardly inclusive as city making in Dakar and Nairobi appears to be dominated by elite cliques and cartels. Thus, questioning the representativeness of these masterplans to citizens’ aspirations. Rather, they symbolize policy and institutional commitments that articulate a transformation agenda, which expresses the desire for international recognition and reputation building to be called a world-class city at the expense of citizens’ livelihoods and wellbeing. Furthermore, the study indicated that achieving equity in the provision of basic services in Dakar and Nairobi remains a distant prospect. The findings showed inefficiency across water and transport indicators, which suggests that access to these public services, is wanting.

Given the inadequacies of existing approaches to urban governance to translate into city transformation that is sustainable and inclusive, leadership becomes an even more crucial factor in the process of negotiating a mutually shared vision of the city that also articulates the hopes and aspirations of ordinary citizens. The article therefore suggested that harnessing the aspirations and capacities of ordinary citizens in ways that allow it shape city transformation may be a useful entry point in enabling mutually shared goals if inclusion and sustainability are desired. This study also proposed that prioritizing citizens livelihoods and basic services as part of the broader agenda to portray the city as a global center will lay a good foundation for building trust and legitimacy if supported by monitoring and evaluation mechanisms that accompany citizens and key stakeholders in appreciating progress made and challenges encountered.
Be that as it may, an analysis of the urban governance approaches in Dakar and Nairobi elicits a reflection on three important leadership questions as we contemplate what city transformation means to ordinary citizens. First, how can the actions of global policy actors and instruments such as SDG 11 and the New Urban Agenda be utilized to enable mutuality between city leaders and their people in ways that facilitate the common pursuit of a collective future? Second, how can the drive to attract city investors be redeployed toward a common vision of city transformation for leaders and the whole of society? Third, like Olonisakin (2015) reasons, how can the behavior of Africa's governing elite be altered to shift away from self-serving objectives and move towards a path of mutuality with the people they govern?

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Understanding Devolution from the Perspective of Ethnic Conflict Management: Study of Tana River County, Kenya

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Abstract

The article focused on the historical ethnic conflict in Tana River County in Kenya, pitting the agriculturalist Pokomo versus pastoralist Orma over natural resources. This study made use of the theory of conflict research. This theory approaches conflict management by defining the underlying issues that are core in a particular conflict situation, and identifies parties’ interests and structures that accord opportunity for conflict. It proposes how actors in a conflict recognize and accommodate each other in a situation of scarce resources. This study deployed a qualitative approach in order to enable the researcher to obtain in-depth information from purposively selected respondents who are key in providing the necessary information to enrich the study. Hence, individuals involved with the implementation of devolution were instrumental in the study. The findings indicate there are a number of factors that perpetuate ethnic conflicts. These included land use and ownership, religious and lifestyle differences, structural alienation, politics and negative ethnicity, inadequate engagement of local authorities through public engagement and deployment of administrative and government resources. Finally, this study contributes to the pool of knowledge in relation to decentralization and ethnic conflict management, by providing solutions to solve perennial ethnic conflicts.

Keywords: Decentralization, Devolution, Kenya, Land, Socio-economic and ethnic conflict management
Introduction
Devolution as a function of decentralization refers to the delegation of powers from the central government of a sovereign state to sub-national level units, at regional or local level. According to Prachi (2018), decentralization refers to the assignment of authority together with the responsibility at each tier of the institution. As Murugu (2014) observes, the worldwide adoption of the concept of decentralization was supposed to be the answer to the “discretionary use of power by central elites as well as a way to enhance the efficiency of social services provision by allowing a closer link between public policies and the desires, needs and aspirations of people at the grassroots”.

According to Mumbua (2018), data from the International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP) states that, about 80% of all developing countries have adopted the devolution or decentralized system. This was necessary because, the system was “a means of engendering political participation and social inclusion which would lead to stability”. This claim supports the argument that most conflicts, especially in the developing world are because of poor governance. Accordingly, Murugu (2014) argues, decentralization has increasingly become the fundamentally preferred democratic principle of the world, and African states have progressively been embracing decentralization.

Conflicts in the Tana Delta have existed since the 19th Century, over cultural, religious, economical, and political divisions. However, players have thus changed over time, with the intensity increasing during the dry spells, when pastoralists from other regions flood the area in search of water and pasture, thereby increasing pressure over the overstretched available resources (Kirchner, 2013).

Equally, tension always escalates to conflicts whenever government/foreign investors intend to initiate large-scale agricultural programs, which are beneficial to agriculturalist Pokomo, but rather disadvantageous to pastoralist Orma, who depend on the wetland for their livelihood. Again, as Kirchner puts it, conflicts in the Tana Delta have connection to the national policies, political systems, including elections. For instance, in the 1990s, politicians used banditry tactics to destroy/steal voter cards of their competitor to win elections. A weak land policy is also a
factor that exacerbates conflict in the delta region. For example, the conflicts of 2001 and 2012, just before the elections, stemmed from government plans to adjudicate the land, an issue favoring the Pokomo and vehemently opposed to the Orma, was instigated by some politicians (Kirchner, 2013).

In that regard, this article focuses on this very problem of conflicts between the Orma and Pokomo neighbors, who have lived side-by-side for many years with intermittent peace. The problem of ethnic conflict has persisted in this area for decades. This land use and ethnic conflict has not been resolved even after the introduction of devolution, which demands an enquiry on the underlying structural causes of the conflict and mechanisms for its management.

The expectation of devolved governance is to bring services of government closer to the people, build cohesion among the different ethnic groups in the localities and ensure equitable allocation/distribution of resources, hence, effectively ensuring and fostering stability. As described by D’Arcy (2018), devolution is supposed to strengthen institutional democracy and effect the separation of powers through election of governors as county chiefs. However, this has not been the case; instead, it had an adverse effect on the politics of identity, cemented ethnic identification, consequently marginalizing minorities in the communities. This led to an increase of new possibilities for conflict at both the county and national levels.

Furthermore, D’Arcy (2018) claims that, devolution is facing the problem of ethnic politics, corruption, and lack of resources, similar to those at the national level. This creates an environment of competition of winner-takes-all politics. Thus, the ethnic majority in a devolved segment turns the policy and administrative affairs to exclude the minority to access the resources. This exclusion breeds discontentment, tension and eventually conflict or even violence.

Indeed, the concentration of power at the sub-national level has resulted in political competition and incentives for violence (Cohen and Schelnberger, 2018). Hence, there is need for further research to understand the linkage between decentralization and the violence at the devolved units.
Theoretical Focus: Decentralization

Scott and Rao (2011) observe that, decentralization is the transfer of power from the central government to the lower echelons of government, together with the obligation to manage various government functions, raise revenue and allocate resources. That decentralization happens at three levels. First is the *administrative decentralization*, which refers to the transfer of authority, responsibility and resources to field offices and agencies, with limited local citizen involvement, while retaining overall authority. Second, is the *fiscal decentralization*, which denotes the transfer of funds or powers of revenue raising to local lower units of governance from the central authority on a negotiated agreement. This is done to enable the lower-level government to have enough resources to facilitate it to discharge its obligations. Thirdly, there is *political decentralization*, also known as democratic decentralization. It refers to the conveyance of power from the center to the local units duly elected by the citizenry, and therefore possesses some limited self-government. Such local units become answerable to the citizens who voted them. The units thus come into being through constitutional, legal, or regulatory framework to ensure accountability and transparency. In their view, political decentralization may result in devolution, which symbolizes the transfer of responsibilities, resources, revenue creation and decision-making powers to the local authorities that have local autonomy, which are legitimate, fully elected, and independent.

However, according to Borja (2010), decentralization and participation should be complementary mechanisms that reinforce each other for better management and deepening of democracy. While Kerre (2010) argues that decentralization processes, (which he attributes to the democratization of power, services, and resources) had been there in the East African context since the onset of colonization era, since 1884, but switched to the centralized formation in the 1960s. Countries in the region, such as Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda, have undergone the transitional process of multi-party systems of governance, and are increasingly now undertaking wide-ranging programs of local government reforms, aimed at enhancing decentralization and local democracy and institutionalizing citizen participation in local governance and expanding local government capacity.
Erk (2014) posits that, the 1990s were marked by democratic reforms throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, which went on well with the Decentralization Reforms, either creating or strengthening sub-national levels of government. He, however, registers some worries that after more than two decades down the line, following the implementation of decentralization, there is nothing to show as a success story south of the Sahara. Thus, there is a glaring gap between the institutional or constitutional blueprints introducing the reforms and the reality on the ground.

Nevertheless, Vasquez (2011) contends that, decentralization allows the sub-national authorities to develop key public sector actors due to their growing roles and increased expectations placed on them. He continues to argue that it is important to know about the impact devolution has had on a number of economic areas such as in growth and development. However, it is equally imperative to ask whether the decentralization trend is actually assisting or hurting these sectors.

Kalin (2014) argues that local citizens perceive the national government as being far, physically/geographically and generally in terms of distance. In addition, the government is farther psychologically when it fails to provide quality services with consistency, to improve living standards of majority of the population. For instance, geographical distance from central authority makes it unable to appreciate the needs of the local population through lack of information. Hence, the demands of the locals are disconnected from the activities of the central government. This implies that decentralization was imposed on them, by agencies that developed ideologies within the context of the interest of central government. Thus, there is need for decentralization, for greater efficiency and accountability, to promote and protect rights of minority groups, enhancement and protection of liberty and democracy of citizens at the local levels.

According to Elfversson (2019), decentralization is meant to mitigate effects of winner-takes-all political struggles over central power (especially in contexts marked by communal conflicts), through the aspect of local political power sharing. The intention is to diffuse contest by rival political groups over access to power, promote inclusivity and allay fears of repression and marginalization. Consequently, building trust and commitment to peace by groups while also addressing their security concerns. This paper looks at two counties in the Rift Valley (Nakuru
and Uasin Gishu), adversely affected by communal conflict (2007-08) following the elections of 2007. The article also looks at the impact of local power sharing. In Nakuru County, local elites from the dominant ethnic groups (Kikuyu and Kalenjin) were able to negotiate an arrangement for sharing of elective positions, thus lowering ethno-political tensions, and enabling enduring harmony. In the case of Uasin Gishu County, the situation remains tense. However, the emergence, effects, and scope of those power-sharing deals by the elites, influenced the politics at the national level. This seems to create a temporary situation and instead accentuate future conflicts since the root cause of the problem has not been solved.

On the other hand, Boex and Yilmaz (2010) observe that, the intended benefits of public sector decentralization continue to be elusive despite international community efforts. This makes sceptics assert that, the weak institutional capacities of local governments are responsible for the poor implementation of the policy. Further-more, technical, institutional, and political obstacles are stalling appropriate implementation of the decentralization policy and local governance restructuring, hence, the need to device a framework on how to attain a well-performing local public sector/decentralized system of local unit authorities, especially in the context of developing economies. To address this, they proposed a three-pronged analytical approach to decentralization, to address challenges of how to measure the implementation, design, and effectiveness of the decentralization process. To this end, this paper proposes a comparative decentralization assessment framework in place, which should include the political, administrative, and fiscal structures of the implementation process. That this assessment tool should be thorough because it has to consider the different technical scopes of decentralization namely: institutional, political economy and intergovernmental relations of the local public sector they seek to assess.

Cabral (2011) argues that decentralization successes depend on the policy design and context, especially the need to take into account the political incentives and interests of the ruling clique and elites. In addition to their connection with local power bases and electorates. However, there are arguments that African decentralization is not deep, but merely widespread, and has consisted mainly of administrative functions rather than true devolution of powers, largely driven by the interests of politics. There is also an assertion that the impact of decentralization on
service delivery is limited, as revealed by the indicators on intermediate variables like information access, accountability relations, locus of power and administrative performance. Nevertheless, it is important to note that decentralization has strengthened alliances with local elites, fostering central power rather than pro-poor policies, and determined to challenge emerging forces from below. This means that lack of proper and systematic analysis of decentralization suggests that decentralization is yet to deliver on expected results. That as it is, reveals that there is hardly any evidence signifying improved service delivery / poverty reduction indicators because of decentralized governance.

Indeed, Kerre (2010) observes that, the dismal performance of devolution is analysed in a number of ways. Firstly, the decentralized units do not boast political and economic strength enough to keep-off the central entity. Thus, there is a possibility of relapsing back to the centre (recentralization), reversing the intentions of the reforms. Secondly, rampant inherent deficiencies in infrastructure and personnel, taken over from the central government could in future be a problem. Kerre adds that, decentralization has created new conflicts between ethnic groups competing for the control of the new sub-national entities. As manifested through the failures, and variations of the intentions of decentralization, and the reality on the ground.

Furthermore, Bosire (2013) argues that Devolution is the transfer of powers from the centre to existing or new units, with an ascertained degree of permanence through constitutional entrenchment or framework legislation. The devolved units therefore exercise powers, which are normally in the form of political, administrative, and financial aspects, with a reasonable degree of autonomy from the centre.

Vasquez (2011) has posited that the advent of devolution started several decades ago, terming it like a revolution in many countries worldwide, with the devolving of fiscal and political powers to the sub-national units. This trend would be influential for good governance and improving the lives of ordinary citizens. He equates it to a major institutional transformation as the decolonization of Africa and Asia, or transition from planned to market economies by the Soviet Union and China. However, Steeves (2015) contends that, most ethnically or regionally divided developing countries, will likely shift away from the unitary centralized arrangement to
decentralized or devolved system of government (Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands in 1975 and 1978 respectively). In the case of Kenya, there was a reversion to devolved government after a 2010 referendum and creation of a new center of political and administrative power in the form of 47 counties; touted by the World Bank as the “most rapid and ambitious devolution process” (World Bank, 2015). However, this development is faced with challenges of funding from the central government as well as powerful political constituencies affiliated to the center, still reluctant to relinquish power and tools from central control over to local authorities. Nevertheless, despite creating an array of political struggles and realities for the political class in Kenya, devolution is set to thrive and continue owing to the power vested in the governors and the counties since they are critical development actors.

Jackson (2020) tries to demonstrate the successes of devolution in the context of a crisis (COVID-19), as a better option than centralized arrangement, citing its introduction in Scotland, Wales and re-introduction in Northern Ireland, as transformational in governance of the United Kingdom (UK). He tries to prove the power of devolution in attenuating inherent tensions, especially on the nationalistic tendencies of Scotland and Wales, which posed a threat to the unity of the Kingdom. Thus, the need to grant greater democratic autonomy to Scotland and Wales.

In addition, Kubai (2015) observes that, devolution in Kenya has brought a lot of hope to the people through the new governing system of county units that target to address the local socio-economic challenges. He sought to understand these expectations by looking at the County of Meru to see what makes devolution work. He thus looked at aspects of availability of resources; relevance of the existing systems, legislation; and staff training. The first feature is about enhanced power on decision-making, adequate authority, and having local control over resources. This is to guarantee effective implementation of the concept for spurring socio-economic development and restoring equity in society. For instance, sharing of the national revenue equally at 3.5% (of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) for each county will assist in developing the marginalized areas, (Kubai, 2015). However, there is need for a sound financial management system at the local level to avert manipulation by local politicians. In addition to enactment of appropriate legislation to legitimize the various functions, training of
personnel to enhance their capabilities is imperative. In addition, capacity building of staff be
given preference to handle devolution issues. On funding, which still poses a problem of
disbursement from the central authority, the devolved unit should increase its tax base or venture
into partnership with external investors. The writer also states that, the local unit should pass
legislation to promote resource mobilization and revenue collection to boost its income, and
hence, gain the ability to execute its mandate of serving its citizens.

On the other hand, for Jacinto (2013), the devolutionary reforms in Tana Delta ignited long-
standing historical grievances over land and resources. That the administration’s questionable
large-scale land deal concessions for rice, sugarcane, and bio-fuels projects with national and
multinational companies, to take over land, which was used for farming and grazing, only served
to raise tensions to crescendo levels. Again, she continues, the shifting political power amongst
the communities also fuelled the conflict as losing the elective seats meant losing everything,
including land. Thus, politicians used this to instigate trouble to gain political advantage,
culminating into the deadly attacks and counter attacks of December 21st, 2012, between ethnic
Pokomos and Ormas, claiming over 140 lives. The above attacks occurred because of politics,
economics, old ethnic scores and new alliances and awakening brought about by the devolved
system.

Finally, Kerre (2010) has argued that the dismal performance of devolution happens because of a
number of ways. Firstly, the decentralized units do not boast political and economic strength
enough to keep-off the central entity. Thus, most have the tendency of relapsing back to the
centre (recentralization), reversing the intentions of the reforms. Secondly, rampant inherent
deficiencies in infrastructure and personnel taken over from the central government could be the
problem. Kerre goes on to state that, decentralization has created new conflicts between ethnic
groups competing for the control of the new sub-national entities. Kerre argues that these failures
and variations manifest that decentralization/devolution on the ground.
Ethnic Conflict Management

Ethnic conflict, in its multi-dimensional nature, as reflected by Williams (2015), remains a contested phenomenon and continues to be part of the contemporary armed conflicts across the globe. Williams contends that, scholars have debated on the causes of ethnic conflicts but settled on three major theoretical approaches: Primordialism, Instrumentalism and Constructivism. In Primordialism, ethnic identity is natural, fixed and irreconcilable, which defines an objective entity termed as ethnic group. In that regard, ethnic differences are ancestrally entrenched, occasioning the inevitable emergence of ethnic conflict because of ancient hatreds between ethnic groups for fear of domination, expulsion, and extinction by the other group.

For the Instrumentalist, according to Williams (2015), ethnicity is not an inherent aspect, but a coalition of sorts targeting amassing a large share of scarce resources – political and economic power. Thus, parties mobilize along ethnic lines to build up the necessary muscle to target the available opportunities. Hence, ethnic conflicts take place over scarce resources whenever rational agents drive political and economic ambitions and gains. On the other side, Constructivists, see ethnic identity as a social construct, created through a number of ways including conquest, colonization or immigration. Ethnic groups are social constructions with histories and origins that are recognizable, through their expansion or contraction, division, or amalgamation. Thus, ruling elites, colonial and post-colonial, have been using the historical construct to build and maintain exclusive identities for political and social control, creating hostilities between ethnic groups, causing polarization of ethnic identities, thereby creating a favourable climate for violence.

However, according to Nasong’o (2015), the ethnic diversity of African states artificially created by the colonial masters has seen the spread of political conflicts across the continent defined in ethnic terms. Ethnic political mobilization has been the key factor responsible for the resultant spectre of ethnic strife arguing that one of the major reasons for ethnic mobilization is ethnic identity. Referring to Primordialism, ethnic identity breeds political assertiveness and militancy in society, fuelled by social and economic factors that result in discontentment. This discontentment is augmented by the process of modernization in respect of increased social
interaction or competition between ethnic groups, occasioned by rapid social growth that elevates awareness of cultural differences; hence, exacerbating conflict.

Pickmeier (2011) observes that, conflict in the society can result from competition over resources like water, pasture and especially land, in terms of ownership and use, and manifested chiefly along ethnic lines. That the issue of land acquisition is a historical matter for the Pokomo and Orma inhabitants of the Tana Delta. Each ethnic group stake ownership and claim of right by virtue of being the first to settle there. Their different lifestyles and the fact that each group sees land use and ownership in different angles. The Orma view it as being available for use communally - for grazing their herds, whereas the Pokomo understand it as a private entity belonging to individuals - for farming. Thus, during the dry seasons, pressure on grazing areas and watering points increases. This leaves the only recourse to access the River Tana and adjacent areas for water and pasture. Unfortunately, the Pokomo, who occupy the arable land close to the water, fail to leave corridors for the pastoralists to drive their herds through for watering, leading to crop destruction along the way. Ultimately, conflicts take place, escalating from the individual, group to community level.

On the other hand, clannism, according to Karienye and Warfa (2020), has been identified as one of the major factors driving violent conflicts in the North Eastern part of Kenya. However, there is limited understanding of the causes that lead to these violent conflicts. To understand the realities on the ground, the scholars sought to identify the drivers of intra and inter-clan-based conflicts in the context of Wajir County, in Kenya. Nevertheless, the key drivers of clan conflicts comprised political influence (struggle for power and dominance over other clans); unclear constituency boundaries (between those from colonial masters and the ones by Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission - IEBC); unequal sharing of the county resources and competition over natural resources – water and pasture, a perennial problem. Clannism occurs because of violent extremism and its dominance has even undermined devolution, whose major responsibility was to address decades of marginalization and underdevelopment.

Aapengnuo (2010) argue that ethnicity is not the classical driving force of conflicts in Africa, rather the lever upon which political leaders bank on to mobilize their groups for power,
resources and wealth. This argument emphasises that it is time to refocus our attention on the real drivers (political triggers) of conflict. As such, recommends a systematic civic education that will enable dispersal of the potency of ethnicity for political ends. This is supported by the point that, most ethnic groups in Africa co-existed peacefully, coupled with intermarriages and economic partnerships but the ethnic card played during the struggles for political power, destroyed that culture. Aapengnuo (2010) further cites a similar case for the Rwandan Genocide of 1994, where it was used as a means to eliminate political opponents (both Tutsi and moderate Hutu) for political power and resources, (Aapengnuo, 2010).

Adding their voice in the ethnicity-conflict debate, (Esteban et al., 2012) confirm that, indeed ethnicity is a factor contributing to conflict. They further affirm there are two diverse measures of ethnic division that jointly influence conflict -polarization and fractionalization. Consequently, polarization occurs when winning group enjoys what they refer to as ‘public’ prize, or possession of political power. Whereas fractionalization denotes what they term as ‘private’ prize, or looted resources, infrastructures: the result hence being conflict. They conclude that, instrumental factors are more likely to be influence ethnic conflicts, rather than driven by primordial hatreds, (Esteban et al., 2012).

In view of Ottaway and el Sadany (2012), ethnicity is the biggest problem or major source of conflict. They cite South Sudan as a good example where war broke out in 2013, barely two years after a referendum (in 2011), for a unified South Sudanese State, independent from the North. The issues were the unattended deep, cold, and frozen relations among different ethnicities in the South.

On their reading of conflict management, Khun and Pool (2021), describe it in two ways: as either being distributive or integrative. For them, distributive is a model focusing on a fixed number of positive outcomes; whereas for integrative, the idea is to integrate the needs of both feuding parties to ensure a result with a favourable outcome for all parties involved. Nazar and Shahdanejad (2011) argue that the greatest threat to contemporary peace is in the intransigent ethnic conflicts manifested in identities embedded in cultural practices. That the culture and identity thus form the core of ethnic conflicts. They therefore suggest successful management of
conflicts through consideration and emphasis on the opportunities and constraints offered by cultural and political dynamics. For instance, they propose management of conflicts through undertaking structural changes in the constitution, as well as establishing other alternative initiatives, like the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as was the case for South Africa. The South African government abolished the homelands and created nine provinces out of the previous four during apartheid era, in order to ensure more distribution of resources to sub-national entities, to help de-escalate the conflicts.

In the understanding of Baas (2013), power-sharing model could directly articulate ethnic conflict management. Especially in areas getting back to normalcy or are in transition after conflict. She argues that the model is instrumental in promoting governmental stability and democracy in deeply divided societies. That the model is advantageous as it accords safeguards to plural representation in divided societies; to mean the inclusion of all distinctive population groups in the community. She therefore suggests adoption of a model to facilitate application of Consociationalism as given by a 1969 political science scholar, Arend Lijphert, which has four mechanisms of grand coalitions, mutual veto, proportionality, and segmental autonomy, as a means to achieve the intended objective.

Similarly, Kinnander (2011) tries to look at conflict management approaches in the context of project process, an essential aspect for project managers. He cites time, cost and quality as critical values of a project and therefore, effective and professional management of conflict is key to ensure positive effects of these values. For him, approaches to conflict are an individual attribute, but those conflicts where emotions play a key role are the ones most likely to have negative impact. Hence, conflict prevention methods like feedback are necessary. This approach allows members an opportunity to know their behaviours and themselves. Ultimately, settles on two aspects of conflict management: prevention of conflicts and management of functional conflicts.

From the above literature, there is a strong link between devolution and management of ethnic conflict. The structures that give effect of devolution demonstrate a strong link in addressing
grievances that emerge at the community level in a more holistic way. The next section looks into the findings from the Tana River County, where the study looked into the Orma and Pokomo ethnic conflict.

**Methodology**
The study investigated the role played by devolved local governments in the management of ethnic conflicts in Tana River County, Kenya. It sought to identify and understand the root-causes of ethnic conflicts in Tana Delta. The investigations sought to determine the role of devolved local government units in the management of ethnic conflict.

The study used both primary and secondary data to make its findings. The primary data were collected through scheduled interviews and self-administered questionnaires. The secondary data obtained from reports prepared by the Government of Kenya institutions and the Civil Society Organisations. The research identified its target population through purposing sampling where respondents picked based on their position they held in society and level of knowledge possessed regarding the ethnic conflict in the Tana Delta.

**Findings and Observations**
The study observed that the devolved structures of governance in Tana River County have contributed to bridging the gaps in governance and development in the society. In the study survey, the research established that, the County Government of Tana River authorities in conjunction with the Central Government initiated numerous activities to manage conflict between the Pokomo and the Orma.

The study found out that, support was extended to local chiefs and sub-chiefs in assembling elders and collecting grievances arising from the Pokomo and Orma communities as they seek to address the same conflicts at the grassroots level. The chiefs and sub-chiefs are involved in mediating the grievances if they are administrative in nature. If the chiefs and sub-chiefs determine that the grievances are touching the county government system, the local authorities engaged the office of the Members of the County Assembly or Ward Administrator. However, there was evidence that the process yielded some effectiveness through that co-operation. Both
county administration and the central government addressed public meetings held. This reflected positive state society relations. This mitigating conflicts or impending threats to peace or after a security lapse had occurred.

It is important to mention that realized shared or joint public meetings by the central government administrators and the devolved county officials are key to sensitising and creating awareness between the Pokomo and Orma on security threats and responses through formal or traditional means. In addition, this showed that, the devolved government had sought to increase the opportunities for education and business to all residents of Tana River County. The county government has expanded the schools’ infrastructure by constructing more schools and increasing the number of classrooms or learning facilities. Education opportunities could gradually bridge the perceived gap in empowerment between the Pokomo and Orma but resented by both the Orma people and their elected leaders.

However, addressing Pokomo-Orma perennial disputes over the use of land and environmental resources in the Tana River County, the County Government of Tana River enacted the County Grazing Land Bill in 2016. The bill seeks to ensure that matters related to natural resources’ control and use be harmonized through by Assembly membership. The elected members to the County Assembly are able to identify and generate a regulatory law, to ensure fairness in land use. Ultimately, this mitigates conflicts. County Assembly leadership therefore has provided leadership in land adjudication, and fair distribution to the members of the society. Nevertheless, the County Grazing Land Bill shall mitigate competition over land and establish proper structures on land ownership, minimizing community ambiguity on land ownership.

**Conclusion**

The ethnic conflict between the Orma and Pokomo originates from historical confrontations over settlement areas. However, the land ownership question, social and cultural differences, structural exclusion in both social and economic activities, and political leadership contributed to the ethnic conflicts. In addition, Tana River County Government is keen to eliminate the sources of the conflict in the Tana Delta through public participation and deployment of administrative
and government resources to sensitize residents on the peaceful means of addressing grievances arising in the society. This means there is political will. It is important to note that the County Government of Tana River is co-operating with the Central Government to mitigate the historical distortion on social and economic development of the communities to promote equity. This reflects how the state meets its obligations. It is important to mention that Orma and Pokomo conflict is both ethnic and socio-economic in nature, embedded in structures that perpetuate grievances, and the poor governance of the resources in the environment. Hence, the contribution of the state is paramount in the whole process of devolution.

The conflict in the Tana Delta is the evolution of a natural resource economy, which is an obstacle in resolving the conflict. The devolved government of Tana River County should increase its regulatory framework to control and exploit the land, pasture, and water in the county without conflict between the Orma and the Pokomo. In addition, the county government of Tana River should co-operate with the central government in enforcing the security measures in the Tana River County. The Tana River County is sharing its boundary with the Republic of Somalia. The instability in Somalia has contributed to an influx of small arms that escalate the hostilities between the Orma and the Pokomo. There is a need to derail the rampant acquisition of small arms in the communities that easily engage in confrontations, whenever differences arise. The central government should increase the surveillance of the Somali - Kenyan border to curtail movement of the small arms into Tana River County.

The conflict in Tana River County would realize peace if both the devolved government and the community leadership constantly sensitize the Orma and Pokomo on peace and security issues. The Orma and Pokomo, once they are able to interpret the long-term benefits of peace, they will be able to fairly share and exploit the environmental resources in the County. The natural resources would gradually be a means to development instead of being a source of conflict. The Orma and Pokomo should seek to exploit the environmental resources and acquire sufficient household incomes for social and economic empowerment in a peaceful environment.
Finally, the Orma and Pokomo conflict, if not addressed successfully, may become a protracted problem in Tana River County. This would inhibit social and economic development. The Tana River County government should seek to initiate partnerships with non-governmental organizations; if possible, the private sector should be involved to accelerate the social and economic development programs that shall translate to inter-community cohesion. The Non-governmental organizations and private sector being non-state agencies would play a neutral role and bring the Orma and Pokomo communities to closer harmony. Both the non-governmental organizations and private sector have a reputation to initiate community projects, which can cut across the ethnic divide to enhance positive collaboration versus negative competition. The projects initiated by non-governmental organizations, and private sector could complement the county and central governments in rebuilding the infrastructure and social institutions for the welfare of the society.
References


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